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Securing MANETs Against Gray and Black Hole Attacks Using QKD-AES Verification
Abstract
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) remain susceptible to insider routing anomalies, particularly Gray Hole and Black Hole attacks, where compromised intermediate nodes partially or completely discard data packets while appearing cooperative during route discovery. Existing countermeasures predominantly depend on static symmetric keys or classical public-key infrastructure (PKI), leaving them exposed to long-term key degradation, post-quantum cryptanalytic threats, and Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) key manipulation. To address these vulnerabilities, this paper introduces an enhanced Sequence-Connection Oriented Verification Scheme integrated with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Galois/Counter Mode authenticated encryption (AES-GCM). By leveraging free-space or optical wireless channels, the proposed architecture replaces traditional static keys with an unconditionally secure quantum key pool. Dynamic session keys, generated via cryptographic Key Derivation Functions (KDF), encrypt and authenticate control probes—specifically Verification Packets (VP) and Response Packets (RP)—ensuring rigorous payload confidentiality and tamperproof message integrity. Both theoretical proofs and discrete-event MATLAB simulations demonstrate that the framework achieves a 100% detection rate for selective packet-dropping behavior with zero false positives under key-conserving sampling intervals, while delivering information-theoretic security resilient against post-quantum adversarial models.
Article information
Journal
British Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies
Volume (Issue)
4 (3)
Pages
37-47
Published
Copyright
Copyright (c) 2026 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Open access

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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