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Terrorism Risk Assessment to Children: A Study in Poso

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ABSTRACT

The long history of conflict in Poso, Indonesia, causes the trauma of people living in the area, including children. This study aims to examine the risks and needs of children raised amongst terrorist organizations in Poso. 33 children whose parents were involved in terrorist groups were assessed in this study and analyzed using quantitative and qualitative methods. The findings show that the average risk is 1.35, which is at low risk. Moreover, they need to be addressed to prevent them from joining terrorist groups. The findings could help educational and counterterrorism practitioners to plan an intervention for children raised within the terrorism movement in Poso.

1. Introduction

A long history of conflict in Poso, Indonesia, causes human rights issues and trauma of people living in the area, including children (Ali, 2016; Arianti, 2018; Efendi, Matompo, & Purnawai, 2019; Thahir, Ihsan, & Hamka, 2018; Tressa, 2018). A study by Tol, Reis, Susanty and de Jong (2010) comprehensively describes children's suffering in Poso; they include poverty (due to the destruction of houses, belongings, and plantation gardens for farming), trauma, and fears even somatic problems.

The trauma of children in Poso involves fears related to previous violent incidents. The fear reactions include fears stimulated by burning bamboo (that sounds like gunshots), thunder, people hunting, falling coconuts, crowds, fireworks, visitors, screaming or running people. The fears could be formed as somatic sensations: trembling, sweating, fever, headache, a pale face, a drop in body temperature, dizziness, and a feeling of urging to run away/hug parents. Several somatic problems in children of Poso reported are physical weakness, diarrhoea, susceptibility to illnesses/low immunity, and vomiting (Tol, Reis, Susanty, & de Jong, 2010).

Poso children's fears and trauma strongly lessened when the security situation enhanced after the Malino Reconciliation (Tol, Reis, Susanty, & de Jong, 2010). However, there are still socially/morally unacceptable or inappropriate behaviours reported, such as early sexual behaviour and relations (e.g., with porn movies), school refusal, stealing, disobedience towards parents and elders, use of drugs, cigarette smoking, and the use of violent language. Government and religious schools play an important role in educating children of Poso to reach morally correct behaviours (Tol, Reis, Susanty, & de Jong, 2010). Against this background, this paper is aimed to examine the risks and needs of children whose parents and relatives are involved in terrorist groups in Poso. This study includes 33 children as participants and applies both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The study may help educators and counterterrorism practitioners in planning an intervention for children raised amongst the terrorism movement in Poso.

1.1 The Development of Conflict in Poso

The communal conflict in Poso occurs in several phases. Aragon (2001) explains that the first phase began in 1998 after Soeharto Regime between Muslims and Christians, and the second and third phases recurred in 2000, followed by the fourth phase happened in August 2001. Cinu (2016) then adds that the fifth phase occurred in December 2001. Aragon (2001) describes the horrifying catastrophe of the conflict, which include neighbourhood attacks, masked murders, hundreds of people injured and killed, burned corpses, hundreds of destroyed houses, destroyed schools and places of worships, and thousands of people fled their homes, left Poso as a dead (empty) city.

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The hostility between several Christian and Muslim groups in Poso happened due to several factors such as the shift of state and military policies, regency-level political turbulence, legal depravity, weak journalism, provocation by some religious leaders on both sides, and multiple reciprocal revenge which were justified in ambiguously holy scripts/verses (Aragon, 2001). In other words, the Poso case is complicated as religion interacted with economic and political structure in a damaging way correlated with Indonesia's broader national and international challenges. Nonetheless, Christians and Muslims living only a half day's drive away from the conflict spots in Poso manage to remain friendly and communicative even though they cannot deny that they feel worried.

Dysfunctional postcolonial circumstances in Indonesia led to ethnoreligious violence in numerous places in the country (Tambiah, 1996). The history of shoreline Muslim kingdoms and Christian missionization of the inner/highland also contribute to the conflicts (Aragon, 2001). Moreover, Aragon (2001) explains that Indonesia's political reformation in 1998 led the country to focus on the state's interaction with the grassroots. At the same time, there were unfinished issues related to clashes between Indonesia's indigenous/homeland communities and the migrant/diaspora communities coming from another island (Java). The 1997 Asian monetary recession combined with political turbulence, corruption, and nepotism brought Indonesia into a crisis where riots and ethnic or religious attacks happened in several places, including Poso (Barker, 1998; Hefner, 2000; Ryter, 1998; Siegel, 1998; Sharma, 2001). Further, after the political reformation, decentralization or regional autonomy led to local competitions and communal mobilization in several areas. For example, the Poso election struggles eventually were centred around religious (Christian vs Muslim) rather than ethnic (Pamona versus Bugis and Javanese) factions/issues (Aragon, 2001; van Klinken, 2001; Vel, 2001).

Suspected manipulation by political provocateurs at the national or international level added to the severeness of the situation in Poso (Aragon, 2001). There was abundant evidence to prove paid henchmen spreading hoax/rumours or committing criminal acts to enflame communal fear and revenge, while the central government could not generate effective strategic plans to handle the detrimental condition (van Klinken, 2001). The country's national military and police were experiencing major crises and restructuring during this period (Aragon, 2001). Additionally, Poso had no local mass media (e.g., newspapers, television stations) to clarify the situation so that almost all news was reported by outer journalists who were unwilling or unable to enter the spots of conflicts. This resulted in minimal or one-sided journalism (Aragon, 2001; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2001; Reen, Alloway, Murphy, & Thayrun, 2000).

Poso is an old coastal seaport that relates sea trade through riverine routes/roads to the agrarian valleys and fearsome mountain ranges that cover inner Sulawesi Island. The people of Poso had their own indigenous religion prior to visiting the external world (Aragon, 2000; Schrauwers, 2000). Later, Muslim traders settled near coastal sides prior to the Dutch colonialization (before the late 1800s) and married indigenous/coastal people; thus, they adopted Islam, whereas Dutch Protestant missionization targeted small interior populations or highlanders who lived by farming, so they adopted Christianity. The Protestant missionization intensified after 1905 under the Ethical policy (Noorduyn, 1991).

The indigenous belief system of Central Sulawesi highlanders was attached to their ancestors' practice (Aragon, 2000). The highland populations conventionally defined their identity by their place of origin (Aragon, 2001). Therefore, the division of identity: insider versus outsider or ethnic disputes over land is deeply rooted. Nonetheless, precolonial hatred and violence did not always follow 'highland vs lowland divisions' prior to Dutch interference. Since the colonial period or the international invasion, the relatively small number of highland communities became increasingly aware of their minority status on Sulawesi Island in comparison to more numerous lowlanders (in the same island) and Javanese (in the whole nation) (Aragon, 2001). The Protestantism introduced by European missionaries then initiated to unite highland settlements into bigger coalitions through church affiliations and connect them to powerful groups beyond the borders of their inherited farms and nearby rainforests (Adriani & Kruyt, 1950; Coté, 1996; Schrauwers, 2000).

Kruyt (1950), under the Netherlands Mission Society (Nederlands Zendeling Genootschap), opened the earliest and largest mission in Central Sulawesi, which the headquarters was established in Tentena to convert the animists existing around Poso Lake. In contrast, in Palu, a half-day away from Poso, Protestant missionaries arrived several decades later when the colonial government provided religious jurisdiction over the area to the Salvation Army based in England. The two European Protestant missions implemented different methods in approaching local communities. The Salvation Army adopted the Malay (Indonesian) language, while the European missionaries used regional languages and focused on the Christianization of very localized ancestral customs (Kruyt, 1950; Henley, 1996; Schrauwers, 2000).
In both areas of Central Sulawesi, Palu and Poso, the Dutch administration recruited the newly missionized highlanders as colonial supporting staffs/aides who would act communally as a Protestant shield against the perceived threat of Islam based at the coasts. The Dutch announced rules and regulations to disrupt the interchange and cooperation

between the highland and the lowland people, military support, and "royal" marriages between coastal Muslim kingdoms and highland people. Dutch administration also limited the population movements to avoid contact between the two communities (Aragon, 1996; Aragon, 2000; Bigalke, 1981). Protestant missions built several schools and clinics for the new highland converts to isolate them from the Muslim coastal populations and gave them privileges or distinctive government treatment (Aragon, 2001). They also gave educated Protestant converts (from the highlands) local bureaucratic positions, including jobs as teachers for new schools in remote areas. When the Japanese invaded Sulawesi during World War II, most highlanders were more closely allied (socioeconomically) to the Protestant missions and the Dutch colonial regime than to coastal Muslims and independence movements (Aragon, 2001).

1.2 Terrorism Movement in Poso

After the Indonesian Independence Day in 1945, each of two communities in Sulawesi (Christians and Muslims) developed its extremism movement. Sulawesi highlanders had to choose between the Muslim-majority peninsula of southwestern Sulawesi and the Protestant-majority peninsula of northern Sulawesi. They described the confusion of being in between the two violent extremisms: Permesta or Protestant rebellion (in North Sulawesi) and the Kahar Muzakkar or Darul Islam rebellion (in South Sulawesi) (Aragon, 2001; Bigalke, 1981; Harvey, 1977). Muzakkar's aim with the Darul Islam movement in 1953 was to establish the Islamic Republic in Sulawesi and to oppose the "feudalism" in the new country, animism (ancestral forms of worship), and Dutch influences such as Protestantism (Acciaioli, 1989; Bigalke, 1981; Gibson, 2000; Harvey, 1974; Kahin & Kahin, 1995). There were reciprocal attacks between the two groups, with hundreds of villagers were tortured, murdered, or forced to leave their towns. The army ultimately resolved the Permesta rebellion in 1961, while government forces finally shot Muzakkar in 1965 (Aragon, 2001).

The succeeding Suharto regime was when highlanders and most Indonesians complied with new rules and regulations over their egocentrism/individual and collective rights to achieve greater stability and wealth. Indonesians were required to uphold one of the authorized religions: Islam (87% of the Indonesian population in the 1980s), Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, or Buddhism. Moreover, the Protestant domination of civil service positions under the Dutch in Sulawesi Island was slowly changed by the national Muslim majority (see Aragon, 2001; Kipp, 1993). Nevertheless, Indonesian Muslim groups often considered their organizations being repressed by the early Suharto regime since Benny Murdani, Catholic intelligence personnel and military commander, played a major role in security and defence. Learning from the Muzakkar case, the early Suharto regime anticipated any kind of Islamist extremism by supporting Muslim rituals and charitable activities yet banning its political movement (Aragon, 2001). This policy then shifted dramatically with the creation of new institutions such as the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI), in which Muslim intellectuals patronized modernist Muslims to be socioeconomic development agents. Further, they made an implicit distinction between these Muslims and Chinese due to several factors, such as the Chinese were seen as not blending with society, not being involved/invested in the independence movement, upper classes, and non-Muslims (Hefner, 1993; Permono, 2020; 2021; Siegel, 1986).

In 1978, Muslims demanded the close monitoring and controlling of Protestant mission funds, including many Central Sulawesi clinics and schools operated by Protestant churches (Aragon, 2000; Kim, 1998). The Suharto regime increasingly assigned modernist Muslims in high-ranked military positions, supported Islamic banks, strengthened Islamic studies in the school curriculum, and subsidized more Islamic schools and buildings. The later Suharto regime's policy was seen by observers as favouring Islam (Bowen, 1993; Brenner, 1996; Hefner, 1993, 2000).

Modification of policy by the Suharto regime could not please everyone. The policy made people aware of the past economic and political discrimination towards Muslims and the present/future discrimination towards Christians (Aragon, 2001). In Central Sulawesi, Muslim and Protestant organizations competed to present themselves as eligible or favoured so they could receive economic development funds. The competition attracted attention and resentment with the construction of more flashy churches and mosques, buildings which would be targeted symbols of unmerited wealth and hostility during the communal conflicts in Poso (Aragon, 2001).

In 1998, Suharto resigned as president of Indonesia. The fall of his regime gave opportunities to many groups, including fundamentalist, separatist, and even religious-motivated terrorist groups, to reveal their existences (Canu & Canu, 2020). Each group metamorphosed in different ways. One of the violent extremist groups is Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) which is known nowadays as the most brutal hard-liner terrorist group in Poso. MIT was metamorphosed from the "Laskar Jihad" movement against Christians (Muthohirin, 2015). The group supported the caliphate, hence pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) (Arianti & Azman, 2019; Arianti & Singh, 2015; IPAC, 2020). The group consisted of former Muslim combatants and victims' families of Christians in the Poso conflict (Canu & Canu, 2020). Although the former vice president Mr. Jusuf Kalla initiated reconciliation in Poso (called 'Malino Reconciliation'), the resentment in the region remains due to the

'unhealed pain and suffering' of the people/victims from both groups (Muslims and Christians) (Canu & Canu, 2020). Reconciliation is also seen as not representing Muslim's combatant groups as it invited those who were not directly involved in physical battles in Poso (McRae & Haripin, 2016).

A well-known figure of MIT is Santoso a.k.a Abu Wardah Santoso Asy Syarqy Al Indunisy. As the former leader of MIT, he declared a war against national law enforcement, which he considered as discriminating (Sahrasad & Chaidar, 2016; Canu & Canu, 2020). He also pledged allegiance to ISIS, which means he and his affiliations were connected to a global terrorism network (Sahrasad & Chaidar, 2016; Mbai, 2014; Muthohirin, 2015). As Javanese diaspora living in Poso, Santoso was one of the victims of the massacre in Walisongo traditional Muslim school (*pesantren*) (Sahrasad & Chaidar, 2016; Canu & Canu, 2020). His family were murdered in the school at night by Christian groups during conflict (Canu & Canu, 2020). For him, Malino reconciliation is an 'easy way-out' for enemies who intend to escape from responsibilities or atonement for murders (Canu & Canu, 2020).

In terms of Ideology, MIT adopted Tauhid wal Jihad, an ideology generated in Iraq by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2001 (Canu & Canu, 2020). Other observers even argue that MIT adopted the Ideology of Al-Qaeda as they tried to establish an Islamic caliphate (Sahrasad & Chaidar, 2016; Mbai, 2014). Furthermore, the existence of MIT has brought a division among Muslims in Poso: pro-MIT vs pro-government. The division, as well as the never-ending police-and-military operations in Poso, has brought tension and unhealthy psychological issues to the Muslim community in Poso, such as fear, anxiety, and confusion, including to children of schools/pesantrens in Poso (Canu & Canu, 2020; Cinu, 2016).

1.3 Religious Extremism in Poso

There are two elements of radicalism in Poso that MIT delivers: a) it is transnational, that is referring to Ideology brought by Muslims in the Middle East, b) it targets/recruited the youths and children in schools, colleges, and mosques in Poso (Canu & Canu, 2020). Radicalism is propagated in meetings, social media platforms, and political campaigns. On the one hand, MIT becomes a symbol of several Muslim groups to fight against any perceived injustice towards Muslims in Poso. On the other hand, MIT causes stigma towards Muslims in Poso, that Poso is the epicentre of terrorism in Indonesia (Efendi, Matompo, & Purnawai, 2019). Therefore, the government is careful in applying policy in Poso, such as by not limiting Muslims' religious practice in Poso (Canu & Canu, 2020).

In terms of the use of scriptural teachings to justify the violence, religious groups in Poso see their acts of violence as a defence against abuses and Christianization (Aragon, 2001). For example, several Muslims witnessed their Protestant neighbours suddenly burn their houses and pick their cacao trees. They then heard about the direct involvement of church leaders in the violence and became believing that Christian mercenaries (one of the names was Tibo) had been paid a large amount of money for every Muslim they slaughtered (Aragon, 2001). Moreover, Muslim leaders asserted that local Protestants and the Western/foreign missionaries were very aggressive in seeking converts from the Muslim population (i.e., using force and terror manoeuvres where necessary) (Hadi, 2000; Warn & Hikam, 2000). Many Muslims also spoke about national and international ambition to eradicate Muslims from Poso soil (Hadi, 2000; Haryono & Pambudi, 2000; Waru & Hikam, 2000). While at the protestants' side, they witnessed several Muslim groups burning their houses and cars and mutilating those who were perceived as enemies. These Muslim groups' revenge was considered as too harsh that the regional chair of the Council of Indonesian Muslim Leaders in Poso, H. S. Saggaf Aljufri, stated that Islam allows a defence for every attack received, but Poso Muslims had done three or four times harder (amplifying the revenge) (Reen et al., 2000).

Several Poso protestants explained about the anti-Muslim retaliation (in Phase Three) in the following theological terms: Poso Protestants had given their cheeks twice (in Phases One and Two), so no more cheeks left to give (Aragon, 2001). Other Protestants even justified the violence towards Muslims by stating that the Old Testament agrees that God would decide that one group or individual deserved victory and blessings, and another (Muslims, in this case) did not (Aragon, 2001). Nonetheless, the Protestants' belief that God decrees victory and defeat somehow offended other Christians or Protestant groups as the argument cannot explain the Muslims' victories in Phases One and Two of Poso conflict, the rest of places in Indonesia, and other Muslim-majority populations in the world (Damanik, 2000). Furthermore, some other Protestants believed that Christian mercenaries such as Tibo could not be real Christian if he committed the violence he was accused of. Some of them even believed that Tibo was a Catholic (Aragon, 2001).

Despite the conflict and religious extremism in Poso, western Central Sulawesi people can manage peace between Protestants and Muslims where both communities are better able to counter provocations (Aragon, 2001). Salvation Army leaders pronounce to Christian leaders in Poso that "People make plans, but it is God who arranges everything", "everything is in God's hands", and "we humans must just pray". The phrases inspire worshipers not to interfere with the conflict other than to pray to God (Aragon, 2001). Even though Salvation Army and its members are criticized by some

observers for presenting themselves as too exclusive, by July 2000, congregations in Palu collected rice donations for Poso refugees without regarding their religious affiliation. They were concerned with their unhelpful image with local Muslims; hence, their leaders temporarily stopped the construction of half-built churches in Palu by stating that it was improper to continue the projects while refugees were suffering. More peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts by Christian and Muslim groups throughout Sulawesi, especially Poso, are needed to maintain chapters of peace and fill the common needs of people (Aragon, 2001).

1.4 Terrorism Risk Assessment

Rosenfeld (2003) states that terrorism is different from any form of violence that criminologists study. LaFree and Dugan (2004) explain several conceptual dissimilarities of terrorism acts from general crimes: 1) terror actions make various crimes, 2) the responsivity to terrorism goes beyond local authorities 3) terrorist offenders seek for extreme exposure, 4) terrorism is used as an instrument for certain political goals, 5) terrorists declare higher goals; thus they are seen by their sympathizers as altruists, 6) terrorists overtime modify their criminal activities.

In Indonesia, Sukabdi (2018, 2021a) distinguishes 18 psychological risk factors of terrorist offenders, which could be applied to religious extremists or militants in terrorist organizations/movements (Table 1). The 18 psychological risk factors are gathered into three domains: *Motivation, Ideology,* and *Capability*. Six risk factors of *Motivation* ('heart') include *economic, situational, justice, actualization, power,* and *social motives*. Six risk factors of *Ideology* ('head') are *targets of missions, values, attitudes, understandings of philosophy and contexts, militancy,* and *layers in ideological groups*. Six risk factors of *Capability* ('hand') include several skills in *mechanics and electrics (M and E), information and communication technology (ICT), military, language, social domination* (e.g., recruiting and financing)*, and intelligence*.

Sukabdi (2020) released an instrument to investigate the 18 offenders' criminogenic risk factors (MIKRA). The instrument is currently used to examine the terrorism risks in extremists/militants, foreign terrorist fighters/offenders, and their families in several terrorist groups (Amelia, Widodo, & Budiarto, 2020; Slamet, 2020). The instrument will be used in this study to identify risk and need assessment of children in Poso to plan an intervention.

Table 1: *18 psychological terrorism risk and need factors in Indonesia*

Risk and Need Factors
1. *Economic Motives*: motives of terrorism associated with economic and biological needs.
2. *Justice Motives*: motives of terrorism associated with the need to search for fairness.
3. *Situational Motives*: motives of terrorism associated with the need for safety and security.
4. *Social Motives*: motives of terrorism associated with the need for social support, sense of belonging, and social identity.
5. *Power Motives*: motives of terrorism associated with a need for political power, including reaching a higher position in the hierarchy within a terrorist organization.
6. *Actualization Motives*: motives of terrorism associated with the need to give impact to others.
7. *Values (Doctrines)*: thoughts, concepts, dogmas, doctrines, and ideas which are favourable to violence and other destructive behaviours.
8. *Violent Ideology-Driven Attitudes*: attitudes toward outside social group driven by thoughts, concepts, dogmas, doctrines and ideas which are favourable to violence and destructive behaviour.
9. *Beliefs about Objectives (Targets of Missions)*: goals, objectives, purposes and targets of life driven by thoughts, concepts, dogmas, doctrines and ideas which are favourable to violence and destructive behaviour.
10. *Layers in Ideological Groups*: roles, status, involvement, grades, layers, levels, positions, tasks, and ranks in ideological groups, driven by thoughts, concepts, dogmas, doctrines, and ideas which are favourable to violence and destructive behaviour.
11. *Terrorism Militancy*: presentations of a belief system that include loyalty, persistence, and commitment to a more dominant figure or to a set of doctrines that are favourable to violence and destructive behaviours.
12. *Understandings on Philosophy and Contexts*: presentations of a belief system that incorporates knowledge and understanding of religious teachings and philosophy and its implementation in many contexts.
13. *Intelligence Skills*: skills to acquire, collect, manage, store, retrieve, combine, compare, distribute, build, and use information, including complex data, to manage or conduct terrorism activity.
14. *Language Skills*: skills of listening, reading, speaking, and writing in multiple languages, used to manage or conduct terrorism activity.

Risk and Need Factors
15. *ICT (Information and Communication Technology) Skills*: skills in using and creating Information and Communication Technology, such as computers, programs, cyberspace, Information Technology (IT) and Dark Web, used to manage or conduct terrorism activity. 16. *Military Skills*: skills in physical fighting, battlefield, warfare, and conflicts, used to manage or conduct terrorism activity. 17. *Social Domination Skills*: skills in influencing others, such as persuading, negotiating, recruiting, mobilizing, directing, manipulating, controlling, financing, and leading people, used to manage or conduct terrorism activity. 18. *Mechanical and Electrical (M and E) Skills*: skills in using and creating technical, mechanical and electrical device(s) for managing or conducting terrorism activity.

Source: Amelia, Widodo, & Budiarto (2020); Slamet (2019); Sukabdi (2018, 2021a)

2. Methods

2.1 Participants

This study assessed 33 children in terrorist networks in Poso whose parents were members of MIT or former terrorist offenders. Their families' involvement in terrorism activities were sympathizers (e.g., supporting the group in social media) and supporters (i.e., helping family members who were terror actors, information hiding, funding). The participants' ages were between 7 and 17 (mean: 11). They came from several different villages where the Poso conflict took place. 17 of these children studied in primary schools (17 from public schools). 10 of them studied in junior high school (7 from public and 3 from traditional Islamic schools called *madrasah*).

The researcher managed to contact several local facilitators coming from these participants' villages to help in observing and assessing the participants. Five local facilitators/field observers from different villages were involved in this study to provide information about the 33 participants, as seen in Table 2. These field observers living in the same villages as the participants had known and observed the participants since they were babies. These field observers had good relations with the participants' parents and families. Furthermore, two psychologists (forensic and child psychologists) and two counterterrorism practitioners as raters were engaged to administer the risk assessment. The four raters discussed the information about the participants (i.e., school reports, police investigation reports/documents, participants' self-reports, and observations in the field by local facilitators/observers) to conduct the risk assessment.

Table 2: *Examples of participants' observers*

Participants	Observers		Raters
	Individuals	Relationship with the participants	
1	A	Neighbour	1. A forensic psychologist 2. A child psychologist 3. Two counterterrorism practitioners
	B	Friend of family	
2	A	Friend of family	
	B	Neighbour	
3	A	Friend of family	
	B	Neighbour	
33	G	Friend of family	
	H	Friend of family	
33	G	Friend of family	
	H	Friend of family	

2.2 Procedure and material

The names of children raised within the terrorism movement in Poso were gathered from the National Anti-Terrorism Agency and the National Police. The information was collected from police investigation documents and field observations at several villages in Poso. The requirement for consent was waived by the university's ethics committee due to the urgency of the research to investigate risk assessment and maintain peace in Indonesian society.

For the purpose to assess the participants, the researcher was invited by the National Anti-Terrorism Agency and the National Police. The participants were invited by the National Anti-Terrorism Agency and the National Police to outbound and picnic events (together with their local facilitators/observers their parents trusted) and with their parent's consent. The local facilitators described

the rundown of the events to the participants' parents, which consisted of assessment such as essays/self-reports and cognitive tests, followed by a picnic, outbound activities, and swimming; thus, the parents prepared the participants' necessities (e.g., swimming suits, spare t-shirts, praying clothes, and mat). Receiving the parents' approval, the local facilitators managed the trip (travelled with the participants by buses) to stay in a hotel close to the outbound arena. The participants stayed for three days in that hotel.

There had been no initial assessment conducted to the participants by any psychologist; hence the researcher in this study managed to collect the participants' school reports, self-reports, and cognitive (Weschler) test with the help of local facilitators. The data collection, assessment, and outbound activities were conducted in May 2020. Furthermore, the instrument applied in this study for assessing forensic risks was *Motivation-Ideology-Capability* Risk Assessment (MIKRA) by Sukabdi (2020, 2021b). MIKRA comprises behaviour checklists examining risk factors under three domains: *Motivation, Ideology,* and *Capability*. MIKRA explains four risk levels: "very high", "high", "medium", "low" risks (Table 3), with behaviour key indicators/codes illustrated in Figure 1. When designing rehabilitation for women/families of terrorist offenders, MIKRA helps nurse participants' progress of programs during the intervention. This goal is to decrease risks (Sukabdi, 2020, 2021).

Table 3: *Scoring system of MIKRA*

Risk Levels	Scores
Very high	5
High	4
Medium	3
Low	2
Zero	1

Source: Sukabdi (2020, 2021b)



Figure 1. Behaviour codes in MIKRA terrorism risk assessment (Sukabdi, 2020, 2021b)

In terms of MIKRA administration, two observers were assigned to describe a participant daily (Table 2). The two observers' descriptions (for each participant) verified one another and combined with the data from school reports, self-reports, and cognitive tests. All information (descriptions from two observers, school reports from teachers, cognitive tests, and self-reports) was given to four raters. The raters discussed each of the 33 participants to assess their risks based on behaviour indicators/keycodes given in the MIKRA risk assessment.

2.3 Analysis

This study implemented qualitative dan quantitative methods of analysis. Qualitative analysis was applied to define the uniqueness of each participant, whereas the quantitative method was to identify their risk scores (the general and each domain's scores). An inter-rater judgment was performed to ensure data collection occurs successfully to assess each participant's situation and risks. In the inter-rater judgement, raters discussed each participant's self-report/essay, cognitive test, police investigation document, and observation checklist by two local facilitators/observers (Table 2), followed by ranking the participant' risks by referring to MIKRA guidelines/behaviour key indicators (Figure 1). The inter-rater judgment produces several scores for each participant: general risk, *Motivation, Ideology* (extremism), *Capability* (e.g., military training, shooting skills), and each risk factor (of 18) scores.

Table 4: *Levels of risk in MIKRA*

Scores	**Levels of risk**
0.00 - 1.00	Zero (Protected)
1.01 - 2.00	Low
2.01 - 3.00	Medium
3.01 - 4.00	High
4.01 - 5.00	Very high

Source: Sukabdi (2020, 2021b)

3. Results

The findings demonstrate that the average terrorism risk score of children raised amongst extremist movements in Poso is 1.35 or within a "low" risk to conduct terrorism. Each participant's scores (of risk factors, domains, and general) are demonstrated in Table 5. In this study, the children raised amongst extremist organizations in Poso are all at low risk and accept the government's aids and programs. Furthermore, Table 6 illustrates the qualitative descriptions of these participants.

Table 5: *Terrorism risks of children within terrorism networks in Poso*

Participants	*Motivation*						*Ideology*						*Capability*						General Risk Scores	General Risk Levels	Percentage of Interrater Agreement
	Economic	*Justice*	*Situational*	*Social*	*Superiority*	*Actualization*	*Doctrines*	*Attitudes*	*Targets of Missions*	*Layers in Group*	*Militancy*	*Philosophy and Contexts*	*Intelligence*	*Language*	*ICT*	*Military*	*Social Domination*	*Mechanical and Electric*			
1	1	2	3	4	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1.72	Low	75
2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	1	2	3	1	1	1	1	1.50	Low	75
3	1	1	1	3	4	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	4	1	1.61	Low	75
4	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1.28	Low	75
5	1	1	1	2	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1.33	Low	75
6	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.11	Low	75
7	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.17	Low	75
8	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1.33	Low	75
9	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.28	Low	75
10	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.17	Low	75
11	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	5	1	3	1	1	1	1.56	Low	75
12	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.22	Low	75
13	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1.28	Low	75
14	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.33	Low	75
15	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1.33	Low	75
16	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	3	1	1.61	Low	75
17	2	1	1	3	1	1	2	3	1	2	1	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1.61	Low	75

18	1	1	1	3	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1.39	Low	75
19	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1.28	Low	75
20	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1.39	Low	75
21	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	1	1.39	Low	75
22	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.28	Low	75
23	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.17	Low	75
24	3	1	1	2	3	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	3	1	1.67	Low	75
25	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1.39	Low	75
26	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.17	Low	75
27	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.22	Low	75
28	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.11	Low	75
29	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.28	Low	75
30	2	2	1	3	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	3	1	1	1	1.56	Low	75
31	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.11	Low	75
32	3	1	1	3	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1.39	Low	75
33	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.17	Low	75
The average risk level of all participants:																			1.35	(Low risk)	

Table 6: *Qualitative reviews of children within terrorism movement in Poso*

Participants 1
He has social needs to hang out with friends yet have not been fulfilled and try to fulfil them by often carrying out activities on social media. He also needs some security (e.g., financial, care, love, support) that has not been fulfilled, so that it requires attention. He also often compares himself to others and feels jealous. He also raised his desire to be able to influence/become a leader for his friends. He is a clever individual at school. He is categorized into a low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 2
His extreme fantasy needs special attention, which is to kill infidels. However, he has a good intellectual capacity to involve in discussions regarding peace and reconciliation. After receiving several interventions such as training and counselling, he also understands the concept of co-existence and the importance of peacekeeping in Poso. Having no involvement in children's military camps/training, he is categorized into a low risk of engaging in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 3
He has a high desire to be able to influence others around him. He also has a high need for power that he claims to be able to manipulate adults if he wants to. He has an adequate intellectual capacity to understand rules and lessons on religious teachings. He is never involved in violence; he is regarded as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 4
He has social needs to be accepted by his peers, but it has not been fulfilled. Thus, he feels lonely. Based on the cognitive assessment, he has an adequate intellectual capacity to support his understandings of rules, regulations, and peaceful religious concepts. He is categorized into a low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 5
He wants to be a leader to his peers. He is able to manipulate his friends to generate behaviours he wants. He has an adequate intellectual capacity to discuss local wisdom, norms, and rules. He is categorized as low risk in terms of involvement in violent extremism and crimes.

Participants 6

He wants to be accepted by his peers; hence he admitted he would do anything to become part of a group. Furthermore, the reports show he needs power and like manipulating his peers. Based on the assessment, he has a good cognitive/intellectual capacity to digest/understand Ideologies such as religious lessons and their wisdom and manage his feelings when he feels down. He is categorized into a low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 7
No early alarms or caution are found. She is quite good at managing feelings and understanding religious concepts, the national constitution, and the wisdom/philosophy of religious teachings to be applied in Indonesia. Although she was raised in an extremist movement, she is categorized as low risk to involve in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 8
He has an adequate intellectual capacity to support his understanding of abstract concepts about morals, ethics, even the trauma of living in Poso. He is able to control and manage his feelings when he feels sad. He is categorized as low risk to involve in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 9
Living under severe poverty, she has economic needs that have not been fulfilled and become a concern. Her cognitive capacity is above average. She is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 10
He has a large social need that he wants to be accepted by his peers. He admits that he feels marginalized and lonely most of the time. Although his intellectual capacity is considered average based on his school reports and assessments, he understands the wisdom of religious teachings and supports peace ideology. He is characterized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 11
He is known to be a bright/clever child in his neighbourhood, school, and family. His cognitive assessment also proves that his intellectual capacity is superior. Adults in the terrorist movement often ask him to look for information. Understanding peace concepts in religious teachings and how to manage information (e.g., avoid confrontation and extreme Ideology), he is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 12
He admits he feels lonely most of the time. He wants to have many friends, yet he does not know how to approach other friends to develop a productive relationship. He wanted to gain social support from his friends. His school reports show that he has good intellectual capacity. He is characterized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 13
She made good friends and seemed to adjust well with her peers. The assessment also shows her above-average cognitive ability. In terms of emotional ability, she shows a good ability in managing negative feelings. She is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 14
He wants to have many friends, but he has difficulties in approaching his peers. He wants to be accepted by his friends. In behaving with adults, he often refused a visit. He is categorized as low risk to involve in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 15
Living under extreme poverty, he admits that sometimes he feels jealous of friends who are able to fulfil their basic needs. However, he is able to manage his feelings of jealousy. He is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 16
She feels lonely on a daily basis; hence she joins social media to find friends. She spends the most time on social media to update news and read the news. When contacted by adults, she is quiet and does not like to communicate.

She is also unresponsive to visits. The assessment shows that she has a high need for power that she likes to be in charge among her peers. Ananda is categorized as a low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 17
She lives in poverty; therefore, she feels inferior when she meets people. She does not respond when visited; this makes others experience difficulties interacting with her. Furthermore, she does not like the national constitution and Indonesia lesson, even though she has an above-average intellectual capacity. She is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 18
He spends much time on social media to look for information. He often uses his social media account to talk or make friends. He is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 19
Living under extreme poverty, she admits that she would steal if she had to (for example, if she is hungry). Her intellectual capacity is above average, and she is good at managing her emotions/feelings. She is classified as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 20
He has social needs that have not been fulfilled. He wants to be accepted by his friends. He understands abstract concepts when discussing local wisdom and Indonesia. His school reports show satisfying results. He is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 21
She likes to use technology/gadgets to meet friends or fulfil her social needs. She also spends her leisure time online. She is a cheerful person. She likes to study religious teachings and concepts. She is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 22
She lives in poverty and needs help in this area. Her school reports and assessment show her mental and cognitive abilities that are above average. She hopes to receive a scholarship for her achievements at school. Surrounded by religious fundamentalists in her community who tries to influence her thought process, she still is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 23
She has many friends and good social skills to approach people. Her school reports show academic achievements. Although she was raised in a fundamentalist movement, she is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 24
She lives in poverty, and she admits she would steal if she were starving. She wants to have the leadership among her peers. She is trained in the basics of martial arts. Moreover, she makes various social activities in cyberspace to find friends and looks for information. She is classified as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 25
His financial needs have not been sufficiently fulfilled. He likes religious studies and shows good academic achievements. He is good at managing his feelings of inferiority towards his peers. He is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 26
She is a shy girl. Her school reports show her above-average intellectual capacity. She understands abstract concepts of religious teachings and the local wisdom of people in her villages. She is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 27

She is a vocal individual that She is sometimes involved in debates with her family regarding religious teachings. Her school reports and cognitive assessment show satisfying results that she has an adequate intellectual capacity. She is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 28
He is the youngest among all participants and looks cheerful when meeting new friends. There is no indication of trauma and aggression; however, he tends to be silent when facing a situation that makes him uncomfortable. He is categorized as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 29
He has several economic issues within his family due to poverty. Moreover, his school reports and the cognitive test did not show satisfying results. He takes a longer time than other participants in understanding instructions and lessons. Nonetheless, he is categorized as low risk of being involved in crime.

Participants 30
She is so active in cyberspace; this is to get social acceptance. She sometimes compares herself and others whom she thinks are wealthier; thus, she feels down. Based on the cognitive test, she takes more time than other participants to be able to understand the rules and absorb information. With her ability to manage the feelings, she is grouped as low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 31
She adjusts well in new situations introduced to him. The cognitive test and school reports demonstrate his good capability in an academic context. She is classified into a low risk to involve in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 32
She has socioeconomic issues (e.g., hunger, loneliness, jealousy) which need to be addressed. She does not mind stealing if she has to. Based on the cognitive test, she takes more time than other participants to be able to understand the rules and absorb information. Furthermore, she admits that she has inferiority and anxiety regarding bullying that happen to her. She is classified into a low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

Participants 33
She is a cheerful individual and adjusts well in new situations such as new school, peers, and neighbourhood. She is categorized into a low risk to engage in crimes such as terrorism.

For the domain of *Motivation* and *Ideology,* the assessment shows that the participants are at low risk. Table 7 demonstrates that in most motives of terrorism, they are protected (null/zero risk). The findings could be due to several factors such as the success of reconciliation amongst Christians and Muslims, the absence of children military camp for ISIS supporters, and the success of counternarrative and deradicalization programs to extremist networks (by government or non-government institutions) in Poso. Further, Table 8 shows the participants' risk factors of *Ideology* in which most of the participants are protected.

Table 7: *Motivation for terrorism assessed in children of violent movement in Poso*

Participants	Domain of *Motivation*						Risk Levels in *Motivation*
	Economic	*Justice*	*Situational*	*Social*	*Superiority*	*Actualization*	
1	Protected	Low	Medium	High	Low	Low	Medium
2	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
3	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	High	Protected	Low
4	Protected	Low	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
5	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Medium	Protected	Low
6	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
7	Low	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
8	Low	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
9	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low

10	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
11	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
12	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
13	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
14	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
15	Low	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
16	Low	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
17	Low	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
18	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
19	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
20	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
21	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
22	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
23	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
24	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low	Medium	Protected	Low
25	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
26	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
27	Low	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
28	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
29	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
30	Low	Low	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
31	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
32	Medium	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
33	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
Average risk level in *Motivation*:							Low

Table 8: *Extremism Ideology assessed in children of violent movement in Poso*

Participants	Domain of *Ideology*						Risk Levels in *Ideology*
	Doctrines	*Attitudes*	*Doctrines*	*Attitudes*	*Doctrines*	*Attitudes*	
1	Low	Protected	Protected	Low	Low	Protected	Low
2	Protected	Protected	High	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
3	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
4	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
5	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
6	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
7	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
8	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
9	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
10	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
11	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Low
12	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
13	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Low
14	Protected	Medium	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Low
15	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
16	Protected	Low	Low	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
17	Low	Medium	Protected	Low	Protected	Medium	Low

18	Low	Protected	Low	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
19	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
20	Protected	Protected	Low	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
21	Protected	Protected	Low	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
22	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
23	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
24	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
25	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
26	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
27	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
28	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
29	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
30	Low	Protected	Low	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
31	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
32	Low	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
33	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
Average risk level in *Ideology*:							Low

For the domain of *Capability*, the assessment demonstrates the participants' limited skills to be involved in terrorist acts (helping adults/parents). None of the participants joins military camps for children. They join regular schools and some moderate Islamic schools, not special ones managed by their networks, which blend with the broader society. Moreover, in some cases, the participants are exposed to information in social media (e.g., broadcasts, hoaxes, propaganda), finding new friends online, and spreading news, even though they are under age to join any social media platforms which need attention. Additionally, their school curriculum does not provide lessons on digital literacy, such as the dos and don'ts for activities in social media.

Table 9: *Capability for terrorism assessed in children of violent movement in Poso*

Participants	Domain of *Capability*						Risk Levels in *Capability*
	Intelligence	*Language*	*Intelligence*	*Language*	*Intelligence*	*Language*	
1	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
2	Low	Medium	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
3	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	High	Protected	Low
4	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
5	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Low
6	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
7	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
8	Protected	Low	Low	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
9	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
10	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
11	Very high	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
12	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
13	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
14	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
15	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
16	Protected	Protected	Medium	Low	Medium	Protected	Low
17	Protected	Low	Low	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
18	Protected	Protected	Medium	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
19	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low

20	Protected	Low	Low	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
21	Protected	Low	Medium	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
22	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
23	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
24	Protected	Protected	Medium	Low	Medium	Protected	Low
25	Protected	Low	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
26	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
27	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
28	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
29	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
30	Protected	Low	Medium	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
31	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
32	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	Protected	Protected	Low
33	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low
Average risk level in *Capability*:							Low

4. Discussion and conclusion

Children in Poso experience fears and trauma even after the Malino Reconciliation. There are still morally inappropriate behaviours reported amongst these children, such as school refusal, stealing, disobedience towards parents and elders, use of drugs, cigarette smoking, and the use of abusive language. Against this background, this paper is aimed to assess the risks and needs of children in Poso whose families (parents and relatives) are involved in terrorist groups (Tol, Reis, Susanty, & de Jong, 2010). This study included 33 children as participants, 5 local facilitators ad observers, and four raters for inter-rater judgment. It implemented both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

This study demonstrates that the average terrorism risk score of children raised amongst extremist movements in Poso is 1.35 or low risk. For *Motivation* and *Ideology* as two domains assessed in this study, the participants are at low risk, and for *Capability*, they have limited skills to help adults in terrorist acts or involved in crimes. The findings could be due to several factors such as the success of reconciliation amongst Christians and Muslims, the absence of children military camp for ISIS supporters in Poso, and the success of counternarrative and deradicalization programs to extremist networks (by government or non-government institutions) in Poso. In terms of its implication, the study may help educators and counterterrorism practitioners in planning an intervention for children raised amongst the terrorism movement in Poso.

Despite its originality, the study has two limitations. The first is in the multifaceted process for administrating the MIKRA risk assessment. This is to gain the accuracy of information regarding each participant. Observers were assigned to witness the participants on a daily basis. The second limitation is the costly resource allocation. The administration process could be fiscally consuming that include fulfilling needs (e.g., basic logistics, safety, training) for each observer, especially if they (observers and participants) live in outer islands and forests in the Indonesian archipelago.

Further studies recommended by the researcher are to investigate risk assessments to children in other islands or regions with a long story of conflicts or intolerance, such as Aceh, Papua, and Maluku. As explained by many scholars in Indonesia, religious radicalism in the country is strongly connected to terrorist acts (Mahfud et al., 2018; Zulkarnain & Purnama, 2016). Moreover, studies on religious tolerance in Indonesia by the National Ministry of Religious Affairs show Religious Tolerance Indexes as follow: 72.20 in 2017, 70.90 in 2018, 73.83 in 2019, and 67.46 in 2020 (considered as high tolerance) (Table 10), yet some regions such as Aceh and Papua need an improvement (Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2020). The index score had been above 70 for five years (Nathalia, 2019); however, the score slightly declined in 2020 due to the increased *prejudices* during the pandemic (Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2020).

Table 10: *Religious Tolerance in Indonesia from 2017 to 2020*

Year	Religious Tolerance Index*	Indicators of Religious Tolerance	
2017	72.20 (High)	Tolerance	70.90
		Equality	72.40
		Cooperation	73.50
2018	70.90 (High)	Tolerance	70.33
		Equality	70.33
		Cooperation	70.56
2019	73.93 (High)	Tolerance	72.37
		Equality	73.72
		Cooperation	75.40
2020 (Covid-19 Pandemic)	67.46 (High)	Tolerance	64.15
		Equality	69.54
		Cooperation	68.68

*Notes:
0-20 = Very Low
21-40 = Low
41-60 = Medium
61-80 = High
81-100 = Very High

Source: Burhani, Awaludin, Haryadi, & Sila (2020); The National Ministry of Religious Affairs of Republic of Indonesia (2019; 2020)

The three dimensions measured in *Religious Tolerance* by the Ministry of Religious Affairs are *Tolerance*, *Equality*, and *Cooperation* among believers of different religions. *Tolerance* involves two indicators: *acceptance* and *respecting differences*. *Equality* contains *protecting each other*, *sharing opportunities,* and *avoiding superiority*. *Cooperation* comprises *active collaboration* and *showing empathy to outgroups.* The studies will provide comprehensive profiling to design a blueprint for rehabilitation for children where terrorism movements (including separatism) are located.

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