
| RESEARCH ARTICLE

Determination of Limited Security Area at the Indonesian Flight Academy, Banyuwangi: A Case Study at Banyuwangi Airport

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| ABSTRACT

The Security Restricted Area at airports plays a crucial role in preventing unauthorized access and criminal activities around the airport. This research aims to evaluate the design of the Security Restricted Area and access control at Banyuwangi Airport, operated by the Indonesian Civil Pilot Academy Banyuwangi. The research adopts a qualitative approach with data collection techniques such as participant observation, interviews with relevant stakeholders, and analysis of documents related to airport security regulations and standards. The findings reveal that the Airport Business Entity (BUBU) or airport operator is responsible for security in the airside area, but through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), this responsibility is delegated to the Indonesian Civil Pilot Academy Banyuwangi. Weaknesses in access control and security measures were identified in the airside area operated by the academy, including inadequate guarding at certain access points and the absence of mapping for the Security Restricted Area. The research provides recommendations to enhance access control and security at Banyuwangi Airport, aiming to improve operational safety and the airport's reputation.

| KEYWORDS

Security Restricted Area, Access Control, Delegation

| ARTICLE INFORMATION

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1. Introduction

Air transport is widely recognized as one of the safest modes of transportation, and the sector consistently demonstrates improvements in performance and safety standards (IATA, 2019). The preference for air travel is often attributed to its speed and safety. Ensuring the safety of air operations is a crucial aspect of air transportation (Piotr, 2020). Airports play a pivotal role in the air transportation system, and airport managers continually face challenges to maintain safe operations. The Security Restricted Area at an airport represents the highest level of security and safety, functioning to prevent unauthorized access and criminal activities around the airport. Stringent controls for individuals entering restricted areas are essential to prevent unauthorized access to critical facilities (Chun-Nen Huang, 2021). Therefore, access control is imperative for the Restricted Security Area. However, some airports have areas operated by third parties with varying security levels. The Indonesian Pilot Academy in Banyuwangi is one such third party that operates the Security Restricted Area at Banyuwangi Airport. Consequently, it is necessary to conduct research to assess whether the design of the Limited Security Area and Access Control at Banyuwangi Airport, operated by the Indonesian Pilot Academy, aligns with regulations governing Limited Security Areas. Research on the "Determination of Limited Security Areas at the Indonesian Pilot Academy, Banyuwangi: A Case Study at Banyuwangi Airport" is imperative as aviation security and safety are paramount and must be meticulously upheld at airports. Additionally, airport security and safety are crucial for maintaining the airport's reputation and building trust among the public and aviation service users. By researching the appropriate design of Restricted Security Areas, we aim to enhance aviation security and safety at Banyuwangi Airport and provide valuable recommendations for other airports in Indonesia.

2. Method

This research adopts a qualitative methodology. The variables in this research focus on the Limited Security Area at Banyuwangi Airport, operated by the Indonesian Pilot Academy, Banyuwangi.

The population for this final assignment research comprises all third-party officers involved in operating the Limited Security Area at Banyuwangi Airport. Data collection techniques include interviews, observation, documentation, and case study techniques. Data processing involves several stages: Data Transcription, Data Reduction, Data Presentation, Data Verification, and Data Interpretation.

The research was conducted at the Indonesian Aviation Academy Banyuwangi campus, which operates the Limited Security Area at Banyuwangi Airport. The study spanned from May to July 2023.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Results

3.1.1 Limited Security Area Responsibility at Banyuwangi Airport

Based on the results of interviews with Avocat Banyuwangi Airport personnel, several important findings and information can be identified regarding Angkasa Pura 2's policies concerning Limited Security Areas (DKT) and the role of APIB in airside security. In this interview, and in accordance with the Decree of the Minister of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia Number KM 211 of 2020 concerning the National Aviation Security Program, it is known that security on the airside, which includes DKT, is the responsibility of BUBU/airport managers. In this case, Angkasa Pura 2 (AP2) is responsible for Banyuwangi Airport. However, through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)/cooperation agreement between Angkasa Pura 2 and APIB, there is a delegation of responsibility to APIB to carry out inspections of individuals and employees wishing to enter the operated airside. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that has been established refers to the Decree of the Minister of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia, Number KM 211 of 2020, concerning the National Aviation Security Program.




Figure 1. Memorandum of Understanding

Source: API Banyuwangi

If an audit or inspection is carried out by the Directorate of Aviation Safety (DIRKAMPEN) and findings are discovered in the airside area of APIB, this will be APIB's responsibility. Even though audit findings are directed to AP2 as the manager of Banyuwangi Airport, APIB is responsible for and fulfills the provisions agreed upon in the MoU. If APIB cannot fulfill these provisions, the delegation of airside security can be revoked. The ideal conditions for access to the airside at APIB involve controls such as an Access Control Point (ACP). The Access Control Point must have control, security, and inspection at the entrance from the landside to the airside, and vice versa at APIB. When the airport security level rises to red, AP2 will take over security responsibilities at APIB. Everyone entering the airside must pass inspection by licensed AVSEC personnel. Furthermore, in the interview, it was mentioned that the Access Control Point must be guarded by AVSEC personnel. The Access Control Point is like an access door to a restricted area or airside and must be closed or locked. However, if you want to open the Access Control Point, there must be personnel on guard. There is a distinction between the Access Control Point and the Security CheckPoint (SCP), which is intended for passenger inspection. The Access Control Point is intended for staff or crew, and the Security Checkpoint requires equipment such as X-ray and other aviation security inspection facilities (FASKAMPEN), whereas the Access Control Point focuses more on controlling access with minimal use of inspections such as Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD) or body search. APIB has also faced several findings from previous audits, including unguarded and left-open access doors, fences with a perimeter height less than the 2.44 meters stipulated in the MoU, and unclosed borders.



Figure 2. Gate and Fence Perimeter

Note: The fence height perimeter does not comply with the MoU, and the access door was left open.

3.1.2 Security at the Indonesian Aviation Academy Banyuwangi

Based on the results of interviews with campus security officers (PAMDAL) as respondents, several crucial findings have emerged regarding the implementation of security Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) on the campus. Campus security SOPs commence with procedures for screening guests entering the campus. Security officers stationed at the front post will stop every guest and inquire about their needs and the individuals they intend to meet on campus. Subsequently, the security officer will confirm the guest's authenticity with the intended person. If the guest's needs are verified, they are granted access to the campus. Additionally, the security SOP encompasses monitoring the airside, which is a Limited Security Area on campus. Access to these areas is restricted to security personnel, staff/crew, and students only. Security officers conduct controls every two hours to ensure airside security. Patrols are carried out throughout the building to prevent unauthorized access to vital areas. Access doors to the airside are locked and patrolled every two hours during the night.

However, the implementation of campus security SOPs faces several challenges. One of these challenges is the limited number of security personnel, with only three individuals per shift working eight hours a day. Due to this constraint, it is not feasible to maintain and inspect the airside entrance at all times, as outlined in the MoU between APIB and Angkasa Pura 2. Additionally, there is a potential risk of unauthorized guests attempting to enter restricted areas. To address this, only authorized guests

accompanied by personnel are allowed entry. If unauthorized individuals attempt to access restricted areas, security officers issue warnings and directions. If accompanied by staff or crew, security communicates with the individual to clarify that only crew members are permitted in restricted areas. In summary, campus security SOPs involve guest screening, monitoring restricted areas, conducting patrols, and securing access doors. However, the shortage of personnel poses a challenge, and there is a lack of guards at the airside access doors.



Figure 3. Access Door to the Airside

Note: Lack of care and inspection of individuals entering and exiting from the airside.

3.1.3 APIB Management Policy

Based on interviews with respondents regarding conditions and policies of Angkasa Pura 2 regarding Restricted Security Areas (DKT) at the Indonesian Pilot Academy Banyuwangi (APIB), several issues require attention. The researcher conveyed these concerns to the Head of Academic, General Administration, and Education Facilities. During the discussion, the researcher highlighted the absence of official mapping for Limited Security Areas at APIB, which should include specific areas such as Hangar and Open Area. Respondents acknowledged the absence of clear mapping at APIB. Areas such as Hangar, Apron, and their surroundings should be designated as Restricted Security Areas, necessitating special procedures for the entry and exit of individuals and goods. In compliance with the MoU, inspections with metal detectors and strict entry procedures must be enforced, along with the placement of signs/Sign Boards indicating "Restricted Area" as a reminder of the importance of adhering to access rules and restrictions.

The discussion on management policies also touched upon deficiencies in entry access control. The respondent explained that while SOPs for checking people entering the Airside exist, the inspections are general and lack specificity for entry into the airside. This indicates shortcomings in controlling entry access, not aligning with the provisions of the MoU. Another issue raised is the inactive licensing status of Basic Avsec for PAMDAL personnel in APIB. The respondent clarified that campus security had been handed over to a third party as per government decision. However, recruiting security personnel with Basic Avsec licenses poses a challenge. Respondents recognized the time and financial constraints associated with license renewal and training but are actively working to resolve this issue.

Subsequently, the researchers and respondents discussed management's plans to relocate offices and classes to the building in front of APIB. Hangar, Meru Betiri Building (OPS 2 Building), and Apron will be dedicated solely to flight operational activities,

with stringent inspection and control of entry access. Management acknowledges the need for time and resources to meet personnel and facility requirements, including perimeter fencing, signboards, and metal detectors. Nevertheless, they have devised plans to address these challenges within a specific timeframe.



Figure 4. Hangar Access Door

Note: Absence of a signboard on the access door to the airside, as stipulated in KM 211 and the MoU.

From the results of this interview, it can be concluded that APIB needs to officially map DKT and implement appropriate procedures for controlling entry access in accordance with what is stated in the MoU between APIB and Angkasa Pura 2. Additionally, license renewal and Avsec training for security personnel are deemed a priority. Through office relocation plans (Hangar B) and classes (Meru Betiri Building), there is an expectation of enhanced airside security at APIB. Management acknowledges that meeting personnel and facility needs requires time and financial investment, but they are committed to overcoming these challenges to maintain security at APIB.

4. Discussion

Airports are integral to the air transportation system, and airport managers continually face challenges to ensure safe operations. However, certain airports have areas operated by third parties with varying security levels. The Indonesian Pilot Academy Banyuwangi (APIB) is a third party operating part of the Limited Security Area (Security Restricted Area) at Banyuwangi Airport. APIB, an aviation education and training institution, has direct access to the Limited Security Area at Banyuwangi Airport.



Figure 5. Map APIB

Note: A, B, C represent hangars; 1 is the OPS Building 1, and 2 is the Meru Betiri Building (OPS Building 2).

Banyuwangi Airport and APIB are deeply concerned about the security aspects of their operations. In in-depth interviews with various related parties, several crucial points were found related to policies and the delegation of responsibilities aimed at ensuring security on the airside operated by APIB. Observations on the airside operated by APIB revealed several entrances in the form of doors on hangar A, hangar B, hangar C, Meru Betiri Building (OPS 2 building), and several doors on the perimeter fence. Currently, hangar B is used as an office where many non-crew employees pass by and potentially enter the airside.

In accordance with the Decree of the Minister of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia Number KM 211 of 2020 concerning the National Aviation Security Program, security on the airside, including DKT, is the responsibility of the Airport Business Entity (BUBU)/airport manager. Currently, Angkasa Pura 2 (AP2) is responsible for Banyuwangi Airport. However, through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)/cooperation agreement between Angkasa Pura 2 and APIB, there is a delegation of responsibility to APIB to carry out inspections of staff, crew, and students who wish to enter the airside operated by APIB. This cooperative effort emphasizes security maintenance on the airside, including the Limited Security Area.

In the event of an audit or inspection carried out by the Directorate of Aviation Safety (DIRKAMPEN), and if there are findings in the operated airside area of APIB, this will be APIB's responsibility according to the MoU. However, audit results will be directed to Angkasa Pura 2 as, the manager of Banyuwangi Airport. If APIB cannot fulfill the provisions stated in the MoU, the delegation of airside security can be revoked. Under specific conditions, Angkasa Pura 2 can take over security responsibilities at APIB if necessary when the airport security level increases.

To ensure airside security at APIB, it is crucial to implement strict controls on entry to the airside/Restricted Security Area. In accordance with the MoU, APIB must establish an Access Control Point (ACP) acting as an access door connecting the land side with the limited security area (DKT) or airside. At the Access Control Point, strict access control, security, and inspection are to be carried out. Internal security personnel (PAMDAL) with a Basic AVSEC license are responsible for conducting comprehensive checks and inspections using a minimum of a Hand Held Metal Detector for every person entering the airside. The airside access door or Access Control Point should be locked when unattended by PAMDAL employees. However, the facts found by researchers reveal that there has been no mapping and designation of Limited Security Areas at the Access Control Point. Furthermore, there is no guarding or inspection by PAMDAL personnel at the airside entrance, and the airside access door is left open without a guard during operational hours. Based on the findings, APIB should establish a Restricted Security Area (DKT), and the recommended DKT is illustrated as follows:



Figure 6. Illustration of DKT determination in APIB

Note: The white box is a suggestion for establishing a Limited Security Area at APIB.

Apart from that, there were several previous audit findings related to airside security at the Indonesian Pilot Academy Banyuwangi. These findings included the absence of security and inspection of people at the access doors to the airside, the need to increase the height of the perimeter fence, and issues with closure under the perimeter.

On the other hand, the security policy at the Indonesian Pilot Academy Banyuwangi is also a concern. Security Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) involve checking every guest who wants to enter the APIB campus area at the Gate post. Each guest is asked to provide information and confirm their identity before being allowed to enter the APIB campus area. Meanwhile, monitoring of the airside, which is a Limited Security Area (DKT), is carried out routinely by security officers who conduct patrols every two hours. However, this is not an ideal condition in accordance with the MoU, and one of the obstacles faced is the limited number of security personnel available, resulting in the absence of guarding at all times and inspections at the airside entry access operated by APIB.

APIB management is aware of several security-related issues and is planning steps to address them. One of the issues discussed was the need for the official mapping of DKT at APIB, including limited areas such as Hangar and Apron. Management also plans to relocate the office currently located in Hangar B and classes to the front building/OPS 1 building. Hangar, Meru Betiri Building (OPS 2 building), and Apron will be devoted only to flight operational activities, and inspection and control of entry access will be carried out strictly to comply with the provisions of the MoU. Management recognizes the need for time and expense to meet personnel and facility needs, such as perimeter fencing, signboards, and metal detectors. However, they have planned steps to overcome this problem within a certain time period.

5. Conclusion

This research aimed to evaluate the design of the Security Restricted Area and access control at Banyuwangi Airport, operated by the Indonesian Civil Pilot Academy Banyuwangi. The research adopts a qualitative approach with data collection techniques such as participant observation, interviews with relevant stakeholders, and analysis of documents related to airport security regulations and standards. Control of the Limited Security Area at Banyuwangi Airport, which is operated by APIB, faces several obstacles. Airside access doors are left open unattended during operational hours, increasing the risk of unauthorized entry. Even though PAMDAL officers monitor airside access by patrolling every two hours, this is not an ideal condition, as stated in the MoU between Angkasa Pura 2 and APIB. The limited number of security personnel results in the absence of guarding at all times and inspections at entry access.

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