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| **RESEARCH ARTICLE**

Collaborative Governance in Prevention of Village Fund Corruption Crimes in Indonesia: A Case Study in Bandung Regency West Java Province

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| **ABSTRACT**

The phenomenon of village fund corruption in Indonesia, including in Bandung Regency, has become a serious issue that hampers development and community welfare. Even though there have been various efforts to overcome this problem, corrupt practices still occur in the management of village funds. This research aims to analyze the collaborative governance process and the supporting and inhibiting factors of collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency, to further formulate a collaborative governance model for preventing village fund corruption. The research method used was descriptive qualitative, where primary and secondary research data were obtained through interviews, observation and documentation studies. The analysis techniques used through descriptive techniques include data reduction, data presentation. The research results are: 1) collaborative governance in preventing corruption in Bandung Regency involves various actors, but there is still minimal involvement from NGOs, the community and academics. Trust between actors is built through coordination, communication and information transparency. Actors' commitment is built through information disclosure and independent monitoring. Shared understanding is built in line with consensus which emphasizes the importance of dialogue to reach agreement even if there are differences in interests. Short-term achievements in preventing corruption in village funds in Bandung Regency show positive achievements in the short term; 2) Supporting factors for collaborative governance to prevent corruption in village funds, namely in the initial condition aspect which includes the active role of all related parties, in the institutional design aspect which includes coordination between institutions, in the facilitative leadership aspect which is shown by the same vision between actors which is the foundation for strong collaboration. effective in preventing corruption. Inhibiting factors, namely the initial condition aspect, include an imbalance in the quality of human resources, low public understanding and participation in preventing corruption; aspects of institutional design include ineffective communication between related parties, sectoral egos, and lack of coordination between stakeholders; the facilitative leadership aspect includes a culture of corruption, personal interests, and lack of commitment and trust between parties; 3) Researchers formulated a collaborative governance model for preventing corruption in village funds which was developed from the Ansell and Gash (2007) model with the name "Quad-helix collective prevention of corruption," which is believed to be able to improve the collaboration process optimally thereby encouraging the realization of effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. and accountability in managing village funds, because it involves many sub-actors in the quad-helix. The novelty in the model is the need for involvement of academic actors and mass media in collaboration to prevent corruption in village funds..

| **KEYWORDS**

Collaborative Governance, Corruption Prevention, Village Funds

| **ARTICLE INFORMATION**

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1. Background

Corruption is universally recognized as a systemic crime with profound socioeconomic consequences, undermining governance and eroding public trust (Rajasa Asdiansyah et al., 2023). As a "wicked problem"—a term denoting issues resistant to resolution due to interconnected political, social, and cultural complexities—corruption perpetuates inequality, distorts resource allocation, and destabilizes institutions. Its multifaceted nature allows it to thrive in environments where accountability mechanisms are weak, and power is concentrated among elites. For Indonesia, a nation that ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption

(UNCAC) through Law No. 7/2006, the fight against corruption has been marred by paradoxes. Despite international commitments and domestic anti-corruption campaigns, the country's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) stagnated at 34/100 in 2022, ranking fifth in Southeast Asia and well below the global average of 43 (Transparency International, 2022). This stagnation reflects systemic failures in governance, particularly in fiscal decentralization policies such as Law No. 6/2014 on Villages. While the law aimed to empower rural communities by channeling trillions of rupiah annually into village development, it inadvertently created opportunities for mismanagement. For instance, the lack of stringent oversight and the centralization of financial authority in village heads have turned village funds into a breeding ground for corruption, disproportionately affecting marginalized communities and hindering equitable development.



Source: Transparency Internasional (2022)

Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index of Indonesia 2002-2022

Between 2004 and 2022, Indonesia recorded 1,261 corruption cases, with the central government implicated in 409 instances—a statistic highlighting the pervasiveness of graft even at the highest levels of authority (KPK, 2023). Regions such as West Java (118 cases) and East Java (109 cases)

Source: The Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia , 2022

Figure 2: Number of Corruption Cases Based on Regions in Indonesia in 2022

further illustrate the geographic spread of corruption, often linked to infrastructure projects and public service delivery. The enactment of Law No. 6/2014 exacerbated these issues, as village fund allocations surged from IDR 20.7 trillion in 2015 to IDR 72 trillion in 2021, distributed across 74,961 villages. However, this financial empowerment was counterbalanced by a parallel rise in corruption. In Bandung Regency, village funds reached a record IDR 827 billion in 2023, a 23.4% increase from 2020, yet corruption risks escalated proportionally (Admin, 2023). A emblematic case occurred in Cihawuk Village (2016–2018), where the village head embezzled IDR 800 million through fraudulent tax reporting and falsified construction expenditure claims, exploiting loopholes in budget oversight (Mandalahi, 2022). Such cases underscore systemic flaws: under-resourced auditing bodies like the Inspectorate and BPK struggle to monitor 75,436 villages nationwide, while participatory mechanisms such as *Musdes* (Village Deliberations) are often co-opted by local elites. Collusion between village heads and Village Consultative Bodies (BPDs)—as seen in the 2022 Muara Enim case involving IDR 15.5 billion in losses—further erodes accountability, revealing a governance ecosystem where institutional checks and community engagement remain fragmented (Yulianto, 2017; Lailiani, 2017).

No	Village	Perpetrator	State Loss (IDR)	Modus Operandi
1	Cihawuk	AS Village Head 2006 – 2018	800,038,600	Tax evasion, physical project fraud
2	Sukarame	S Village Head 2014 – 2019	277,595,800	Misuse of ambulance procurement funds
3	Warnasari	U Village Head 2014 – 2119	222,627,745	Inflated construction costs
4	Panyocokan	Village Head 2020	Undisclosed	Alleged fund diversion
5	Cangkuang Wetan	Village Head 2022	Undisclosed	Abuse of authority
6	Haurpugur	Village Head 2019	Undisclosed	Budget misallocation

Table 1: Alleged Village Fund Corruption Case in Bandung Regency

As presented in Table 1, there have been several alleged cases of village fund corruption in Bandung Regency, with six suspected cases uncovered in recent years. These cases range from those already prosecuted to those still under investigation. One notable example involves the Village Head of Cihawuk, Kertasari Subdistrict, Bandung Regency, as reported by *detiknews.com* (2022). Between 2016 and 2018, the village head embezzled IDR 800 million by evading tax payments, underreporting labor costs, and fabricating accountability reports. These actions resulted in misallocated funds for village activities, deviating from the approved Budget Plan (RAB) and causing significant state losses (Mandalahi, 2022).

Village fund corruption severely undermines public service delivery in rural communities. This phenomenon is not solely attributable to the substantial annual allocations but also stems from systemic failures in transparency, participatory governance, and accountability within village financial management (Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2018). Compounding the issue are limited media scrutiny of village affairs, the strategic role of villages in local electoral politics, alliances between village heads and regional candidates, and low public awareness among villagers. These factors collectively create an environment conducive to corruption.

The frequent involvement of village heads as perpetrators highlights non-compliance with Article 26, Paragraph (4), Letter f of Village Law No. 6/2014, which mandates village heads to uphold principles of accountable, transparent, professional, efficient, and corruption-free governance. Corruption risks in village fund management are concentrated in two phases: budget planning and implementation. During planning, Village Revenue and Expenditure Budgets (RAPBDes) are formulated through Village Deliberations (*Musdes*), which should involve broad community participation. However, these forums are often dominated by local elites, village officials, and associates of the village head, effectively sidelining genuine public input. Consequently, RAPBDes frequently reflects the personal interests of village heads rather than alignment with the Village Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJMDes). Indicators of corruption at this stage include inflated or deflated item costs (*mark-up* or *mark-down*) and discrepancies between budgeted amounts and market prices (Yulianto, 2017).

Furthermore, corruption-driven budget planning manifests through deviations from RPJMDes frameworks, arbitrary adjustments to activity budgets beyond district-level norms, and non-compliance with ministerial regulations governing RAPBDes drafting committees. This centralization of authority in the hands of village heads undermines checks and balances, perpetuating a cycle of graft (Yulianto, 2017).

Three interrelated factors drive corruption in village fund management. First, weak institutional oversight by bodies such as the Regency/City Inspectorate, the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), which lack the human resources and budgetary capacity to effectively monitor Indonesia's 75,436 villages (Yulianto, 2017). Second, low community participation in supervising the Village Budget (APBDes). While villagers are often involved in project implementation—a phase vulnerable to collusion—their role in planning remains tokenistic, reduced to procedural compliance without substantive input (Yulianto, 2017). Third, limited public awareness and education hinder active participation in village development discussions, exacerbating corruption risks (Lailiani, 2017). These cases illustrate the symbiotic relationship between weak governance and corruption. Poor institutional frameworks perpetuate severe corruption, whereas robust *good governance* systems reduce it. Governance and corruption concepts evolve independently yet remain correlated, with *good governance* increasingly critical to modern administrative systems. Contemporary demands now push toward *sound governance*, a theory reflecting evolving modern expectations (Prastika, 2020).

Despite ongoing anti-corruption efforts, village officials dominate corruption defendants in Indonesia, necessitating targeted interventions (Yulianto, 2017). Zakariya (2020) identifies five primary forms of village fund corruption: budget inflation, fictitious projects, falsified reports, embezzlement, and fund misuse. Regional case studies corroborate these patterns (Safitri, 2022). Addressing such systemic issues requires collaboration beyond government actors. Partnerships with NGOs, corporations, and civil society—formalized through *cooperation* or advanced *collaboration*—are essential (Fendt, 2010). *Collaborative governance*, a decision-making framework engaging cross-sector stakeholders (Stoker, 2017), emphasizes structured, consensus-driven processes to manage public assets (Dewi, 2019). In Indonesia, this model integrates public and private entities, fostering multistakeholder participation in policymaking (Retno, 2020). While effective in theory, challenges like stakeholder disengagement hinder implementation, demanding extraordinary measures to curb corruption's societal harm (Abubakar et al., 2017).

Ansell and Gash (2008) define collaborative governance as a formal, consensus-oriented process involving public and private stakeholders. In Indonesia, this model integrates government agencies, NGOs, corporations, academia, and communities, fostering multistakeholder participation in policymaking (Retno, 2020). Key elements include face-to-face dialogue, shared trust, and commitment to equitable outcomes—critical for preventing fund misuse and ensuring transparency. For instance, Zakariya (2020) demonstrates that enhancing public access to information, regular participatory forums, and open communication channels can reduce corruption risks. However, challenges such as stakeholder disengagement, bureaucratic resistance, and inadequate institutional coordination persist, demanding systemic reforms (Abubakar et al., 2017).

Studies on various cases of village fund management indicate that collaborative governance plays a crucial role in enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of public fund management. According to Ansell and Gash (2007), cross-sectoral cooperation structured within the collaborative governance framework leads to improvements in policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. This approach is particularly essential in the context of corruption prevention, where interactions and collaborations among village governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations contribute to identifying and mitigating potential corruption risks. The integration of multiple stakeholders within a structured governance model ensures that decision-making processes are inclusive, thereby reducing opportunities for corruption and enhancing transparency.

The dimensions proposed in the collaborative governance model of Ansell and Gash (2007)—including face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, and commitment to the process—facilitate the development of more inclusive and effective policies. By understanding and applying these principles, village fund management can become more transparent and accountable, thereby reducing corruption risks and improving the quality of public services. This approach also ensures that all stakeholders have an active role in decision-making, which is critical in developing equitable and sustainable governance policies. The involvement of various actors in governance mechanisms fosters accountability and ensures that public resources are utilized efficiently.

Based on this background, this study examines the topic "Collaborative Governance in Preventing Village Fund Corruption in Indonesia: A Case Study of Bandung Regency, West Java Province." Bandung Regency has been selected due to its record-high village fund allocations, which amounted to IDR 827 billion in 2023, reflecting a 23.4% increase from 2020 (Tempo, 2023). This allocation consists of IDR 366 billion from the State Budget (APBN), IDR 35.1 billion from the Provincial Budget (APBD), and IDR 425 billion from the Regency Budget (APBD). Comparatively, in 2022, the total allocations reached IDR 724 billion, with APBD contributions increasing by IDR 60 billion due to economic growth. In 2020, village fund allocations totaled IDR 670 billion, marking a 23.4% increase by 2023. With continued economic expansion projected, village fund allocations—and the associated corruption risks—are expected to increase through 2024 (Tempo, 2023).

2. Methodology

This study employs a qualitative descriptive approach, aiming to explore and analyze social phenomena comprehensively. This study adopts the collaborative governance framework proposed by Ansell and Gash (2007), which defines collaborative governance as a governance framework that regulates one or more public institutions directly involving both state and non-state actors, including stakeholders, in a formal, consensus-driven, and deliberative collective decision-making process. Their model highlights six key criteria: the presence of a forum initiated by public institutions, the inclusion of non-governmental elements as participants, direct stakeholder involvement in policymaking beyond mere consultation, formal organization of the forum with regular meetings, decision-making based on consensus, and collaboration focused on public policy or public management.

As a qualitative study, this research relies on multiple sources of data, including informants, documents, photographs, textual records, and statistical reports. Informants provide primary data through their statements and behaviors, with key respondents selected from the public sector, private industries, and civil society based on their direct involvement in village fund management

and anti-corruption initiatives. Documents such as government records, academic literature, media reports, and regional statistics serve as secondary data sources, offering contextual insights into village governance and corruption prevention. Photographs and textual records supplement these findings, allowing for an in-depth qualitative interpretation of the research subject. Statistical data are also incorporated to support qualitative analysis, providing background on demographic trends and governance structures without being subjected to quantitative statistical procedures.
The study collects both primary and secondary data, ensuring a comprehensive analysis. Primary data are obtained directly from informants through interviews and field observations, including interview recordings and researcher-generated photographs. Meanwhile, secondary data consist of books, reports, images, and statistical figures sourced from existing publications, serving to complement and reinforce primary data. The selection of informants follows a purposive sampling technique, based on several criteria: informants must be directly involved in corruption prevention and village fund management, reside in Bandung Regency for at least the past one to two years, possess relevant authority or expertise, be directly impacted by the governance process, and demonstrate knowledge, competence, or legitimacy regarding the research topic.

No	Informant	Informant Category	Total
1	Regent of Bandung	Key Informant	1
2	Chairman of Bandung Regency DPRD	Key Informant	1
3	Head of Bandung Regency District Attorney's Office	Key Informant	1
4	Head of Community and Village Empowerment Agency, Bandung Regency	Main Informant	1
5	Village Head	Main Informant	7
6	Chairman of Village Consultative Body	Main Informant	7
7	NGO/Anti-Corruption Organizations in Bandung Regency	Supporting Informant	3
8	Mass Media	Supporting Informant	3
9	Academics/Experts/Practitioners	Supporting Informant	2
Total			26

Table 2: List of Informan

To ensure data validity, this study employs in-depth interviews, non-participant observation, and document analysis as key data collection techniques. In-depth interviews allow for detailed insights, enabling informants to openly express their perspectives on corruption prevention and village fund management. The interview process follows a semi-structured format, providing flexibility for deeper exploration of key themes. Non-participant observation is conducted to objectively analyze collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency, ensuring that the researcher does not influence or alter the natural behavior of the observed subjects. A structured observation guide is used to systematically document findings. Document analysis is also employed to collect relevant reports, records, news articles, and scholarly literature, offering a broader perspective on governance practices.
The research follows the Miles and Huberman (2009) model for data analysis, which involves an interactive and continuous process until data saturation is achieved. This process consists of three key stages: data reduction, where raw data are categorized and summarized; data display, where information is organized to facilitate interpretation; and conclusion drawing and verification, where patterns and relationships among data are analyzed to derive meaningful insights. This iterative analytical approach ensures rigorous and systematic data processing, allowing for a comprehensive understanding of collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency.

3. Result and Discussion

3.1 Collaborative governance in Preventing Corruption of Village Funds in Bandung Regency

3.1.1 Face-to-Face Dialogue in Collaborative Governance for the Prevention of Corruption of Village Funds

The prevention of village fund corruption in Bandung Regency presents significant challenges in enhancing transparency and accountability in budget management at the village level. To address these issues, a collaborative governanceapproach has been implemented through face-to-face dialogue between various stakeholders, including local government agencies, village officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community representatives, and law enforcement authorities. This dialogue serves as a crucial mechanism for fostering synergy among actors in preventing the misuse of village funds.

In the context of collaborative governance, face-to-face dialogue is not merely a discussion forum but also a platform for exchanging ideas, problem-solving, and consensus-building that promotes transparency and integrity in village fund management. This process aims to establish a more effective oversight system by involving various societal elements that play strategic roles in ensuring financial accountability at the village level. Several key actors participate in these dialogues, including Local Government Agencies (OPD) responsible for overseeing and guiding village governments in the implementation of village funds, particularly in areas such as fund allocation, disbursement, implementation, and reporting. The Community and Village Empowerment Agency (DPMD) plays a critical role in coordinating between local government agencies and village governments to ensure compliance with regulations. Additionally, the Bandung District Attorney's Office, through its *Jaksa Jaga Desa* (*Prosecutor Guards the Village*) program, contributes to corruption prevention by integrating legal oversight and educational initiatives for village officials. The Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) further reinforces the need for tighter supervision by local inspectors to minimize the potential for misuse of village funds.

At the village level, village heads are the primary actors in fund management and are responsible for conducting deliberations with the Village Consultative Body (BPD), village facilitators, and the community to uphold principles of good governance. The BPD functions as a supervisory body at the village level, ensuring that the village head performs duties transparently and in accordance with established regulations. Insights from interviews with village-level informants reveal that face-to-face dialogue encompasses several critical aspects. First, it facilitates the establishment of dialogue forums and consensus-building, involving key stakeholders such as community members, government agencies, and law enforcement authorities. Second, it contributes to capacity-building for village officials, enabling them to understand regulations and implement policies transparently. Third, it supports participatory oversight mechanisms, granting the community and the BPD access to village financial information and providing space for public input. Lastly, it enhances cross-sector coordination, integrating NGOs and media in efforts to boost transparency and accountability.

Overall, face-to-face dialogue within collaborative governance has proven to be a pivotal factor in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency. Through open communication and intensive coordination, the oversight process has become more effective, involving a broader range of stakeholders. However, challenges remain, including low public trust in village officials, a lack of transparency in financial information, and the dominance of local elites in decision-making processes, which can hinder community participation in financial oversight. Therefore, strengthening face-to-face dialogue mechanisms is essential, not only during the initial stages of policy formulation but also throughout the implementation and evaluation phases of village fund programs. Increased commitment and trust among actors are key to ensuring that village fund management remains transparent, accountable, and free from corrupt practices.

3.1.2 Building Trust in Collaborative Governance for Preventing Village Fund Corruption

Building trust is a critical element in collaborative governance for preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency. Trust serves as the foundation for cooperation among various stakeholders, including local governments, village officials, community members, law enforcement agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Without trust, collaborative efforts risk failure due to suspicion, lack of engagement, and resistance to oversight. According to Ansell and Gash (2007), successful collaborative governance requires trust-building as a continuous process that strengthens relationships, reduces conflicts, and fosters commitment to shared goals. In the context of village fund management, trust enables transparent communication, effective monitoring, and active public participation in financial oversight.

Trust-building efforts in Bandung Regency are shaped by several key strategies implemented through collaborative governance mechanisms. One significant approach involves regular and transparent information dissemination by the local government and village authorities. Public access to financial data, including village budgets, expenditure reports, and project plans, is crucial in increasing community confidence in governance processes. This aligns with Fung’s (2006) deliberative democracy model, which emphasizes that citizen trust in government increases when decision-making processes are inclusive and information is readily available.

Another essential trust-building mechanism is the institutionalization of participatory forums, such as village meetings (Musdes), consultative sessions with the Village Consultative Body (BPD), and collaborative dialogues with external stakeholders. These forums provide spaces for open discussions between village officials and the public, allowing citizens to voice concerns and contribute to decision-making processes. Data from interviews with government representatives indicate that frequent engagement between village authorities and community members reduces skepticism toward fund management and strengthens public trust in local governance structures.

Despite these efforts, several challenges hinder trust-building in village fund management. One of the primary obstacles is historical cases of corruption, where past instances of fund mismanagement have led to widespread public distrust toward village officials. According to empirical data, many community members remain hesitant to engage in village governance due to perceptions that local elites manipulate financial decisions for personal gain. This aligns with Ostrom’s (1990) institutional collective action theory, which argues that trust deficits arise when governance actors fail to demonstrate accountability and fairness in resource distribution.

Moreover, unequal power dynamics between government institutions and local communities pose another barrier to trust-building. Observations indicate that village decision-making processes are often dominated by a small group of elites, limiting the meaningful participation of marginalized community members. This reflects Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation, where governance structures that fail to provide real decision-making power to citizens reinforce distrust rather than build confidence in government institutions.

Another factor affecting trust is the inconsistent enforcement of anti-corruption policies. While legal frameworks exist to regulate village fund management, enforcement mechanisms remain weak due to lack of coordination between oversight institutions, inadequate legal follow-up on corruption cases, and political influence protecting corrupt actors from accountability. This finding aligns with Lipsky's (1980) street-level bureaucracy theory, which suggests that local administrators often face conflicting pressures between enforcing regulations and maintaining political stability, leading to selective policy implementation.

To address these challenges, several trust-building strategies must be strengthened. First, local governments must institutionalize public accountability mechanisms, ensuring that village financial reports are not only published but also effectively communicated in accessible formats. Second, capacity-building programs for community members and village officials should be expanded to enhance their understanding of transparency regulations and participatory governance. Third, law enforcement agencies must adopt a more proactive stance in prosecuting corruption cases, demonstrating to the public that misconduct will not be tolerated. Lastly, creating independent monitoring bodies that include representatives from academia, NGOs, and community organizations can provide an additional layer of oversight and impartial evaluation of village fund management.

In conclusion, building trust in collaborative governance for preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency requires continuous efforts in transparency, community participation, legal enforcement, and equitable governance structures. By reinforcing these elements, stakeholders can cultivate an environment where public confidence in village fund management is strengthened, leading to more accountable and corruption-free governance at the local level.

3.1.3 Commitment to the Process in Collaborative Governance for Preventing Village Fund Corruption

Commitment to the process is a fundamental pillar of collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency. This commitment refers to the sustained engagement and dedication of stakeholders—including government institutions, village officials, law enforcement agencies, and community representatives—in ensuring that anti-corruption measures are effectively implemented. According to Ansell and Gash (2007), commitment to the collaborative process involves continuous participation, problem-solving, and shared responsibility among actors, ensuring that governance efforts are not only initiated but also maintained over time.

In the context of village fund management, commitment to the process manifests in several ways. First, government institutions at the district and village levels must demonstrate consistency in enforcing regulations and policies related to transparency and accountability. Findings from this study indicate that regular audits, structured oversight mechanisms, and the integration of digital reporting systems have strengthened commitment to the collaborative process. These efforts align with Fukuyama's (2013) theory on institutional governance, which emphasizes that strong institutions play a central role in sustaining accountability and reducing corruption risks.

Second, capacity-building initiatives for village officials and community members reinforce long-term commitment to governance. Training programs on financial management, anti-corruption strategies, and participatory decision-making help institutionalize best practices in village fund management. Empirical data from this research highlight that when village officials and community representatives receive adequate training and resources, their willingness to engage in collaborative anti-corruption efforts increases. This finding supports Putnam's (1993) concept of social capital, which asserts that long-term investment in capacity-building enhances trust, cooperation, and shared governance responsibilities.

Third, legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms must be consistently applied to prevent disengagement from the process. One of the key challenges identified in this study is the uneven application of legal sanctions in cases of village fund mismanagement. While some officials face strict legal consequences for corruption, others manage to evade prosecution due to political connections or administrative loopholes. This discrepancy weakens commitment to governance efforts, as community members perceive that anti-corruption measures lack fairness and consistency. This aligns with Lipsky's (1980) street-level bureaucracy theory, which suggests that frontline officials often exercise discretion in policy enforcement, sometimes leading to selective governance practices.

Additionally, stakeholder engagement must be continuous rather than episodic. Findings from the interviews and document analysis indicate that while collaborative governance structures exist, participation from community members and NGOs often fluctuates depending on political cycles, leadership transitions, and funding availability. This instability creates gaps in oversight and allows corrupt practices to persist during periods of weak engagement. According to Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012), governance sustainability depends on institutional mechanisms that maintain stakeholder involvement even amid leadership changes. In Bandung Regency, some village officials exhibit a lack of long-term commitment to transparency, treating collaborative governance as a procedural requirement rather than an integral governance principle.

To strengthen commitment to the process, several improvements are necessary. First, policy continuity must be ensured, preventing anti-corruption initiatives from being abandoned due to changes in political leadership. Second, multi-stakeholder partnerships must be formalized, ensuring that NGOs, academia, and the private sector play an active role in long-term monitoring and evaluation. Third, legal accountability must be strengthened, guaranteeing that all corruption cases are addressed transparently and impartially. Finally, continuous public education and awareness campaigns must be conducted to sustain community engagement in oversight activities.

In conclusion, collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption requires a long-term commitment from all actors involved. Without sustained engagement, transparency measures risk becoming ineffective, and corruption may persist due to weak enforcement. By institutionalizing commitment through policy stability, legal consistency, stakeholder engagement, and capacity-building, Bandung Regency can enhance the effectiveness of its collaborative governance framework, ensuring that village fund management remains transparent, accountable, and resistant to corrupt practices.

3.1.4 Shared Understanding in Collaborative Governance for Preventing Village Fund Corruption

A shared understanding among stakeholders is a fundamental element in collaborative governance, particularly in efforts to prevent village fund corruption in Bandung Regency. Shared understanding refers to a collective agreement on objectives, roles, and strategies among various actors involved in governance processes, including local government agencies, village officials, law enforcement institutions, community representatives, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). According to Ansell and Gash (2007), collaborative governance requires a strong foundation of mutual understanding among participants to foster cooperation, reduce conflicts, and align goals. In the context of village fund management, a shared understanding is essential for ensuring that all actors work towards the common goal of transparency and accountability.

The findings from the research indicate that efforts to build a shared understanding in Bandung Regency involve regular socialization, training programs, and multi-stakeholder dialogues. The local government and related agencies have conducted public education initiatives aimed at enhancing knowledge about village financial management, corruption prevention strategies, and legal frameworks governing village funds. This aligns with Putnam's (1993) theory of social capital, which highlights the importance of civic engagement and knowledge-sharing in fostering collective governance efforts.

One of the main strategies to establish a shared understanding is the implementation of joint training programs for village heads, village consultative bodies (BPD), and local government agencies. These programs focus on financial accountability, administrative procedures, and participatory decision-making, ensuring that stakeholders have a uniform comprehension of governance responsibilities and anti-corruption mechanisms. Empirical data show that in villages where such training sessions are frequently conducted, there is greater alignment in governance objectives, stronger inter-institutional coordination, and improved public trust in village fund management.

Another critical factor contributing to a shared understanding is the role of structured deliberation forums, such as village development planning meetings (Musrenbangdes) and village consultative meetings (Musdes). These forums serve as platforms for open dialogue between village officials and community members, allowing stakeholders to discuss budget allocations, identify corruption risks, and propose solutions collaboratively. The study found that villages with active participatory forums exhibited higher levels of transparency and accountability in fund management, demonstrating the positive correlation between shared understanding and governance effectiveness.

However, several challenges hinder the development of a shared understanding in collaborative governance for village fund corruption prevention. One of the primary obstacles is the variation in stakeholders' knowledge levels and legal literacy. Some village officials and community members lack a comprehensive understanding of financial regulations and anti-corruption laws, leading to misinterpretations, procedural errors, and weak oversight. According to Ostrom's (1990) institutional analysis framework, governance systems require uniform comprehension among actors to function effectively, meaning that knowledge gaps weaken governance efficiency and increase corruption risks.

Another significant barrier is the resistance from village elites who perceive participatory governance as a threat to their decision-making authority. Observational data indicate that in certain cases, village heads and officials deliberately withhold financial information from the public, limiting community involvement in budget planning and oversight. This reflects Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation, where governance participation remains at a tokenistic level rather than achieving full citizen empowerment. The exclusion of community members from governance discussions weakens the collective understanding of village fund management, increasing the potential for corruption.

Additionally, bureaucratic fragmentation among government institutions presents another challenge to achieving a shared understanding. The study found that coordination gaps between local government agencies, law enforcement bodies, and village administrations create inconsistencies in policy implementation and enforcement. For example, conflicting interpretations of financial regulations among different institutions result in unclear guidelines on accountability measures, reducing the effectiveness of corruption prevention initiatives. This aligns with Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh's (2012) framework on collaborative governance, which argues that misalignment in institutional policies hinders the development of a unified governance approach.

To strengthen shared understanding in collaborative governance for preventing village fund corruption, several strategic recommendations are proposed. First, expanding public education programs to enhance financial literacy among village officials and community members will help create a uniform comprehension of accountability mechanisms. Second, formalizing participatory forums as mandatory governance structures will ensure continuous stakeholder engagement and information-sharing. Third, improving inter-agency coordination through the harmonization of regulations and oversight mechanisms will reduce policy inconsistencies and enhance the effectiveness of corruption prevention strategies. Lastly, incentivizing transparent governance through performance-based rewards for village officials may encourage greater adherence to financial accountability principles.

In conclusion, achieving a shared understanding among stakeholders is a critical component of collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency. While significant progress has been made through training programs, participatory forums, and policy reforms, challenges related to knowledge gaps, elite resistance, and bureaucratic fragmentation must be addressed to maximize governance effectiveness. Strengthening efforts to align stakeholder perspectives will ensure that village fund management remains transparent, participatory, and resistant to corruption practices, ultimately contributing to better public service delivery and sustainable rural development.

3.1.5 Short-Term Achievements in Collaborative Governance for Preventing Village Fund Corruption

Short-term achievements serve as early indicators of progress in the implementation of collaborative governance to prevent village fund corruption in Bandung Regency. These achievements are essential in building trust among stakeholders, reinforcing commitment to transparency, and demonstrating the effectiveness of governance reforms. According to Ansell and Gash (2007), collaborative governance requires incremental successes to sustain engagement and motivate long-term institutional changes. In the case of Bandung Regency, several notable short-term achievements have been observed in financial transparency, community participation, and inter-agency coordination, all of which contribute to reducing corruption risks in village fund management.

One of the most significant achievements has been the improvement in financial transparency at the village level. Village governments are now required to publicly disclose financial reports, including budget allocations, expenditure breakdowns, and accountability statements. These disclosures are made available through village information boards, digital platforms, and community meetings, allowing citizens to monitor the flow of funds. This practice aligns with Fung's (2006) model of participatory governance, which asserts that public access to financial data is crucial for minimizing corruption opportunities. The study found that villages implementing regular financial disclosures experienced fewer cases of fund mismanagement, as community scrutiny acted as a deterrent against fraudulent activities.

In addition to financial transparency, community participation in village fund governance has increased. The establishment of village consultative meetings (Musdes) and participatory budgeting forums has allowed community members to actively engage in decision-making processes related to fund allocation and expenditure priorities. This heightened level of participation has strengthened public awareness and improved local governance outcomes. According to Putnam (1993), social capital is enhanced when citizens are actively involved in governance, leading to greater collective responsibility and accountability. Empirical findings indicate that villages with active community engagement mechanisms exhibited stronger financial discipline and fewer instances of misappropriation.

A third key achievement has been the enhancement of inter-institutional coordination, particularly between local government agencies, village administrations, and law enforcement bodies. The collaborative efforts of the Inspectorate, the Village Community Empowerment Office (DPMD), and the Prosecutor's Office have significantly improved monitoring and oversight functions. In particular, the involvement of the Prosecutor's Office in the "Jaksa Jaga Desa" (Prosecutors Safeguarding Villages) initiative has created a legal deterrent effect, discouraging corruption through education, preventive measures, and targeted enforcement. This collaborative approach aligns with Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh's (2012) theory of collaborative governance, which highlights the importance of multi-sectoral engagement in ensuring policy effectiveness.

Despite these positive developments, several challenges continue to hinder the full institutionalization of short-term governance improvements. One major issue is the inconsistent implementation of transparency regulations across different villages. While some village governments have fully embraced public financial disclosures, others have been reluctant to provide detailed financial reports. This reluctance is often linked to resistance from village elites, who may seek to retain discretionary control over budget allocations and minimize public scrutiny. Observational data suggest that in areas where elite influence remains dominant, community participation remains more symbolic than substantive. This supports Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation, which warns that mere procedural inclusion without real empowerment does not lead to meaningful governance reforms.

Another persistent challenge is the limited enforcement capacity of oversight institutions. While regulatory frameworks for village fund management exist, the study found that delays in auditing processes, lack of coordination between monitoring agencies, and political interference often weaken enforcement efforts. For instance, while the Inspectorate and local government agencies conduct audits, follow-up actions on identified irregularities are frequently slow or incomplete. This is consistent with Lipsky's (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy, which posits that frontline government officials often face structural constraints that limit their ability to fully implement policies. Without swift and decisive enforcement mechanisms, governance reforms risk becoming largely symbolic rather than transformative.

Moreover, while community participation in village fund governance has increased, the depth of engagement remains inconsistent. Interviews with community members revealed that while they are often invited to attend budget discussions, their influence on decision-making remains limited. This suggests that in some cases, participatory mechanisms function more as formalities rather than as genuine platforms for citizen empowerment. According to Gaventa (2006), participation must go beyond passive consultation and should be structured in ways that grant citizens actual decision-making power. Without empowered civic engagement, village officials may continue to make financial decisions with minimal public accountability.

To sustain and build upon short-term achievements, several strategic recommendations must be considered. First, strengthening enforcement mechanisms through real-time auditing tools, independent financial oversight bodies, and enhanced digital reporting systems can significantly improve transparency. Second, capacity-building programs for village officials and community representatives must be expanded to ensure a uniform understanding of governance best practices. Third, formalizing multi-stakeholder governance structures, such as independent monitoring teams consisting of government agencies, NGOs, and citizen representatives, can further institutionalize collaborative governance practices. Lastly, incentivizing compliance by providing performance-based rewards for village governments that demonstrate exemplary transparency and accountability can foster sustained improvements in governance behavior.

In summary, the short-term achievements of collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency have laid a solid foundation for enhancing transparency, accountability, and stakeholder engagement. While financial disclosures, community participation, and inter-agency coordination have improved, challenges such as inconsistent enforcement, elite resistance, and shallow citizen engagement remain obstacles to fully institutionalizing governance reforms. To maximize the impact of collaborative governance, future efforts must focus on strengthening oversight mechanisms, deepening public participation, and ensuring regulatory compliance. By reinforcing these governance practices, Bandung Regency can move toward long-term structural reforms that secure the sustainability of anti-corruption initiatives in village fund management.

3.2 Supporting and Inhibiting Factors of Collaborative Governance in Preventing Corruption in Village Funds

3.2.1 Supporting Factors in Collaborative Governance for Preventing Village Fund Corruption

The effectiveness of collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency is significantly influenced by several supporting factors. These factors play a crucial role in ensuring the sustainability, effectiveness, and legitimacy of governance mechanisms, as well as in fostering an environment conducive to transparency, accountability, and multi-stakeholder participation. Based on the analysis of the study, the key supporting factors can be categorized into three main dimensions: starting conditions, institutional design, and facilitative leadership, which align with Ansell and Gash's (2007) framework for collaborative governance.

1. Starting Conditions (Initial Context)

The starting conditions refer to the pre-existing circumstances that shape the collaborative governance process, including stakeholder relationships, trust levels, and the balance of power between actors. In Bandung Regency, several favorable initial conditions have facilitated the collaboration between local government institutions, village administrations, law enforcement bodies, and civil society organizations in preventing corruption.

One major supporting factor in this dimension is the increasing awareness among village officials and local communities regarding the importance of transparency and accountability in managing village funds. This growing awareness has been driven by extensive socialization efforts, policy reforms, and public education programs initiated by government agencies, NGOs, and academic institutions. The active role of the Inspectorate, DPMD, and law enforcement institutions such as the Prosecutor's Office in educating village stakeholders has contributed to a higher level of compliance with financial management regulations. This finding aligns with Fung's (2006) participatory governance model, which emphasizes the role of public awareness in fostering demand for good governance.

Another significant supporting factor is the presence of legal and regulatory frameworks that provide a strong foundation for corruption prevention measures. The implementation of Law No. 6/2014 on Villages, along with regional policies that mandate public disclosure of financial reports, participatory budgeting, and independent auditing, has strengthened the institutional landscape for collaborative governance. These regulations ensure that village governments operate within a clear legal framework, making it more difficult for corruption to occur unnoticed. This aligns with North's (1990) institutional theory, which highlights the importance of formal rules in shaping governance behavior and reducing corruption risks.

2. Institutional Design

The institutional design of governance structures in Bandung Regency has also played a crucial role in enabling collaborative governance in corruption prevention. Well-defined roles and responsibilities among different governance actors, as well as the establishment of coordinating bodies, have strengthened the overall governance framework.

A key supporting factor in this dimension is the existence of multi-stakeholder oversight mechanisms, such as the involvement of the Prosecutor's Office in the "Jaksa Jaga Desa" program, the role of the Inspectorate in monitoring financial reports, and the engagement of community-based organizations in oversight activities. These mechanisms enhance accountability by ensuring that multiple actors participate in monitoring and enforcing financial integrity. This is consistent with Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh's (2012) theory of collaborative governance, which argues that multi-actor involvement increases legitimacy, strengthens accountability, and improves policy implementation.

Moreover, the institutionalization of community participation through platforms such as village deliberation meetings (Musdes) and participatory budgeting forums has provided structured avenues for citizens to engage in governance processes. Empirical data indicate that villages that actively implement participatory budgeting mechanisms tend to experience lower levels of corruption, as financial decisions are subjected to public scrutiny. This supports Putnam's (1993) social capital theory, which posits that strong civic engagement contributes to better governance outcomes.

Another critical institutional factor is the availability of digital reporting and auditing tools. The introduction of online financial reporting systems, where village governments submit and disclose financial statements digitally, has increased transparency and efficiency in monitoring fund allocations. Digital governance tools, such as e-Government applications, are recognized in Heeks' (2001) ICT and governance framework as effective mechanisms for reducing corruption by minimizing opportunities for fund mismanagement and enhancing real-time monitoring.

3. Facilitative Leadership

The role of leadership is another crucial determinant of the success of collaborative governance in corruption prevention. Effective leadership at multiple levels—village heads, district government officials, and law enforcement authorities—has contributed to the sustainability of collaborative initiatives.

One of the most prominent supporting factors in this dimension is the commitment of village heads to implement good governance principles. Interviews with village officials indicate that leaders who actively promote financial transparency, involve the community in decision-making, and enforce anti-corruption measures have successfully reduced instances of fund mismanagement. This finding is consistent with Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg's (2014) collaborative leadership theory, which argues that effective governance requires leaders who facilitate cooperation, build trust, and maintain accountability.

At the district level, the proactive role of Bandung Regency's local government in facilitating coordination between different governance actors has been instrumental in enhancing collaborative governance practices. The leadership of the Bupati (Regent), the Inspectorate, and law enforcement officials in advocating for integrity-based governance reforms has contributed to a governance environment where corruption prevention is a shared priority across institutions. This aligns with Koppenjan and Klijn's (2004) network governance model, which emphasizes the importance of leadership in bridging diverse stakeholders and fostering collective problem-solving.

Additionally, the integration of leadership training programs for village officials has strengthened administrative capacity and financial management skills. Capacity-building initiatives, such as workshops on budget transparency, anti-corruption regulations, and participatory governance practices, have empowered village heads and financial managers to comply with governance standards more effectively. This supports Grindle's (1997) theory on capacity development, which highlights the importance of leadership training in improving public administration performance.

3.2.2 Factors Inhibiting Collaborative Governance to Prevent Corruption in Village Funds

While collaborative governance in Bandung Regency has led to some notable improvements in village fund transparency and accountability, several hindering factors continue to pose challenges in fully institutionalizing anti-corruption measures. These obstacles can be categorized into three main dimensions: starting conditions, institutional design, and facilitative leadership, as outlined in Ansell and Gash's (2007) collaborative governance framework. These challenges hinder effective coordination, weaken accountability structures, and reduce stakeholder participation, ultimately increasing the risk of corruption in village fund management.

1. Starting Conditions (Initial Context Challenges)

The starting conditions set the foundation for effective governance, and weaknesses in this area significantly undermine efforts to institutionalize transparency and accountability. One of the primary challenges in this dimension is low public trust in government institutions, particularly in village-level governance. Historical instances of village fund mismanagement and cases of corruption among local officials have created a climate of skepticism, making it difficult to engage citizens in participatory governance processes. Studies have shown that low trust in government reduces civic engagement, weakens oversight, and increases apathy toward governance reforms (Putnam, 1993).

Additionally, power imbalances between village officials and community members pose another challenge. The dominance of local elites in decision-making means that village fund management remains highly centralized, with little room for public participation. Community members, particularly those from marginalized groups, often feel intimidated or excluded from budget planning and oversight activities. This reflects Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation, which suggests that without real power-sharing, public involvement remains tokenistic rather than substantive.

Another major hindrance is the persistence of informal networks and patronage systems, where political alliances between village heads, regional leaders, and local businesses influence financial decisions. These informal structures create conflicts of interest, making it difficult to enforce impartial financial oversight. According to North (1990), institutional weaknesses often allow patronage networks to flourish, reducing the effectiveness of formal governance mechanisms.

2. Institutional Design Challenges

Institutional weaknesses significantly affect collaborative governance by limiting oversight mechanisms, restricting stakeholder engagement, and creating bureaucratic inefficiencies. One of the most pressing challenges in this dimension is the lack of strong enforcement mechanisms. While legal frameworks exist to govern village fund allocations and expenditures, the actual enforcement of regulations remains inconsistent. The Inspectorate and local auditing bodies often face capacity constraints, limiting their ability to conduct thorough financial audits and investigations. This aligns with Lipsky's (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy, which suggests that government officials often struggle to enforce policies due to resource constraints and political pressures.

Additionally, poor inter-agency coordination among governance institutions weakens the effectiveness of corruption prevention initiatives. While multiple agencies—including the Inspectorate, DPMD, and the Prosecutor's Office—are involved in oversight, the lack of synchronized reporting systems, joint monitoring mechanisms, and real-time data sharing leads to inefficiencies. This issue is compounded by bureaucratic silos, where agencies operate independently without clear mechanisms for collaboration. Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) argue that weak institutional integration hampers the success of collaborative governance by preventing effective information exchange and coordinated action.

Another institutional constraint is limited community access to financial data. While transparency laws require village governments to disclose financial reports, many villages fail to provide comprehensive, accessible, and up-to-date budget information. In some cases, financial reports are only made available upon request, deterring citizen oversight. According to Heeks (2001), restricted access to governance data undermines participatory governance efforts and increases opportunities for corruption.

Furthermore, political interference in financial oversight continues to undermine collaborative anti-corruption initiatives. Interviews with stakeholders reveal that in some instances, village heads exert influence over local oversight bodies, discouraging them from reporting financial irregularities. This finding supports Klitgaard's (1988) corruption equation ($C = M + D - A$), which suggests that corruption thrives when monopoly power and discretion are high while accountability is weak.

3. Facilitative Leadership Challenges

Leadership plays a pivotal role in ensuring the success of collaborative governance. However, weak leadership, resistance to transparency, and lack of proactive governance reforms have been identified as key hindrances to corruption prevention.

One of the primary leadership challenges is the reluctance of some village heads to fully embrace participatory governance. While some leaders actively promote community engagement and transparency, others resist external oversight and prefer centralized decision-making. This reluctance is often motivated by concerns over losing discretionary control over budget allocations. Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg (2014) argue that collaborative leadership requires a commitment to openness, power-sharing, and institutional accountability—qualities that are often lacking in resistant local leaders.

Another major leadership constraint is the absence of strong legal consequences for corrupt village officials. While cases of fund mismanagement are sometimes identified, enforcement remains weak, with legal proceedings often delayed or dismissed due to procedural loopholes or political protection. The lack of a deterrent effect weakens the incentives for village leaders to prioritize good governance. This supports Becker's (1968) rational choice theory of crime, which posits that corrupt actors will continue engaging in fraudulent behavior if the perceived risks are low.

Moreover, limited leadership capacity and financial management training among village officials affect their ability to comply with financial regulations and best practices. In some cases, village heads and financial managers lack technical knowledge of budgeting, accounting, and procurement procedures, increasing the likelihood of unintentional errors or deliberate fund misuse. Grindle's (1997) theory on capacity development emphasizes that without continuous training and professional development, governance actors may struggle to fulfill their responsibilities effectively.

In summary, despite the progress made in implementing collaborative governance for corruption prevention in Bandung Regency, several critical challenges persist. The low public trust in governance institutions, dominance of local elites, persistence of patronage networks, weak enforcement mechanisms, bureaucratic inefficiencies, restricted access to financial data, and limited leadership capacity all serve as significant hindrances to achieving effective anti-corruption governance.

Addressing these challenges requires strengthening institutional enforcement mechanisms, enhancing inter-agency coordination, expanding financial transparency initiatives, and providing leadership training for village officials. Additionally, building stronger public participation mechanisms—such as independent citizen monitoring groups and digital transparency platforms—can further reduce opportunities for corruption. By overcoming these hindrances, Bandung Regency can create a more resilient governance framework that ensures sustainable corruption prevention in village fund management.

3.3 Collaborative Governance Model for Preventing Corruption of Village Funds

The formulation of a collaborative governance model for preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency is a strategic initiative aimed at establishing transparent, accountable, and participatory village governance. In this context, an effective collaboration model involves multiple stakeholders, including government agencies, communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, working together to monitor, plan, and manage village funds responsibly. A shared understanding of the importance of corruption prevention, clear role distribution, and open communication among relevant parties serve as the fundamental pillars in building this model. By designing a collaborative governance model that aligns with local contexts, it is expected to strengthen oversight mechanisms, enhance the capacity of village officials, and foster active public participation in the planning and management of village funds. This model is anticipated to reduce opportunities for fund misappropriation and promote more equitable and sustainable development at the village level. The stages in the modeling process are illustrated as follows:



Figure 3: Stages of Developing a Collaborative Governance Model to Prevent Corruption in Dana Desa

The issues identified in the initial phase of the model formulation highlight several key challenges. The low moral integrity of village heads and the weak oversight function of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) indicate a lack of trust among actors involved in village fund management. Effective collaboration must actively involve all stakeholders, including village heads, BPD, local governments, and the community, to ensure that village fund management aligns with its intended purpose.

Additionally, the suboptimal oversight and internal audits conducted by government agencies such as the Regency/Municipal Inspectorate, the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) reflect institutional weaknesses. For collaborative governance to function effectively, better coordination among these agencies is required, along with the adoption of technology-based oversight systems to facilitate transparency.

The lack of involvement of external actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media, and academia, further illustrates insufficient transparency in village fund management. This gap should be addressed by incorporating more stakeholders into dialogue and monitoring processes. The media, NGOs, and academia can play a crucial role in educating the public and providing data-driven recommendations to enhance transparency and accountability.

Furthermore, low public awareness and participation in the planning and oversight of village funds indicate a lack of trust and collective commitment to preventing mismanagement. In collaborative governance, public awareness and involvement are critical since community members are the primary stakeholders who directly experience the benefits or consequences of village fund management. The prevention of village fund corruption can be more effective when there is collaboration among all relevant actors, including the government, society, NGOs, media, and academia, to establish a more transparent and accountable system.

The findings from the analysis of collaborative governance processes, along with supporting and inhibiting factors in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency, suggest that while collaboration has been fairly well implemented, it remains suboptimal from several perspectives. The primary issue is the lack of involvement of key actors who should be part of the collaborative process. Additionally, there are significant barriers that hinder effective collaboration, including:

1. Uneven distribution of human resources (HR) capabilities
2. Low public participation
3. Lack of understanding and low levels of education in communities
4. Ineffective communication among relevant stakeholders
5. Institutional barriers and ideological differences
6. Lack of coordination with stakeholders
7. Corruption culture and personal interests
8. Lack of commitment and trust among stakeholders

Moreover, based on data collection and analysis, including primary and secondary data from interviews, observations, and document studies, it is evident that no specific collaborative governance model has been agreed upon by either the actors involved in collaboration or experts specializing in collaborative governance for village fund corruption prevention in Bandung Regency. Consequently, in formulating a model, the research directs its focus toward developing a model derived from the collaborative governance framework of Ansell and Gash (2007).

By referring to the Ansell and Gash (2007) model, alongside the findings from the collaborative governance process analysis and its supporting and inhibiting factors, the researcher has developed the model as presented in the following diagram:



Figure 4: Collaborative Governance Model for Preventing Corruption of Village Funds

Based on the illustrated model, it can be stated that the collaborative governance model for preventing village fund corruption has been developed by the researcher from the collaborative governance model of Ansell and Gash (2007)and has been named the "Quad-Helix Collective Prevention of Corruption" model. This adaptation was made due to the suboptimal implementation of collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption in Bandung Regency. The newly developed model is expected to contribute to solving issues in corruption prevention, ultimately leading to a more effective and efficient management of village funds.

From a theoretical perspective, the Quad-Helix Collective Prevention of Corruption model is designed to address the lack of optimal collaboration in corruption prevention, considering the major challenges posed by barriers to collaboration and the need for a more involved role of various actors, as suggested by stakeholder theory. This model is based on the perspective that strong collaboration among four key actors—government, civil society, mass media, and academia—is essential to establishing more effective and sustainable corruption prevention efforts in village fund management.

The prevention of corruption, particularly in village fund management, often faces challenges due to lack of coordination among actors who should be involved. In many cases, each actor operates in isolation, focusing only on their specific roles and responsibilities without intensive collaboration. For instance, while the government has the authority to regulate policies and oversee village fund management, it often lacks effective oversight from society or the media. Similarly, the public may have limited knowledge of their rights in monitoring village funds, while the media is often only sporadically engaged in reporting corruption cases. Through the Quad-Helix approach, collaboration among these actors can be strengthened through open and transparent dialogue, improving oversight and accountability in village fund management.

Several key obstacles hinder collaborative corruption prevention, including lack of trust among actors, poor communication, and sectoral egoism that impedes effective coordination. In many cases, governments tend to assume full authority over village fund management, while civil society feels excluded from important decision-making processes. Mass media sometimes focuses more on sensational news coverage rather than educating the public about the importance of oversight, whereas academics may not be sufficiently involved in providing evidence-based research on anti-corruption policies and programs. These factors create an isolated and ineffective approach to corruption prevention.

The Quad-Helix model focuses on reducing these barriers by establishing better communication channels among the involved actors. This includes reducing sectoral egoism, increasing transparency in village fund governance policies, and developing mechanisms to build stronger trust among actors. One approach that can be implemented is through dialogue forums or multi-stakeholder discussions, where all relevant actors can voice their roles and perspectives to ensure that they are acknowledged and valued.

Stakeholder theory suggests that all parties involved in a project or policy, whether directly or indirectly, must be given equal attention. In the context of preventing village fund corruption, the four main actors in the Quad-Helix model—government, civil society, mass media, and academia—play crucial roles. Each actor contributes unique strengths and resources that can enhance corruption prevention efforts if their collaboration is optimized.

1. Government

   The government plays a central role in formulating policies, establishing transparent regulations, and overseeing the implementation of these policies. Both national and local governments hold the authority to allocate village funds and set procedural guidelines for their use. However, their involvement must be accountable, including creating spaces for public input and engaging with other stakeholders.

2. Civil Society (NGOs and Community Groups)

   Civil society, consisting of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community groups, and individuals, serves as an independent watchdog. Their role is crucial in advocating transparency, ensuring that government decisions align with public interests, and detecting potential fund mismanagement. However, public involvement in village fund oversight is often limited due to a lack of awareness or education about their rights in this process. Therefore, the Quad-Helix model emphasizes the importance of public education and empowerment, enabling communities to be more actively engaged in oversight.

3. Mass Media

   Mass media functions as a channel of information and a tool for public oversight. It plays a significant role in reporting cases of fund misappropriation and exposing governance issues. Media also has the potential to educate the public on the importance of village fund transparency and accountability. However, the media often lacks consistency in covering such issues, tending to focus more on sensational stories rather than long-term systemic problems that require continuous public attention.

4. Academia

   Academics play a critical role in conducting evidence-based research on the effectiveness of policies and corruption prevention programs. They provide in-depth analysis of field conditions and suggest ways to improve the existing systems. Their research can be used to develop better policies that enhance transparency and accountability in village fund management. However, academic involvement in policy implementation is often limited, particularly in terms of applying research findings to real-world governance practices.

By integrating these four key actors, the Quad-Helix model offers a comprehensive framework for collaborative governance in preventing village fund corruption. It ensures that each stakeholder has a defined role and actively contributes to promoting good governance, strengthening oversight mechanisms, and enhancing public trust in government institutions.

Based on stakeholder theory analysis, it is evident that several actors need to enhance their involvement in corruption prevention efforts. Specifically, the role of the government must be strengthened by providing greater transparency, fostering open communication, and establishing oversight systems that involve a wider range of stakeholders. Civil society should be given more space to participate in decision-making processes, both through village deliberations and by enhancing their capacity to monitor the use of village funds. The mass media should be empowered not only to report corruption cases but also to educate the public on effective ways to oversee village fund utilization. Lastly, academics must engage more frequently in providing evidence-based research that can be translated into more effective anti-corruption policies.

1. Coordination and Collaboration Among Stakeholders
   Collective action involves various parties, including the private sector, government, international institutions, and civil society. This collaboration is crucial because corruption is often a complex issue that requires the engagement of multiple actors to create real change. For instance, companies can commit to implementing anti-corruption standards in their operations, while the government can strengthen law enforcement efforts.
2. Enhancing Impact and Credibility
   One of the key benefits of collective action is the amplification of the impact of each individual effort. When multiple organizations or businesses unite to fight corruption, the overall effect of these efforts becomes significantly greater and harder to ignore. The credibility of each participating entity also increases as they demonstrate a commitment to acting in accordance with broader ethical principles.
3. Building Alliances
   Collective action enables weaker or more vulnerable individuals and organizations to form alliances with other entities that share the same vision. This is particularly important in situations where individuals or organizations may lack the power or resources to tackle corruption on their own. Through these alliances, they can support each other, exchange knowledge, and share resources to strengthen their collective efforts.
4. Strengthening Legal Frameworks and Anti-Corruption Practices
   Collective action not only helps reinforce ethical standards at the individual level but can also complement or even compensate for weaknesses in existing anti-corruption laws and practices at the local level. In many countries, anti-corruption laws may not be strong enough or effectively enforced, making collective action an alternative mechanism to ensure that anti-corruption principles are consistently upheld.
5. Advocacy and Influence on Government Policy
   Collective action is not limited to individuals or corporations. This initiative can also be used to influence government policies and encourage authorities to take stronger measures in combating corruption. Through strong alliances among various organizations, collective action can create greater momentum for governments to formulate policies that support transparency, accountability, and corruption eradication

Several of these approaches are relevant in relation to successful case studies of village-level corruption prevention, particularly in Cibiru Wetan Village, Cileunyi District, Bandung Regency, which was selected as one of Indonesia's 10 Anti-Corruption Model Villages by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in June 2022, receiving an outstanding score of 96.16. This achievement was made possible through the development of a Public Information Transparency (KIP) system via the Simpel Desa application and Village Hall (Balai Desa), which provided a platform for the community to voice concerns, submit complaints regarding village governance, and actively participate in oversight through the Village Consultative Body (BPD). Additionally, the village established Sakola Desa (Village School) to educate the community on anti-corruption initiatives.

The government's commitment to building an Integrity Zone and preventing corruption has propelled Cibiru Wetan Village to receive the Anti-Corruption Village Award, setting a precedent for other villages to adopt a similar ethos. Apart from this award, the village also secured first place in the 2022 Regional II Village Competition (Java and Bali),outperforming villages from East Java and Yogyakarta. This success was the result of strong collaboration between the village government, BPD, Village Community Empowerment Institute (LPMD), local community members, and both provincial and regency governments.

Cibiru Wetan Village's flagship innovations include the digitalization of public services through the Simpel Desa application, Automated Population Administration Machine (ADM), Bale Desa, and the development of educational tourism programs. The village is also actively engaged in community empowerment, social protection programs, and the development of the Mawar Raharja Village-Owned Enterprise (BUMDes). This success reflects the Bandung Regency Government's initiative to encourage villages in the region to foster governance, development, and community empowerment innovations.

To effectively implement collective action in corruption prevention, several key elements must be fulfilled:

1. Establishing a Strong Alliance: Forming a group of stakeholders with aligned visions, missions, and objectives is crucial. This alliance must share a collective commitment to act against corruption and be prepared to collaborate within a well-defined framework.
2. Transparency and Accountability: Every party involved in collective action must be committed to operating with transparency and accountability. This means that all decisions and actions taken must be justifiable to the public and other stakeholders.
3. Implementation of Clear Standards: For collective action to be successful, clear ethical standards must be established and adhered to by all involved parties. These standards should cover various aspects, including corruption prevention, financial integrity, and transparency in decision-making processes.

4. Monitoring and Evaluation: To ensure the effectiveness of collective action, it is essential to have an independent monitoring and evaluation mechanism. This ensures that any violations can be detected and addressed appropriately.

With the implementation of collective action, various stakeholders can unite to create a fairer and more transparent system, ensuring that corruption can be effectively controlled or even eradicated. This model then generates collective action recommendations for corruption prevention based on the modus operandi of village fund corruption. The common corruption schemes in village fund misappropriation are as follows (Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2018):
1. Budget Inflation (Mark-up): One of the most prevalent corruption methods involves inflating budget costs, particularly in the procurement of goods and services.
2. Fictitious Projects: In this scheme, village governments fabricate non-existent projects or activities (fictitious projects) to gain access to village fund disbursements for personal gain.
3. Fictitious Reports: This method involves manipulating reports so that they do not reflect the actual implementation of activities, projects, or budget plans (RAB – Rencana Anggaran Biaya).
4. Embezzlement: This scheme is similar to the concept of embezzlement in criminal law (KUHP), where assets are obtained legally but misappropriated for unauthorized personal use.
5. Budget Misuse: This is another common form of corruption in village fund management. It occurs when funds that were allocated for specific planning and development purposes are diverted and used for unrelated activities.

Collective action involving various actors to prevent village fund corruption must be carried out synergistically, both from technical aspects (such as audits, technology utilization, and accurate reporting) and non-technical aspects (such as public awareness campaigns, capacity building, and community engagement). Each actor plays a complementary rolein planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation to prevent the misuse of village funds, including budget inflation, fictitious projects, falsified reports, embezzlement, and budget misappropriation.

The implementation of collective action in preventing village fund corruption presents various positive and negative implications across multiple dimensions. Increased accountability and transparency are among the key benefits, as joint oversight by multiple actors fosters openness in village fund management. Village heads and local officials become more cautious in planning and budgeting, reducing the potential for budget inflation and misappropriation. However, intensive supervision can impose additional administrative and bureaucratic burdens on village governments, especially if capacity-building initiatives for village officials are not simultaneously improved.

Another critical impact of collective action is the strengthening of public trust. Stakeholder collaboration in village fund oversight promotes greater public confidence in governance, as community engagement in monitoring and reporting increases public participation in development and reinforces collective responsibility. However, if monitoring mechanisms lack transparency or violations are not addressed properly, public trust in village governance may deteriorate. Effectiveness in budget oversight and control also improves under this framework. Stronger monitoring systems prevent corruption schemes, such as fictitious projects, falsified reports, embezzlement, and budget misallocation, while integrated reporting systems allow for early fraud detection. Nonetheless, excessive monitoring requirements or misaligned regulations with available human resources can complicate processes and slow down fund disbursement.

Community empowerment and strengthened participation are crucial for sustainable governance. When communities actively engage in planning, implementation, and oversight, they develop a stronger sense of ownership over village development. This fosters higher-quality public participation in deliberations and better decision-making. However, low public awareness or limited knowledge of monitoring mechanisms may restrict participation, opening opportunities for vested interest groups to manipulate decisions. The strengthening of village government capacity is another essential factor, as training and technical guidance from government bodies and academia enhance the competence of village officials in managing funds transparently and accountably. A potential challenge, however, lies in the lack of financial support and institutional commitment to sustainable capacity-building programs.

Collective efforts also contribute to the reduction of corruption levels, as enhanced transparency, proactive monitoring, and stricter legal enforcement deter fraudulent activities. Governments implementing accountable governance systems are less likely to be involved in corruption. Yet, when anti-corruption measures and supervisionlack consistent enforcement or clear policies, budget leaks and corruption risks may persist. Increased efficiency in village fund management is another expected outcome of collaborative oversight, allowing for better-aligned fund allocation to development programs that genuinely reflect community needs. However, overly rigid monitoring may slow project implementation or create budget inefficiencies, while stakeholder conflicts over monitoring responsibilities may further disrupt project execution.

Strengthening legal and social legitimacy is a significant benefit of collective governance, as transparency and public participation in fund management enhance credibility and reinforce trust in local governments. If preventive measures remain unclear or stakeholders fail to fulfill their responsibilities, however, this may weaken governance legitimacy and further reduce public trust. The optimized use of technology also plays a critical role in improving transparency. Digital reporting and real-time monitoring tools accelerate fraud detection and increase public access to financial information. Nonetheless, technological adoption requires proper infrastructure and skilled personnel, and without adequate technical capacity, it may become a hindrance rather than a solution.

Finally, challenges in stakeholder coordination remain a key issue. Effective coordination fosters synergy between government agencies, civil society, and other stakeholders, leading to more efficient corruption prevention strategies. Conversely, poor coordination results in overlapping responsibilities, ineffective communication, and a lack of accountability, ultimately undermining governance effectiveness. By integrating these collective action principles, stakeholders can develop a more transparent and accountable governance system, ensuring that village fund corruption is effectively controlled or eradicated.

For the collaborative governance model in village fund corruption prevention to function effectively, several key prerequisites must be met. Strong leadership is a crucial factor, where village heads and their officials must demonstrate a commitment to transparency and accountability, supported by both central and regional governments. Capacity building is also essential, achieved through training and education for village governments, Village Consultative Bodies (BPD), regional inspectorates, and communities in aspects of financial management, oversight, and relevant legal frameworks.

Additionally, effective coordination and collaboration among actors must be strengthened by clarifying roles and responsibilities and establishing structured communication forums, such as village deliberations or cross-agency coordination meetings. The use of technology plays a vital role in creating a more transparent oversight system, including integrated reporting systems and digital monitoring platforms to prevent fund mismanagement.

From a regulatory perspective, clear policies and effective law enforcement must be implemented, with regular audits and strict sanctions for violators. Public participation is also a critical factor, ensuring involvement in the planning, implementation, and supervision of village funds while being educated on their rights and responsibilities to ensure proper budget utilization.

Institutional silos and bureaucratic barriers among actors must be minimized by streamlining bureaucracy and fostering a shared commitment to corruption prevention. Support from media and academia also plays a crucial role in disseminating information, monitoring policies, and providing data-driven recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of village fund management. Regular evaluation and follow-up on monitoring results should be conducted to ensure that this collaborative model continues to evolve and sustain a clean, transparent, and accountable governance system for village funds.

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