Reflections of the EU Normative Agenda toward First and Second Russia-Chechen Conflicts

Md. Shafiqur Rahaman
Department of History, Pabna University of Science Technology, Bangladesh

Corresponding Author: Md. Shafiqur Rahaman, E-mail: shafiq.rahman@pust.ac.bd

ABSTRACT
Over the decades, the normative approach has been considered as the decisive external policy gear of the EU. But, the limitation of the policy divulges its future application to an external country, promoting the question: Is the EU a normative power, or has it failed to implement its normative policy towards an external country? This paper aims to analyze the normative strategy of the EU and its constraints during the first and second Russia-Chechen conflicts. It investigated the EU normative policy regarding the conflicts and revealed the strategic chemistry of the EU-Russia relation, which fluctuated from time to time. It argues the EU normative discourses toward conflicts were sporadic in character and consisted of verbal and, at best, some written criticisms occasionally. Predominantly, The EU largely disregards the application of its normative values to the Chechen case; instead, it prioritizes its economic and bilateral relations with Russia. However, the 9/11 incident in the USA and the post 9/11 Russian hostage crisis developed the EU normative policy as a less important policy for Chechen conflicts.

KEYWORDS
EU, Normative, Chechen, Conflict, Russia.

ARTICLE INFORMATION
ACCEPTED: 01 May 2024
PUBLISHED: 18 May 2024
DOI: 10.32996/jhsss.2024.6.5.18

1. Introduction
The first (1994-1996) and second Russo-Chechen conflicts (1999-2003) are marked as influential conflicts in Russian history since the termination of the USSR. It occurred between the Chechen fighters and the government of Russia. The dissolution of the USSR and the subsequent political volatility of Russia postulated the forecourt of these conflicts. In 1994, under the leadership of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the formal Soviet Major General of Air Force, the first Chechen conflict was incepted, and it lasted for two years. The decisive goalmouth of the Chechen fighters was to create a free and sovereign Chechen Republic on the foundation of Islamic Sharia. Moscow demarcated the crisis as a separatist and a terrorist movement. Consequently, Moscow began its military operation against the fighters. In May 1997, Yeltsin, the Russian President and the Chechen leader Maskhadov scorched a peace treaty, but the question of Chechen liberation was not resolved. Consequently, after around two years of peace treaty, under the leadership of Shamil Babayev, the second Chechen conflict was begun in 1999. Like in the first Chechen conflict, Moscow did not recognize their independence and identified them as separatist terrorists. The second Chechen conflict was longer than the first conflict. The focal frontline war lasted until April 2000, but the uprising phase lasted until 2009.

Since the commencement of Moscow’s military operation against the Chechen conflicts, the EU critiqued Moscow’s operation and grumbled that Moscow violated international norms of fundamental human rights. They demanded that Moscow should respect the rudimentary code of international human rights to protect Chechen civilians. But Moscow denied the EU’s normative approach and claimed that Russian soldiers did not violate fundamental human rights; rather, they were fighting against terrorism in Chechnya. The conflicts of Chechnya raised tautness between the EU-Russia relations, which progressed them into a subdued diplomatic profile. This study endeavors to find the EU’s normative agenda toward the first and second Chechen conflicts through two major research questions: (1) How did the EU respond to its normative policy toward the first and second Chechen conflicts? (2) Why did the EU fail to apply its normative agenda toward the first and second Russia-Chechen conflicts?
2. Literature Review
There are some noticeable scholarly academic works undertaken on the Russo-Chechen conflict and its human rights violations. However, we get little exact academic work on the EU normative agenda toward the first and second Russia-Chechen conflicts. For instance, Farlane (2000) identified the international communities’ approach to the Russia-Chechnya conflicts. He argued that intranational communities’ pressure against Russian human rights violations in Chechnya was tiny, which did not create any effect on Russia. Francis (2008) stressed the institutional ability and the limitations of the Council of Europe and the European Union. More precisely, he compared the Council of Europe. More precisely, he compared the Council of Europe and the European Union’s role in preventing human rights violations in these conflicts. Kuzio (1996) sketched an overall overview of the international reaction to the first Chechen crisis, but a little bit provided the EU’s reaction to the crisis. He accentuated the Muslim world and the USA’s reaction against Russian policy. Haukkala (2009) defined EU-Russia relations from three perspectives: hard power, market power and normative power. However, in the normative section, he explained only the second Chechen war. Gerber and Mendelson (2008) stressed the Russian view of the second Chechen war but did not provide an EU approach to the second Chechen war. Forsberg & Herd (2005) published a worthy scholarly work on the Russia-Chechen conflicts. They argue to maintain strategic relations with Russia, the EU considered its normative agenda in implementing Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) to Russia. I would rather argue that the EU’s idealistic normative approach was sold by its realistic national interest.

3. Methodology
The study used qualitative research techniques. For the primary sources, it used mostly the EU states’ prime ministers and foreign ministers’ discourses on the first and second Russia-Chechen conflicts. It collected the official documents (Resolutions, summit declarations, Parliamentary debates) of the EU from the officials’ webs of the EU. It also stressed the discourses of the Russian President and Prime Ministers, and its officials’ discourses on Chechen conflicts have been collected from the Russian govt. Webs and reliable television and newspapers. The Secondary sources have been collected mainly from online scholarly books, journals and newspapers. However, the study used the accessible online electronic resources of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation.

Defining EU Normative Approach and Russian Context.

“Normative” emanates from the Latin word “Norma”, which means “rule”, “regulation”, or “a guideline”. In general, “Normative” denotes normative behavior or values. Britannica dictionary defines normative as the precise “way of doing something.” Predominantly, Britannica demarcated this as a wide-ranging framework. In international relations, normative means one type of order that is better or safer for the world order. In Western academia, this safer world order is referred to as the liberal order, which denotes democracy, human rights, rule of law and freedom of speech-based order where the authoritarian type order is not accepted (Baylis et al., 2020).

Historically, the EU normative approach came from its “civilization power” approach. In the early 1970s, Political forecaster and Journalist Francois Duchene first appealed to the EU as a civilian power. He urged his approach at such a time when the world was divided between the capitalist and socialist blocs. This ideological war clearly divided the world. He noted that Europe is developing more as a pivotal actor in the international arena than the USA and USSR’s armed tactics (Yonca ÖZER, 2012a). His strategy was to familiarise Europe as a civilian power rather than the two-supower’s military defiance. He believed the EU could take an inimitable place in the international area by following civilian powers. In fact, the arms competition of the two superpowers and a proxy war in several places of the world demanded a civilian international actor. Duchene argued that Europe should be an example of civilian power by undertaking political cooperation in the global arena, which would demonstrate Europe as the dominant civil power in the world (Yonca ÖZER, 2012b). He argued that Europe should play its role as a politico-economic actor on the basis of cooperation. This role would be placed in Europe as a unique role than a military superpower like the USA or the USSR.

According to him, this civilian power, on the basis of politico-economic cooperation, would be more sustainable and recognized internationally than a military superpower. He accentuated that a united European civilian power would play a focal role in setting a nonviolent order in the world. Europe should not have a dream of a military superpower. This United civilian power dream would lead Europe to the center of global civilian power. Whitman recognizes Duchene’s civilian approach was based on the de-nuclearization of Europe and kept away Western Europe from the war (Whitman Richard G. 1998). In the 1970, this civilian approach was noted as the crucial external approach of Europe. Yonca ÖZER (2012c) claimed that in the 1970s, Europe’s civilian approach had two major characteristics: to find Europe as an economic power along with little military power and being an international actor exploring democracy and the rule of law in the international arena.

Without Duchene, there are several schools in international relations, and they have different perspectives on civilian, military and normative power.
Table 1 Civilian, Military and Normative Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Normative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carr</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galtung</td>
<td>Remunerative</td>
<td>Punitive</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manners</td>
<td>Ability to use civilian instruments</td>
<td>Ability to use military instruments</td>
<td>Ability to shape conceptions of normal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Article F - EU Treaty (Maastricht 1992), Document 11997M006

So, civilian power’s meaning in IR schools is chiefly based on an economic approach which denies military supremacy. Notably, Duchene’s argument for Europe’s global civilian power was not sustained for a long time. Due to transatlantic problems, the European civilian power turned into military power. This turning to military power created a large level of debate among IR scholars. Hedley Bull, the forerunner of the English school, spicily criticized Europe as not being a civilian power. He claimed that Europe should not depend on others for its security; rather, Europe should establish a self-sufficient military base for its security (Manners, 2002).

After the denouement of the USSR, Europe pungently incepted its involvement to extend its normative mission in central and eastern Europe. During the Soviet period, central and eastern Europe’s pro-communist countries were ruled by the authoritarian Soviet model. In this model, the core Western values, democracy, market economy, freedom of speech and human rights, had been demolished by the authoritarian Soviet regime. Europe (mainly Western) thought that the dissolution of the USSR was an opportunity to back Eastern and Central Europe to Europe’s core normative values. In the mission, Europe’s foreign policy was not only bound to support its normative idea in the Central and Eastern Europe region, but they took some actions to protect it’s neighbor countries’ democracy and human rights (Zielonka, 2013).

In Addition, the dream of European integration became successful under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Article 6 of the treaty clearly conditioned that the European Union was established on the core values of liberty, democracy, human rights, freedom of speech and the rule of law (Treaty on European Union (consolidated version), 1992). In 1993, the European Union added Copenhagen criteria for the accession of its members (European Commission, 1993). The accession criteria clearly mentioned that to affiliate with the EU membership, all candidate countries should have to endorse democracy, the rule of law, human rights and, respect and protection of minorities in politics and economics, a market economy but functioning and competitive in character. In the expansive, the EU’s non-military approach, meaning civilian foreign policy, was shifted to a normative approach in the 1990s. Ian Manners said normative power is one kind of power that does not mostly depend on military power, but is exercised by norms rather than military and economic priorities (Manners, 2002b). In other words, the normative power of Europe denotes the idealistic approach of European values, which explores peaceful order. It’s not a military or not quite economic but rather idealistic values (democracy, human rights and the rule of law) which are labored by opinion (Berenskoetter and Williams, 2007).

In the context of Russia, the country has committed to venerate the EU’s normative values since the full member of COE in 1996 and pledged to respect the PCA and TACIS partnership program pact with the EU member states (Francis, 2008). However, in response to the EU’s critiqued of human rights violations in Chechnya, Russia replied to their operation against the terrorist movement. At the same time, the EU did not take any proper steps to apply its normative values in the Chechen case; rather, it marinated its bilateral relations with Russia. This study defined the EU normative agenda as an idealistic shallow approach which is not fit for real world phenomena and the idealistic agenda (normative) by the realistic national interest.


1991 Dzhokhar, Dudayev, the formal Soviet Major General of the air force and his followers attacked the supreme Soviet of Chechen-Ingush. They killed the supreme leader of the communist party of the region and brutalized other communist party leaders. Their ultimate goal was to gain full independent from Moscow. In 1993, his government declared full scale independence of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On 29 November 1994, president Yeltsin declared to separatists to surrender and returned their arms to the central federal government. But Grozny denied surrendering to Moscow. Finally, Russia started its heavy attack in Grozny on 11 December 19994. The war lasted until 31 August 1996. Approximately thirty thousand Chechens and around four thousand Russian soldiers were killed in the first Chechen war (Pain, 2003). It is asserted that an immense number of civilians died, including children, and huge numbers of people were displaced during the war.

The EU had no crystal-clear normative agenda for the fundamental human rights violation during the first Chechen war. Since the commencement of the war, the EU’s policy was very tactical; they did not recognize Dudayev’s Chechen as an independent and sovereign country and also did not recognize the Russian invasion of Chechnya as colonialism (Forsberg & Herd, 2005a). The EU claimed Chechen should have the right to self-determination, but Russian territorial integrity must be ensured. The EU member states appealed that a large scale of civilian casualties, including extrajudicial killings, have been happened in Chechnya, but Russia is committed to maintaining international norms of human rights, which clearly defined in the UN charter. German defense minister...
Volker Ruhe demanded Russia unambiguously dishonored its promised treaty with the EU’s normative values, which decreased the EU’s trustworthiness with Russia (Forsberg & Herd, 2005b). The Italian, French, Dutch and Belgian foreign ministers criticized Russia’s human rights violations in Chechnya. They appealed that Russia respect the OSCE code of conduct. But their critiques were bound to be verbal only. They argued for a political solution only but not any economic sanctions against Russia (Kuzio, 1996a).

In fact, the EU believed Russia was violating human rights over Chechenia, but they were not ready to execute sanctions against Russia. Due to economic cooperation and energy dependency on Russia, the EU member states needed Russia rather than an idealistic human rights agenda. In this phase, the EU policy can be defined as a balanced policy from both sides. To solve the problem, the EU offered 4 provisions to Chechnya and Russia: (a.) OSCE presence in Chechnya(b.) easy access to humanitarian support, (c.) a cease fire, (d.) a political solution but would respect Russian territorial integrity (Kuzio, 1996b). But the solution did not succeed. Due to human rights concerns, the PCA went into a deep dilemma, and this dilemma accelerated EU-Russia relations into a low profile.

It is noteworthy that the EU criticized human rights violations not only for Russia but also for criticized Chechen armies’ human rights violations. The EU clearly condemned Chechen soldiers for the Budennovsk hostage crisis (June 1995) and the Pervomaiskoe hostage crisis (Jan.1996). After these hostage calamities, the EU’s normative discourses softened to Russia’s position in Chechnya and boldly criticized Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov’s policy for kidnapping and killing the hostages (Kuzio, 1996c). The first Chechen conflict came to an end with the signing of ‘Khasavyurt Treaty’ in August 1996. The EU welcomed the peace process but stated that the Chechen government should be formed by a free and fair election system. In a word, the EU normative agenda toward the first Chechen conflict was not a robust policy against Russia but a medium type oral critique only, and the EU did not take any economic sanction against Russia.

5. The EU Normative Agenda to Second Chechen War (1999-2003)
The second Russia-Chechen war began on 7th August with the declaration of independence of Shamil Babayev, a Chechen separatist leader, as Moscow claimed. At the same time, he and his followers invaded Dagestan and declared independence. They declared a holy war against Moscow and claimed their decisive goal was to create an Islamic republic in the arena. Moscow started its military operation on 6th September 1999. The main frontline war lasted until April 2000, but the uprising phase lasted until 2009. A large scale of civilian casualties, including 40000 civilians, were killed in the war (Gerber & Mendelson, 2008).

The EU normative policy regarding the second Chechen conflict was sharper than that of the first Chechen conflict. In this phase, the EU could not provide any trade sanctions against Russia, but the verbal critique was whetted than the first Chechen conflict. They made a draft to impose sanctions against Russia, but finally, they were destined for oral critiques only. In the commencement phase of the war, Finland became the president of the European Commission for July -December of 1999. Finland was one of the EU countries that accused Russia of human rights violations over Chechen civilians. In the course of the Finish presidency, at the end of November, the EU parliament urged to stop air strikes on Chechen civilians and for a ceasefire with a peaceful solution to the crisis (European Parliament resolution on Chechnya 1999). However, the parliament claimed that we were disturbed by the escalating civilian casualties by the Russian airstrikes and the calamitous condition of the civilians, fearing thousands of refugees, which would generate a threat to nearby countries. The resolutions also called to postpone the next OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Istanbul summit on 18-19 November until Russia limited its military clampdown over Chechnya. However, Russia did not care about this EU approach, and the Istanbul summit was held in a timely manner; this summit did not provide any major declaration on the Chechen issue without offering a political solution to the crisis (OSCE Summit Declaration,1999). Notably, the declaration robustly recognized Russian territorial integrity and condemned all forms of terrorism inside Russia.

In December 1999, the war situation in Chechen became worsened by the threat of Moscow. Russia declared an ultimatum to the Chechen fighters to leave Grozny City; otherwise, they would have to face death (Williams, 1999a). Following the havoc statement, the European Council Union called an emergency meeting on 10-11 December 1999. The council condemned Rush’s ultimatum of bombing the Grozno residents and called for a political negotiation with the elected Chechen authorities for an enduring peaceful solution (Presidency Conclusions, 1999, 11 December a). The council issued a statement on the Chechnya crisis, proposing possible sanctions encompassing the extraction of PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement) and trade sanctions (Williams, 1999b). However, the UK and Germany took a preventive position in favor of Russia. For them, the Council should not include any trade sanction in the deceleration. Concurrently, the deceleration claimed Russia is a crucial partner of the EU; EU members repetitively expressed they intended to solve the Chechen crisis by involving Russia, not isolating Russia (Presidency Conclusions, 1999, 11 December, b). Later, due to human rights violations, the European Commission postulated a draft for limited economic sanction to be discussed for the next meeting on 24 January 2000. The drafts included two-thirds of TACIS funding that should transfer to the European normative agenda: democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (Tailor & Chapman, 2000). However, conclusively, the sanction was not imposed on Russia. The main argument of the EU leaders was that this limited sanction would
not create any influence against Russia. However, GAC decided to suspend science and technology cooperation with Russia (Haukkala, 2009a).

The giant EU member states, UK, Germany, Italy and France, were against direct formal economic and trade sanctions against Russia. The UK Prime Minister Tony Blair clearly stood against economic sanctions. He uttered the EU parliament’s approach. He mentioned Chechen crisis could be solved by engaging Russia but not isolating Russia (Forsberg & Herd, 2005c). He said the allegation of Russian human rights violations must be studied very prudently; otherwise, we could not make any decisions against Russia (BBC, 2000). In mid-June 2000, Gerhard Schroder, the German Chancellor, met with the newly elected Russian president Mr. Putin. He said Mr Putin is an “open-minded” leader, meaning that sanctions should not apply against Russia; rather, a political solution would be better for Chechen conflicts (Haukkala, 2009b). As expressed, Mr. Chancellor, Germany is ready to establish a robust bilateral relationship with the new Russian government (Haukkala, 2009c). Basically, he intended to remark that Germany is not ready to impose economic sanctions against Russia; rather, his country is fully prepared to build a strong bilateral relationship with Russia.

France, the other economic and political giant member of the European Union, made a strategic statement during the second Chechen conflict. Since the conflicts, France has provided hard discourses on the UK’s position on the Chechen issue. Notably, the French presidency of the EU from July to December 2000 scored France’s pivotal position on Chechen conflicts. During the French presidency in June 2000, The European Council drafted a resolution that claimed Russian human rights violations against Chechen citizens and demanded avoiding excessive force in Chechnya. (Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 2000, June 19-20). The resolution claimed a political solution to the crisis, but it did not mention how it would work for a longer peaceful position. The resolution can be identified as routine work that has no influence over conflicts.

During the France presidential tenure of the EU Council, In October 2000, Mr. Putin visited Paris. It was his first visit to Paris since his presidency. Moscow expected major bilateral cooperation with France. However, French officials and the media centered the Chechen issue on the discussion table. They identified the conflicts as a violation of human rights and stated that the crisis should be done by politicians only (CNN, 2000). In response to the Chechen issue, Mr. Putin clearly mentioned that he is specially interested in talking about business, especially oil and gas, with France and Russia not agreeing to sit for political dialogue with the terrorists (McNeil Jr, 2000). However, In October 2000, the Russia-EU summit noted a political solution to the Chechen crisis, but it was never practised until the end of the conflict. It is worthy that France’s critique was destined only orally and denied to impose any economic sanction against Russia. French foreign minister Vedrine claimed we are concerned about the Chechen conflict, but Russia is a big country, and we cannot avoid it. We should maintain a good relationship with Russia (Forsberg and Herd, 2005d). His discourse on “big country” means Russia is a big country in terms of economy, politics and technology. The EU should consider Russia as a giant partner in economy, politics and technology rather than its human rights violations in Chechnya.

After the French presidency, In January 2001, Sweden became the president of the EU Council for the next six months. In mid-June of the Swedish presidency, the Goteborg summit emphasized special care for the human rights violations of Chechen inhabitants. This summit urged that the ongoing dire state of Chechnya is our serious concern; to extricate this dire condition, an urgent political solution is needed (Presidency Conclusion, 2001a). The summit claimed the defilement of human rights is the function of perpetrators, and they must face a trial (Presidency Conclusion, 2001b). The discourses of the summit were crucial in cresting pressure on Russia. Following the EU pressure, at the summit, Russia agreed to team up with the EU to provide humanitarian assistance to Chechnya. In practice, the Chechen people were agonized over the lack of humanitarian assistance.

6. 9/11 Attack and Russian Hostage Crisis: The Fall of EU Normative Discourses

The EU verbal critiques and official routine resolution against Russian human rights violations have been unstiffened since the 9/11 attack on the USA. After this incident, US President Bush addressed the nation; now, the states of the world would have to make decisions; either you are with the USA, or you are with terrorists (The Washington Post, 2001). Actually, he started a “global war on terrorism” and claimed those countries supporting terrorism would be considered hostile to the USA. The USA desired all influential countries to support the USA against the combat. Russia was not a good friendly country to the USA, but at this moment, Russia’s position on the “global war on terrorism” was very pivotal to the USA. Predominantly, the EU was placed into a dilemma in defining human rights violations in Chechnya. The USA, the foremost ally of the EU, robustly demanded war against terrorism while Russia was supporting the US war against terrorism, but claimed the 9/11 attack and the Chechen separatist terrorism are in the same banyan tree. Russia clearly stated al-Qaeda has a robust connection with Chechen fighters. To calculate the US’s demand for war against terrorism and Russia’s appeal to Chechen fighters and their importance in global politics, the EU considered cooperating with US-led war against terrorism as its first choice and appeared as being a normative actor in the Chechen issue against Russia.

In this phase, the EU’s normative approach was occupied by its realistic security interest. To take firm action on the 9/11 incident, on 21 September 2001, the EU called an emergency extraordinary meeting. In the meeting, the EU expressed its strong solidarity with the US action and stated the EU is ready to work meticulously with Russia against terrorism (Conclusion and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, 2001). Next month, in the Brussels declaration, the EU again
declared its “unequivocal” support against terrorism and collaboration with Russia (Declaration by the Heads of the State or Government of the European Union, 2001 October 19)). The 9/11 incident can be considered as being a dynamic bridge which connected the EU and Russia in a single line to work together against terrorism. In this bonding, Chechen human rights violations had been translated by the 9/11 incidents. At the end of December 2001, the EU leaders annually met in Laeken, Belgium. The Laeken declaration skipped the Chechen issue. Rather, it emphasized explicit cooperation with Russia in the field of security and trade (European Council Meeting in Leaken, 2001)

Predominately, the EU ignored its normative approach to the Chechen issue since the 9/11 incident. It seemed their normative discourses against Russian human rights violations had been changed promptly. The driving force of the EU: Germany, France and the UK clearly said that the Chechen conflict should be redefined through the lens of the 9/11 attack. The giant EU countries, Germany, France and the UK, took the US led war against terrorism and claimed terrorism must be uprooted, whether it appeared in the USA or Chechnya. At the end of September 2001, Mr. Putin visited Germany. In a press conference with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, he said that it is crystal clear that Russia and Germany will work against terrorism globally (Cable News Network, 2001). The Schroeder’s meeting with Mr. Putin changed Germany’s normative approach toward Chechen conflicts. Predominantly, Germany translated Russia’s human rights violation on the basis of the 9/11 incident and identified Russia as the major partner in the US led combat against terrorism globally.

Lionel Jospin, the French Prime Minister, said terrorism must be uprooted from any part of the world, including Chechnya. He added this did not mean that the Russian military could not do anything as they wished in Chechnya; rather, Russia should move on to a permanent political solution to establish peace in Chechnya. The Italian foreign minister was slightly different from the German and UK’s approach to Russian human rights violations in Chechnya. He provided verbal critiques, but he was against any trade sanctions of Russia.

However, since the 9/11 incident, the UK’s position has been much stronger in favor of Russia than Germany in translating Russia’s human rights violations in the Chechen conflicts. Mr. Blair clearly declared that our critique of Russian Chechen policy should be redefined by the 9/11 incident, and the whole acuity of Russia in the Western world has been significantly renovated since 9/11 (Forsberg & Herd, 2005e). He claimed that Russia is now the major partner of the Western world in the war against terrorism. Providing this speech, he ignored Russia’s human rights violations in Chechnya, and he amalgamated the 9/11 terrorist attack with the Chechen fighters’ attack inside Russia. He robustly accepted Russia’s position in defining Chechen conflicts. He justified Russia’s attack on Chechenia with the 1999 bombing in Russia, where 200 Russians were killed by the Chechen terrorists, as Moscow claimed (The Guardian, 2001). At the same time, Mr. Blair emphasized Russia’s right of self-determination rather than its human rights violation in Chechnya. Basically, Mr. Blair strategically defined the Chechen fighters as the extremists and warned Moscow to provide a deep lens over the extremists so that it would not extend to the neighbor’s countries.

The 9/11 led the EU to seek security bonding with Russia. Post 9/11, EU external policy to Chechnya was far more pragmatic than its traditional normative approach. This approach reached a Zenith when the crisis (2002) and Beslan tragedy (2004) were happened by the Chechen fighters. For the Nord-Ost hostage crisis (2002), Chechen fighters demanded Russian aggression against Chechnya and the full fledge freedom of Chechnya (Margarita Vorsina et al., 2021). Russia denied their demand and provided a robust military operation against them. The crisis came to an end on 26 October 2002 with the killing of 130 hostages, 40 fighters and over 700 were injured. Mr. Putin identified this attack as a deadly attack and boldly declared that Russia would reply against this tragic event according to its chosen time and place (Myers, 2002).

The hostage crises promoted EU-Russia cooperation in the section of security, and concurrently, the EU Council revealed its bottomless sympathy for Russia against Chechen insurgents. This approach diverted the EU normative discourses into a pro-Russian approach. After the Nord-Ost hostage crisis, the European Council (Presidency Conclusion, 2002) noticed we were shocked by the terrible hostage crisis, which could not be justified by any cause. They added we strongly supported Russian government initiatives against terrorism, and the EU is ready to explore its anti-terrorism collaboration with Russia.

Later, the Beslan tragedy of 2004 was done by the command of Shamil Basayev, a Chechen fighter whose followers sieged Beslan school and demanded the complete uprooting of the Russian forces from the Chechen and freedom for Chechen Republic Ichkeriya (Philips, 2007). 334 hostages were killed amid the crisis, 188 of them were children, and almost 600 more were injured in the incident (Tuathali, 2009). The EU showed unconditional sympathy for the families who lost their members. The tragedy accelerated the anti-Chechen approach; as mentioned in the EU Commission (2004) document, it is very clear that the Chechen fighters were responsible for the terrible attack, which cannot be justified by any argument. Concurrently, the EU parliament provided a long discussion on the Beslan tragedy on 15 September 2004. The session was weighted by Ben Bot, a Dutch foreign minister, who demanded a minute silence to commemorate the victims of the tragedy all over Europe’s schools Verbatim Report (2004). In the session, Koch-Mehrin, a German leader, noted the Western world is horrified by the atrocity of the attack. We believe these Chechen fighters are not the freedom fighters; they are the factual murderer. These calamities languid Russian human rights violations in
Chechnya and scoped an opportunity for Russia to believe that the Chechen fighters were the terrorists, which Russia claimed from the inception of the conflicts. In the expansive, the EU’s normative critique against Russian human rights violations became dull and less pivotal to its Chechnya policy. Basically, the EU human rights discourses became dull after the tragedy, and they did not take any major action which prevented Russian human rights violations in Chechnya.

7. Evaluation of Why the EU Failed to Impose Economic and Trade Sanctions Against Russia

The EU’s failure to implement economic and trade sanctions against Russia can be identified from five major causes: First, due to the bilateral relations, the giant EU members were not ready to provide any direct trade sanctions against Russia. It is crystal clear that the EU members were against any trade and economic sanctions; they claimed Russia is a “big” country and we should maintain a robust connection with Russia. This connection is linked to bilateral economic links with Russia. According to the figures, the UK imported £2000 million worth of goods from Russia in 2000 (James Goddard, 2022). In the same year, Germany exported $1.14 billion worth of goods to Russia and purchased $1.29 billion worth of goods from Russia (Russia/Germany, 2022). In 2000, Italy exported $543 million worth of commodities to Russia in 2000, while $357 million worth of goods were imported in 2002 from Russia (Italy/Russia, 2023). In 2002, France purchased $549 million worth of commodities from Russia and exported $283 million worth of goods to Russia (Russia/Italy, 2022). However, it is well-meant that the European countries are decidedly dependent on Russian energy resources, and the EU cannot run their economy and house lives without this indispensable stuff. This robust economic connection and dependency on Russian energy resources demotivated EU countries to impose an economic sanction against Russia because the economic isolation of Russia would be harmful to EU trade and its economy.

Second, The EU had no clear normative agenda for the Chechen conflicts. Even in December 1999, when the war situation was grasped into a worse condition while Russia was declaring to the Chechen people, ‘leave Grozny or die’. In this critical moment, the EU planned a sanction against Russia, but the proposed plan was vague. There were no provisions in the plan about how these sanctions would be activated against Russia. This strategy might be characterized as an extremely ambiguous policy in which the EU did not implement its normative approach with any seriousness. By offering this nebulous normative approach, the EU mostly foiled its normative policy against Russia.

Third, there was disagreement among EU members over the sanctions to be imposed on Russia. Particularly betrayed by four giants: Germany, the UK, Italy, and France created an anti-sanction playground at EU summits. These four giant states’ anti-sanctioning policies against Russia constructed the EU’s policy as an anti-sanctioned policy, and the other EU members adopted this stance in response to their anti-Russian stance. Poland was strict in providing sanctions, but it was not an influential country in the EU in politics and economy. In the expansive, the less influential EU countries’ pro-sanction approach against Russia did not work.

Fourth, Since the 9/11 incident, the conventional narrative of “terrorism” has changed and “terrorism” has become a related word to Muslims. The Western world sensed that they needed Russia’s support to start a “global war on terrorism.” They thought Russia was a prevailing country that had political influence across the world and could play a vigorous role globally in the global war on terrorism. Actually, the EU normative lens toward the Chechens has changed drastically since the 9/11 incident. They generalized Chechen fighters as part of global terrorism. They defined Russo-Chechen conflicts in the light of the 9/11 incident but not their normative framework. This approach pushed them to stop critiques against Russia in the conflicts.

Fifth: The Nord-Ost hostage crisis (2002) and Beslan tragedy (2004) created a deep sympathy for Russia globally. In the post 9/11 hostage crisis, Russia robustly appealed that the Chechen fighters were the terrorists, and Russia gained vigorous support from the EU countries to define the Chechen fighters as a terrorist group. Moreover, in the post 9/11, the Western construction of terrorism was the background for shaping Chechen fighters as the terrorist, and post 9/11 Russian hostage crisis reached the culmination of the phase where the EU supported and honored Russia by providing their whole hearted sympathy for this tragic hostage crisis and their Normative approach to Chechnya shifted as a quite less important agenda against Russian attack. In this period, the EU ignored its traditional normative approach against Russian human rights violations in Chechnya. Predominately, the EU brought a realistic anti-Chechen approach by selling an idealistic normative approach to Chechnya.

8. Conclusion

After the end of the USSR, the first and second Russo-Chechen conflicts were the longest and most bloody conflicts within the European border. The conflict happened during such a time when Russia was enhancing its politico-economic cooperation with the EU. The inception of Moscow’s attack in Chechnya, mostly the civilian casualties, were faced to face the EU’s normative interest in the conflicts. However, the EU’s normative interest in the conflicts was a strategic one in which the EU countries mostly emphasized their realistic interest rather than its normative agenda in establishing human rights in Chechnya. For instance, the EU normative approach in the first Russo-Chechen conflict can be defined as the balance policy. In this phase, the EU’s main goal was to establish a well-adjusted relationship with Russia, but for the normative agenda, their critiques were bound only orally. In the second Chechen conflict, the EU’s verbal critiques were sharpened, and they drafted a very limited sanction against Russia. But finally, the EU member states have reached a decision that this limited sanction would not create any pressure on Russia. In
addition, the major powerful EU member states were against any direct formal economic sanction against Russia, which sold the idealistic (normative) agenda to the realistic national interest. The 9/11 incident and post 9/11 Russian hostage crisis by the Chechen fighters led the EU normative agenda to turn to Russian sympathy, and this policy made the EU normative agenda a vain agenda toward Chechnya. In the post 9/11 hostage crisis, the EU was no longer a normative performer in Chechnya; rather, it appeared as an outsider strategic political actor only who accentuated that the crisis should be resolved by politics alone.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers.

References


