

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Effect of the Director's Tax Expertise, the Tax Consultant Profession and the Frequency of the Board of Commissioners' Meetings on Tax Avoidance

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to determine the effect of the application of the Director's Tax Expertise, the Profession of Tax Consultant and the Frequency of Board Commissioners' Meetings on Tax Avoidance. This study uses a quantitative method, with the data reaching a total of 205 financial reports from 2015 to 2019. The results of this study indicate that the expertise of the director (in the field of taxation, the tax consultant profession and the frequency of board meetings have a significant effect on tax avoidance. The findings of this study are that the use of ex-DGT tax consultants contributes to an increase in the incidence of tax avoidance. This research only uses secondary data where the interpretation of the resulting data is very perceptive.

KEYWORDS

CEO Tax Expertise, Tax Consultant, Commissioners Surveillance, Tax Avoidance

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
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1. Introduction

Tax Receipts are the most significant part of the state budget revenue (Macek, 2015). It was expected that in 2019 the country would have revenues of Rp 2,165,111.8 billion. The targeted tax of this amount is Rp1,786,378.6 billion, or approximately 83% of the total state revenue as a whole. The increase is inseparable from efforts to improve tax research, increase compliance and mobilization of taxpayers, increase the transparency of tax information and international tax treaties, as well as increased attention as well as law enforcement in the field of taxation (Ministry of Finance, 2019).

Indonesia's economic development, conducted by the Organization Of Economic Developing Countries (OECD) in 2018, shows that incomes are still low compared to other developing countries. Despite the increase in mandatory registration, the challenge remains compliance. The administrative power of taxation, the level of corruption and the morality of taxes (or the willingness of the public to pay taxes) are also strongly related to the level of tax receipts (OECD, 2014).



Source: OECD 2020

Issues that must be considered by the government that proves to be the reason for the weakening of income from the tax sector are tax evasion covering the underground economy and how to avoid global taxes (Profit Shifting / BEPS and Base Erosion). Underground economy activities, known as the shadow economy, are legal and illegal economic activities covered by official authorities aiming to prevent tax payments, avoid government offices, exploit the quality of political institutions, and weaken the law.

Medina and Schneider (2019) suggested that underground economy activities in Indonesia during the period 1991-2015 gained an average of 24.11 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, other countries in one region, such as Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand, scored an average score of 50.63%, 18.70%, 31.49%, and 39.31%, respectively. It appears that Indonesia's shadow economy activity compared to Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines is lower. But during the period 2010-2015, underground economy activities in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand faced a considerable weakening. On the other hand, Vietnam and Indonesia tend to remain. The gap of 24.11% means that the level of taxpayers in Indonesia is still low. Underground economic activities cause tax ratios inconsistent with GDP growth (Medina & Schneider, 2019).

In this study, the practice of underground economy is termed as Tax Avoidance of tax avoidance due to weak tax law in Indonesia. Fenomena above shows that the potential of Indonesian tax revenue from the corporate sector is still very large. The role of the Board of Directors and the role of tax consultants play an important role as the key to the problem of tax avoidance in corporations.

In relation to the tax structure in Indonesia dominated by corporations (OECD,2018), it is very important to be considered regulators in finding alternatives to solving this tax avoidance problem. The Board of Directors, one of the elements of Corporate Governance, plays a very important role in corporate decision making as the holder of the highest rank and position in the company (Ege et al., 2020). Research conducted by Lanis & Richardson (2012), Taylor & Richardson (2014), and Khaola & Moez (2019) shows that directors who have experience and expertise in the field of taxation significantly influence tax avoidance. The selection of the right characteristics of the board of directors will greatly affect the implementation of good governance in the corporation.

Summary of the tax structure in Indonesia	Tax Revenues in national currency			Tax structure in Indonesia		
	Indonesian Rupiah, Billions			% in GDP		
	2018	2017	Δ	2018	2017	Δ
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains	749 977	646 800	+ 103 177	5.1	4.8	+ 0.3
of which	-	-	-	-	-	-
Personal income, profits and gains	156 428	182 835	- 26 406	1.1	1.3	- 0.3
Corporate income and gains	593 549	463 965	+ 129 584	4.0	3.4	+ 0.6
Social security contributions	61 993	54 401	+ 7 591	0.4	0.4	+ 0.0
Taxes on goods and services	743 395	674 209	+ 69 186	5.0	5.0	+ 0.0
of which	-	-	-	-	-	-
Value added taxes / Goods and services tax	520 390	464 477	+ 55 913	3.5	3.4	+ 0.1
Taxes on specific goods and services	205 470	192 502	+ 12 969	1.4	1.4	- 0.0
of which	-	-	-	-	-	-
Excises	159 589	153 288	+ 6 300	1.1	1.1	- 0.1
Customs and import duties	39 117	35 066	+ 4 051	0.3	0.3	+ 0.0
Other taxes	210 226	191 319	+ 18 906	1.4	1.4	+ 0.0
TOTAL	1 765 590	1 566 729	+ 198 861	11.9	11.5	+ 0.4

Source: OECD 2020

The second extension that has an influence on tax avoidance in corporate companies is the use of tax practitioners as consultants for tax planning in the company. The importance of this study underlines Wurth & Braithwaite's (2016) statement that most tax practitioners tend to inadvertently engage in illegal behavior. The phenomenon that occurs in some countries is the existence of tax practitioners who were originally former state tax officials. Barrios & Gallemore (2019) stated that tax related human resources have a significant effect on tax planning. Menegaskan that tax practitioners of former state tax officials tend to do tax planning because of his deep knowledge of tax regulation obtained while working for the government.

The frequency of board meetings and attendance is only two-dimensional from the supervision of the board. Empirical evidence largely supports the effect of monitoring the board over managers (Schwartz & Weisbach, 2013). However, the effectiveness of board meetings is difficult to define and assess (Chou, Chung, & Yin, 2013). Of particular relevance to this study is the relationship between the frequency of board meetings and profit management as one of the indicators of tax avoidance (Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). Managers have a significant influence on the level of tax avoidance in a company. Although they are traditionally regarded as acting in the interests of shareholders, agency theory argues that there is a principal-agent problem (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009), whereby tax avoidance reflects the opportunistic behavior of managers both to increase short-term profits and also to hide bad news from shareholders (Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011).

Governance plays a significant role in tax avoidance (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). Dyreng et al. (2010) stipulate that individual executives control a significant role in regulating the level of tax avoidance committed by the company. Viewed from the agency's point of view, the commissioner monitors the actions of managers and increases the frequency of board meetings, thus, improving the quality of corporate governance (Lin et al., 2014). The effect of monitoring is to allow better alignment of interests between agents and principals to influence tax avoidance activities (Barros & Sarmento, 2019).

At this time, to find out the influence of the tax expertise of directors, tax consultants, and the frequency of meetings of the board of commissioners on tax avoidance, purposive sampling techniques and multiple regression analysis have been selected to process and test samples from companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Risk Aversion Theory

The Theory of Risk Defying was put forward by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Allingham and Sandmo argue that if no one wants to pay taxes voluntarily, one continues to argue against paying taxes. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) argue that a person's decision on the application of tax compliance is based on a rational decision to maximize one's economical use. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government and tax authorities to control the fulfillment of state tax obligations.

2.2. Agency Theory

The agency's theory explains an agreement by one or more principals that allows others (agents) to act on behalf of the principal and also allows agents to make decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, management plays an important role when making company decisions (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). Differences in the interests of principals and agents cannot affect the company's business, one of which is the company's tax policy. The tax system that implements the self assessment system in Indonesia allows companies to calculate and report their own taxes. By using this system, agents can reduce the tax burden on companies and manage their taxable income to a lower level.

Increasing conflicts of interest mainly because they have no control over the daily life of management makes the principal not have enough information about the agent's work. This asymmetry of information poses a moral hazard to agents acting for their own benefit by engaging in revenue management practices. Profit management can increase the uncertainty of financial statements and disappoint financial report users who believe in the benefits of financial statements.

2.3. Tax Avoidance

Guire et al. (2014) revealed the tax avoidance strategy implemented by the company with the aim of minimizing the amount of tax paid where it must be done as well as increasing the company's cash flow. The benefit of tax avoidance is cash savings from avoidable taxes (Annuar et al., 2014). Cash savings led to an increase in the company's cash flow, whereby the company could use the cash for investments in order to add value to the company after shareholder wealth and increase dividends.

Profit management can be detected by proxy Book Tax Differences (BTD), where the difference between accounting profit and fiscal profit in the form of temporary differences is indicated by deferred tax expense (benefit) accounts. The underlying thinking is that there is little accounting freedom in measuring taxable income so that BTD can inform the sign of discretionary management in the accrual process. One method to regulate profit management is through the use of freedom given to management in assessing financial reporting standards and in choosing the best accounting model for the company.

The calculation of taxable income under tax law imposes stricter limits on accrual measurements than accounting standards, so the greater btd indicates, the greater the discretion of management which, in another sense, increases tax avoidance. In contrast, the low value of BTD describes the low level of tax avoidance (Fontanella & Martani, 2014) & (Rusydi & Martani, 2014).

2.4. Director's Tax Expertise

Taylor & Richardson, 2014 in its research found a positive influence of the board's expertise on tax avoidance. Top management directors and personnel influence aggressive tax planning closely related to opportunism and management. The existence of a board of directors who have the ability in the field of tax can use their ability to manage tax planning strategies so as to influence decisions taken by the company (Melinda & Endang, 2019). The tax expertise variable is projected with a dummy variable with the number 1 if there is a director who has tax expertise on his profile in the annual report and 0 for the other way around.

2.5. Tax Professional

A tax professional is someone who prepares documents for taxpayers to apply for income from business activities related to taxes. Attitudes that allow fraudulent behavior is considered correct and difficult to measure (Scuden et al., 2008). Rationalization methods have a subjective evaluation of the company, and subjective opinions and decisions are reflected in the values set by the company (Octarigusta, 2017). Therefore, this study uses total accrual to the asset (TATA), which replaces the impact of tax professionals on tax avoidance. The accrual amount is calculated as a change in the working capital account, excluding the deducted depreciation amount. Common calculations are used to assess the role of tax professionals in discretionary accounting and to provide management policies and motivations for profit management.


2.6. Commissioner Surveillance

Rapat the board of commissioners with the board of directors acting as a means of communication and coordination for top management and performance managers (Muchtar & Dariri, 2013). The meeting is held at a specified time to take into account policy issues as well as important issues. There are differences of interest between the company and the government that cause agency conflicts where the results for all manager steps can not be directly supervised by the owner of the company. To overcome the manager so as not to be able to do tax avoidance, it is required to make the composition of the board of commissioners a supervisory party. The board of directors plays a role in resolving issues in its day-to-day duties and becomes increasingly important when the company is in crisis or shareholder interests are threatened. The quality of good disclosure of financial statements will avoid tax avoidance (Annisa & Kurniasih, 2012).

Hijriyani et al. (2014) revealed that the number of board meetings has a negative influence on tax avoidance, as well as the number of board meetings is the number of meetings held at a certain time. The effectiveness of committee supervision is partly determined by the activities of the committee. Committee activity can be measured by the frequency of committee meetings and the level of meeting participation. The meeting frequency variable is given according to the number of meetings conducted in one year and given the MEET symbol.

2.7. Previous Research

The study looked at the human resources divestment of tax areas as a significant input to corporate tax decisions. The results found that human resource investment in tax areas led to greater tax avoidance. Using data collected manually on corporate tax officials during the period 2009-2014, it is claimed that tax planning led to greater tax avoidance (Chen, 2017). The study investigated financial and tax considerations related to hiring former IRS employees (government tax officials) and the results of companies related to increased tax avoidance (Jiang, 2017). This study explores the determining factors and consequences of tax-related human resources. The result showed that companies showed a significant increase in tax avoidance when they hired from low ETR companies (Barrios, 2019).



3. Methodology

3.1. Sample and Data

Tax professionals registered until September 2019 as Indonesian Tax Consultants Association members. A tax professional who comes from retired civil servants djp domiciled in the provincial capital of DKI Jakarta. A tax professional who comes from retired civil servants DJP and in the search for his profile has an attachment with the company that is listed in IDX, evidenced by the company name or company logo as a reference until September 2019; Companies that publish annual reports during audited periods during the research period. So the samples of 205 companies in this study were used during the research period.

3.2. Hypothesis Test

Multiple linear analysis was chosen as the model in this study. The influence of the tax expertise of directors, tax consultants and supervisory commissioners on tax avoidance is formulated in the research model below:

$$\text{Tax Avoidance} = a + \beta_1 \text{DEXP} + \beta_2 \text{Tata} + \beta_3 \text{MEET} + e$$

Where:

Tax Avoidance: Tax Avoidance Rate

a: Constant

β_1 DEXP: Director's tax experience

β_2 TATA : Tax professional

β_3 MEET: Frequency of board meetings

e: Error

3.3. Research Variable Operationalization

3.3.1. Director's Tax Expertise

Directors who have the ability in the field of tax can use their ability in tax planning strategy to influence decisions taken by the company (Melinda & Endang, 2019). The tax expertise variable is projected with a dummy variable with the number 1 if there is a director who has tax expertise on his profile in the annual report and 0 for the other way around.

3.3.2. Tax Professional

It uses total accrual to assets (TATA), which replaces the impact of tax professionals on tax avoidance. The accrual amount is calculated as a change in the working capital account, excluding the deducted depreciation amount. Common calculations are used to assess the role of tax professionals in discretionary accounting and to provide management policies and motivations for profit management. Referring to Beneish (2012), the TATA formula is found:

3.3.3. Commissioner Surveillance

The effectiveness of committee supervision is partly determined by the activities of the committee. Committee activity can be measured by the frequency of committee meetings and the level of meeting participation. The meeting frequency variable is given according to the number of meetings conducted in one year and given the MEET symbol

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Research Data

The research was conducted in Indonesia by taking samples on the population of Tax Consultants registered in the Indonesian Tax Consultants Association 2019 as the basis for data retrieval to be processed. Based on the IKPI directory, it is known that the number of consultants listed is 2,361 people. Of these, 2,332 were separated from the population on the grounds that they were ineligible for sampling. The sampling requirement is domiciled in Jakarta, is a retired civil servant of the Directorate General of Taxation, and has participation either directly or indirectly with issuers listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange as evidenced by the list of issuers' names or logos on the personal pages or institutions where active tax consultants work today. So obtained, 29 people can be sampled in this study. A search of the personal and institutional pages of 29 tax consultants in accordance with the criteria of the study found a total of 41 Issuers listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (attached data). To be able to see the trend of tax avoidance, the authors used data for the last 5 years of financial statements starting from 2015 to 2019, amounting to 205 data.

4.2. Research Result

4.2.1. Descriptive Statistics Analysis

A descriptive analysis of this research is applied to review the data used, including dependent and independent variables. Dependent variables are used by Book Tax Difference (BTD), while independent variables include the Director's Tax Expertise (DEXP), Tax Professional (TATA), and Meeting Frequency of the Board of Commissioners (MEET).

The minimum value is the smallest value for each variable. The maximum value is the largest value for each variable in the study. The Mean is the average of each variable studied. Standard deviation is the distribution of data used in a study and is basically homologous or heterogeneous. Descriptive statistical results are shown in Table 4.1 below:

Table 4.1.
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
BTD	205	0,020942	0,0296151
DEXP	205	0,337857	0,1651119
Tata	205	-0,018864	0,0802063
MEET	205	8,829268	7,5274089

Source: Data processing results

Referring to the descriptive statistics above, it appears that :

1. Director's Tax Expertise – DEXP (X1)
Table 4.1 found dexp value has the lowest value of 0.10, while the highest value of 1.00. The average DEXP value is 0.337857, with a standard deviation value of 0.1651119. The standard deviation value is smaller than the average, showing that the diversity of DEXP data tends to be small.
2. Tax Professional – TATA (X2)
Looking at table 4.1 obtained tata value has the lowest value of -0.4778, while the highest value of 0.3739. The average TATA value is -0.018864 with a standard deviation value of 0.0802063. The standard deviation value is greater than the average, which means that the diversity of TATA data tends to be large.
3. Frequency of Board of Commissioners Meeting – MEET (X3)
Based on table 4.1, that meet value gets the lowest value of 0.0000, while the highest value of 49. The average MEET value is 8.829268, with a standard deviation value of 7.5274089. The standard deviation value is smaller than the average, meaning that the diversity of MEET data tends to be small.
4. Tax Avoidance - BTD (Y)
Referring to table 4.1 obtained BTD value has the lowest value of -0.0633, while the highest value of 0.1576. Average BTD value of 0.020942 with standard deviation value of 0.0296151. The standard deviation value is greater than the average, showing that the diversity of BTD data tends to be large.

4.2.2 Correlation Analysis

Test results are applied using the spearman correlation statistical test; the results will be able to be seen below:

Table 4. 2.
Spearman Correlation Heteroskedastisity Testing

Independent Variables	That's it, that's
DEXP	0,583
Tata	0,094
MEET	0,063

Source: Data processing results

Testing the heteroskedastisity hypothesis showed that all independent variables in the model provided a value greater than the significance level ($\alpha = 5\%$ or 0.05). This suggests that residuals have homogeneous varieties. And this means the assumption of heteroskedastisity is fulfilled.

4.3. Multiple Regression Analysis

Influence director's tax expertise (X1), tax professional (X2), and the frequency of board of commissioners' meetings (X3) to Evasion tax (Y). Refers to the results of linear regression analysis obtained as shown in Table 4.3:

Table 4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis Results

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	That's it, that's
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
	(Constant)	-,004	,004		-,873	,384
	DEXP	,034	,011	,189	3,066	,002
	Tata	,061	,022	,166	2,762	,006
	MEET	,002	,000	,415	6,729	,000

No. 205

F = 25,126

SigF = 0,000

Adjusted R Square = 0,262

*Significant on p-value = < 0,05

** Significant on p-value = < 0,05

The adjusted R-square value on the model has a value of 0.262 or 26.2%. The results indicate if BTD variables are able to be explained by DEXP, TATA, and MEET variables by 26.2% or, it can be said that the contribution of dexp, TATA, and MEET independent variable influence to BTD is 26.2%, but the remaining 73.8% is another variable that was not present in this study. This correlation value (R) of 0.522 indicates that the level of dexp, TATA, and MEET variable relationships to BTD is strong.

Looking at the test results in table 4.9, that dexp variable has a positive and significant influence on BTD of 0.034 with a significance rate of 0.002. TATA has a positive and significant influence on BTD, which is 0.061 with a significance rate of 0.006. MEET had a positive and significant influence on BTD, which is 0.002 with a significance rate of 0.000. The direction can be identified through positive or negative symbols in the coefficient

4.4. Hypothesis Testing Discussion

4.4.1. Hypothesis testing 1

It is known that the statistical t value resulting from the influence of the director's tax expertise (DEXP) on the Book Tax Difference (BTD) is 3,066 with a significance value of 0.002. The significance value is smaller than the significant alpha 5% or 0.05. This means that there is a significant influence of the Director's Tax Expertise (DEXP) on The Book Tax Difference (BTD), so the decision is to reject H0 and receive H1. The conclusion is that the director's tax expertise has a significant positive influence on tax avoidance. These results are in line with Khaola & Moez (2019), Leung (2018) and Taylor & Richardson (2014). Based on his research, companies with directors have the ability to tax and have a significant positive influence on tax avoidance.

This result is in line with the agency's theory that defines if board members with tax experience can contribute to implementing tax avoidance by developing after-tax profits for shareholders. The greater the number of tax-experienced directors, the greater the ability of managers to avoid taxes. Directors with taxation experience can contribute as necessary resources in the development of tax agreements and can significantly improve the performance of taxation that effectively reduces corporate tax liabilities.

The motivation for tax avoidance is to increase after-tax profits for shareholders. Directors with tax experience can influence high-risk tax planning. Aggressive taxation can also be attributed to opportunism and management. Therefore, directors with taxation expertise should effectively use their experience to supervise and inform managers while finding additional opportunities based on their taxation expertise when approving and formulating tax plans.

This is in contrast to what Huang (2020), Hui Hsu (2018), and Chen & Chang (2020) found that directors with negative or more influential tax expertise are able to supervise carefully and guide them to stay compliant, keep up with changes in legislation, and actively add functions in terms of tax-related risk management.

4.4.2. Hypothesis testing 2

Diketahui bahwa nilai statistik t yang dihasilkan dari pengaruh Tax Professional (TATA) terhadap Book Tax Difference (BTD) adalah 2,762 dengan nilai signifikansi 0.006. Nilai signifikansi ini lebih kecil dari tingkat signifikansi $\alpha = 5\%$ atau 0.05. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat pengaruh signifikan dari Tax Professionals (TATA) terhadap Book Tax Difference (BTD). Hasil penelitian ini sejalan dengan temuan sebelumnya oleh Chen (2017), Jiang (2017), Allison Koester (2017) dan Russel (2016) bahwa peran profesional pajak memiliki pengaruh positif terhadap penghindaran pajak. Manfaat dari kapabilitas dan pengalaman seorang profesional pajak, terutama mantan pegawai Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan dengan tingkat penghindaran pajak yang lebih tinggi, diukur dari peningkatan jumlah BTD. Semakin tinggi kapabilitas dan pengalaman seseorang di bidang pajak korporasi, maka semakin tinggi pula kemampuan untuk mengelola pajak secara reliabel.

Menurut teori agensi, perbedaan kepentingan antara prinsipal dan agen dapat memiliki implikasi yang berbeda-beda tergantung pada kinerja perusahaan, salah satunya adalah kebijakan pajak korporasi. Semakin tinggi keuntungan, semakin tinggi pendapatan kena pajak dan semakin tinggi jumlah pajak yang dibayar, sehingga memicu terjadinya perencanaan pajak, di mana perusahaan cenderung membayar pajak yang lebih sedikit daripada yang seharusnya. Penggunaan layanan konsultan pajak mantan pegawai DJP akan memfasilitasi perusahaan dalam melakukan perencanaan pajak karena mantan pegawai DJP cenderung memiliki pengetahuan tentang ins dan outs dari peraturan perpajakan lebih banyak daripada non-pegawai DJP. Hasil penelitian (2018) memberikan bukti empiris bahwa agresivitas pajak secara signifikan berkaitan dengan peran insider. Oleh karena itu dapat disimpulkan bahwa perusahaan akan membayar lebih banyak manfaat profesional pajak yang berpotensi menurunkan kewajiban pajak mereka sambil memastikan perencanaan pajak yang ditetapkan oleh manajemen tetap berada dalam koridor aturan yang berlaku.

4.4.3. Hypothesis testing 3

Diketahui bahwa nilai statistik t yang dihasilkan dari pengaruh frekuensi pertemuan dewan komisaris (MEET) terhadap Book Tax Difference (BTD) adalah 6,729 dengan nilai signifikansi 0.000. Nilai signifikansi ini lebih kecil dari tingkat signifikansi $\alpha = 5\%$ atau 0.05. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat pengaruh signifikan dari frekuensi pertemuan dewan komisaris (MEET) terhadap penghindaran pajak (BTD). Hal ini sama dengan yang ditemukan oleh Barros & Sarmento (2019) dan Armstrong (2015) bahwa frekuensi pertemuan dewan komisaris (proxies for governance control) meningkatkan tingkat penghindaran pajak. Secara keseluruhan, frekuensi pertemuan yang lebih tinggi memberikan kontrol yang lebih banyak terhadap tindakan manajemen yang meningkatkan peluang.

Frekuensi pertemuan dewan komisaris berkaitan dengan kewajiban pajak yang lebih rendah, dan hasil penelitian mengkonfirmasi bahwa frekuensi pertemuan dewan komisaris dengan penghindaran pajak korporasi bersifat positif; manajer yang lebih terkontrol juga lebih cenderung menjadi pembuat keputusan. Mereka memandang kontrol mereka sebagai insentif untuk mengambil langkah penghindaran pajak yang lebih tinggi untuk meningkatkan pengembalian saham.

Hal ini sejalan dengan teori aversi risiko, yaitu keputusan individu mengenai penerapan kepatuhan pajak didasarkan pada solusi terbaik untuk kepentingan individu. Waluyo dan Ferry Halimi (2019) menyatakan bahwa penghindaran pajak yang dilakukan oleh wajib pajak dapat dikatakan sebagai tindakan legal as long as it does not violate the tax laws, but in terms of state revenues, remain at risk of reduced revenues because taxpayers try to get a vacancy to control their taxes.

Hasil penelitian ini bertentangan dengan Kovermann (2019), Nadia (2017), Vafeas (2003) dan Xie (2003), bahwa pengawasan pertemuan yang dilakukan oleh komisaris secara rutin justru mempengaruhi pertemuan dewan komisaris yang memiliki pengaruh negatif terhadap penghindaran pajak yang diukur melalui ETR. Pengawasan dewan komisaris meningkatkan kinerja akuntansi dan tata kelola perusahaan yang baik sekaligus membatasi penghindaran pajak pada tingkat di mana risiko yang timbul tidak melebihi manfaatnya.

5. Conclusion

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh dari keahlian pajak direktur, profesi konsultan pajak, dan frekuensi pertemuan dewan komisaris terhadap penghindaran pajak. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kuantitatif dengan pendekatan kausal. Data dikumpulkan dari laporan keuangan IDX emiten dari tahun 2015 hingga 2019; akhirnya, data mencapai total 205 laporan keuangan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa keahlian direktur (dalam bidang perpajakan, profesi konsultan pajak, dan frekuensi pertemuan dewan komisaris) memiliki pengaruh signifikan terhadap penghindaran pajak secara simultan dan parsial. Temuan penelitian ini adalah bahwa penggunaan konsultan pajak mantan pegawai DJP berkontribusi pada peningkatan insidensi penghindaran pajak. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa perlunya kebijakan pemerintah untuk mengatur penggunaan konsultan pajak mantan pegawai DJP. Penelitian ini hanya menggunakan data sekunder di mana interpretasi dari data yang dihasilkan sangat penting, sehingga dianggap penting untuk dapat menggali lebih dalam pengaruh dari konsultan pajak mantan pegawai DJP melalui metode penelitian lainnya.

5.1. Limitations and Suggestions

a) Limitation

Based on the findings, this research has several limitations:

This study has several limitations. First, the sample was taken from the Indonesian Stock Exchange and developed a proxy measure of tax avoidance due to the private sector and the confidential nature of corporate tax data. Second, this study only focuses on Indonesia. To determine the generalizability of these findings, it may be useful to perform similar analyzes in other jurisdictional settings. Data sources for tax professional profiles (particularly former civil servants of the Directorate General of Taxes) who are returning to work and their competencies in the business world are not widely published on social media and websites. Thus causing the lack of data used. Empirical analysis of this material is still rare, so the writer has some difficulty in analyzing the data and comparing it with the results of previous studies.

b) Suggestion

a) For regulators:

The results of this study indicate that regulatory policies are needed regarding the use of former DGT employee tax consultants, in addition to oversight mechanisms in good corporate governance. This policy must be accompanied by mandatory disclosure rules in the notes to financial statements and accompanied by disclosure of salary and benefits earned as red flags for a tendency to tax avoidance.

b) This research indicates the need to add to the expansion of the concept of supervision so that it can implement the principles of corporate governance in a solid manner.

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