| **RESEARCH ARTICLE**

Exploring Systemic and Behavioral Factors Influencing Corruption in Public Procurement: A Global Comparative Study

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| **ABSTRACT**

Public procurement is particularly vulnerable to corruption due to the substantial financial transactions and discretionary powers involved. Inadequate governance structures and cultural norms often exacerbate this vulnerability. This study explores the systemic and behavioral factors contributing to corruption in public procurement through a global comparative lens, focusing on regions including Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, and the Americas. Systemic factors, such as weak legal frameworks, lack of transparency, and institutional weaknesses, are analyzed alongside behavioral influences, such as cultural norms, individual ethical considerations, and moral disengagement. By conducting a comprehensive literature review, this study consolidates existing knowledge to pinpoint areas for improvement and emerging trends concerning procurement corruption. The research reveals that corruption in public procurement is deeply ingrained in both institutional frameworks and the cultural context in which procurement occurs. It recommends an integrated anti-corruption strategy combining structural reforms, such as bolstering regulatory oversight, with behavioral interventions to reshape cultural norms and foster ethical behavior. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers and academics, emphasizing the necessity of tailored and multifaceted approaches to combat procurement corruption effectively. The study's results enrich the theoretical understanding of corruption by connecting structural and behavioral strategies, guiding policymakers and international organizations striving to promote transparency and accountability in public procurement.

| **KEYWORDS**

Public Procurement, Systemic Factors, Behavioral / Moral Factors, Corruption

1.0 Introduction

Corruption in public procurement presents a complex global challenge that has a far-reaching impact on economies, fair competition, and public trust. It is estimated that corruption costs governments worldwide approximately $2.6 trillion each year, with a significant portion of these losses stemming from flawed public procurement processes (World Economic Forum, 2016). The substantial financial flows and discretionary powers make procurement systems particularly vulnerable to corruption. According to Thomann, Marconi & Zhelyazkova (2024), corruption in public procurement occurs when insiders manipulate the awarding process to favor a specific bidder in return for some benefit, all without detection. These challenges are often compounded by systemic weaknesses, including inadequate legal frameworks and a lack of transparency (Rose-Ackerman, 2015; IMF, 2016; Komakech, 2019; Basheka, 2021; Abdulwaheed & Ohida, 2022; Baranek & Titl, 2021; Obicci, 2024), further complicated by behavioral factors such as cultural norms and individual ethics (Ntayi, Ngoboka & Kakooza, 2013; Dekel & Schurr, 2014; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). Effectively addressing corruption in public procurement requires a comprehensive understanding of systemic factors, such as institutional frameworks and legal systems, and behavioral factors, including individual ethics and organizational culture, that influence corrupt practices.

Systemic factors contributing to corruption in public procurement include legislative inadequacies, lack of transparency, and weak institutional controls. Research (such as, Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; OECD, 2016; IMF, 2019; Williams-Elegbe, 2018; Komakech, 2019; World Bank, 2020; Obicci, 2024) indicates that the legal frameworks governing public procurement often fail to effectively deter corrupt practices when robust enforcement mechanisms do not accompany them. For example, countries with less rigorous regulatory environments tend to experience higher levels of procurement corruption due to the ease with which malpractices can be concealed (Transparency International, 2016). Rose-Ackerman & Palifka (2016) revealed that the absence of transparent procedures can create an environment ripe for corruption, as it allows discretionary decisions by public officials without sufficient oversight.

The prevalence of corruption is intricately intertwined with cultural norms, individual morality, and the psychological predispositions of those involved in procurement processes. Cultural attitudes toward corruption vary widely across regions, impacting the likelihood of participating in or tolerating corrupt behaviors (Hodess, 2003; Johnston, 2005; Ntayi et al., 2013). In certain cultures, actions such as giving gifts to secure contracts may not be considered corrupt, which complicates the enforcement of anti-corruption measures (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996; Bicchieri, 2016). Behavioral economics indicates that individual decision-making in corrupt activities is also affected by cognitive biases and risk perceptions, where the perceived benefits of engaging in corruption outweigh the potential risks or moral considerations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Dekel & Schurr, 2014; World Bank, 2015; Fazekas & Kocsis, 2020). Despite extensive research on the impact of behavioral economics on decision-making in public procurement, there is still a significant gap in understanding how these cognitive biases influence procurement practices across diverse cultural and regulatory environments.

It is important to note that each region poses distinct challenges that shape the nature of corruption in public procurement. For example, in Africa, the prevalence of neo-patrimonial systems often leads to patronage, clientelism, and widespread poverty, deeply embedding corruption within the political and economic systems (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Fazekas & Tóth, 2016; Marquette & Peiffer 2018; Basheka, 2021). Conversely, in parts of Asia, rapid economic growth has outpaced the development of effective governance mechanisms, creating opportunities for corruption as public sectors struggle to keep up with private sector dynamics (O'Brien, 2020; Li & Liu, 2024). In contrast, European countries might face issues related to lobbying and the influence of powerful corporate interests on public procurement decisions, which can be challenging to regulate and expose (Søreide, 2002; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; OECD, 2020; Thomann et al, 2024). Therefore, this research aims to conduct a comparative analysis to identify and analyze the systemic and behavioral factors influencing corruption in public procurement across different global regions. The findings of this study are expected to significantly contribute to the theoretical framework on corruption, offering new insights that bridge the gap between systemic reforms and behavioral changes. Practically, the study will inform policymakers and international organizations by providing evidence-based strategies for improving transparency and accountability in public procurement.

2.0   Methodology

This study employs a comprehensive literature review to explore the systemic and behavioral factors influencing corruption in public procurement globally. Drawing from the framework developed by Boote & Beile (2005) regarding the centrality of scholars in research and the detailed guidelines provided by Rowley & Slack (2004) on conducting effective literature reviews, the primary goal of this review is to systematically gather, critically analyze, and synthesize existing research in order to identify and articulate significant research gaps and theoretical developments.

Following the principles outlined by Rowley & Slack (2004), the literature search was carried out across various academic databases, including JSTOR, Emerald, Google Scholar, EBSCO and subject-specific journals focusing on public administration and corruption through the online library of the Uganda Management Institute (UMI). Keywords such as *"public procurement corruption,"* OR *"procurement corruption,"* OR *"systemic factors,"* OR *"behavioral factors,"* AND *"anti-corruption strategies"* were utilized to ensure a comprehensive collection of relevant academic articles, conference papers, and authoritative reports. Each source was carefully evaluated for relevance, theoretical contribution, and empirical rigor, adhering to the criteria suggested by Rowley & Slack (2004) for assessing the credibility and reliability of academic and professional literature.

The study adopts the thematic synthesis approach detailed by Boote & Beile (2005) and Komakech, Ombati & Kikwatha (2024) in the context of strategic and operations management research, respectively. This approach involves aggregating findings under emergent themes that reflect both the systemic structures and behavioral dynamics influencing corruption in public procurement. This method is particularly suitable for exploring how theoretical and empirical advancements have shaped the understanding of

corruption mechanisms and mitigation strategies in different global contexts. The final stages of the literature review focus on identifying research gaps and suggesting future research directions.

3.0 Results and Discussion

3.1 Comparative Analysis of Systemic and Behavioral Factors Influencing Corruption in Public Procurement

The table synthesizes systemic and moral factors driving corruption in public procurement across different global regions (Africa, Australia, Asia, Europe, and the Americas), highlighting unique challenges specific to each context.

Table 3.1: Matrix of Systemic and Moral Factors Driving Corruption in Public Procurement

Region	Systemic Factors	Moral Factors	Unique Challenges
Africa	1. Weak governance structures *(Amundsen, 2019; Bandiera, Bosio & Spagnolo, 2021)* 2. Limited accountability mechanisms *(Klitgaard, 1988)* 3. Lack of transparency *(World Bank, 2020; IMF, 2016)* 4. Inadequate legal frameworks *(Rose-Ackerman, 1999; IMF, 2016)* 5. Political patronage *(Johnston, 2005; Thai, 2001; Obicci, 2024)*	1. Cultural norms accepting bribery *(Smith, 2018; Tanner, Linder & Sohn, 2022)* 2. Low public sector salaries *(Rose-Ackerman, 2016; Basheka, 2021)* 3. Patronage and nepotism *(Thai, 2001; Hough, 2019; Basheka, 2021)* 4. Moral disengagement *(Ariely, 2012; Ntayi et al, 2013)* 5. Informal networks *(Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Komakech, 2019)*	1. Post-colonial legacies *(Makki, 2015; Lassou, Hopper & Ntim, 2021)* 2. Political instability *(Johnston, 2005; Thai, 2001)* 3. Endemic poverty influencing corruption *(Lassou et al, 2021; World Bank, 2020)*
Asia	1. Complex bureaucratic systems *(Rose-Ackerman, 2018)* 2. Discretionary powers of officials *(Transparency International, 2021; Rose-Ackerman, 2018)* 3. Lack of competition *(Klitgaard, 1988)* 4. Regulatory inconsistencies *(OECD, 2016; Basheka, 2021)* 5. Government capacity *(Søreide, 2002)*	1. Family and business ties *(Jain, 2020)* 2. Cultural emphasis on reciprocity *(Smith, 2018)* 3. High tolerance for corruption *(Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016)* 4. Collective versus individual interests *(Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013)*	1. Rapid economic growth outpacing regulatory frameworks *(OECD, 2018; Song & Zhou, 2022)* 2. Regional disparities in governance *(OECD, 2016)* 3. Corruption as a business enabler *(Khalil, Saffar, W., & Trabelsi, 2015; Komakech, 2019; Henke, Khalil, & Lawarree, 2022)*
Australia	1. High levels of oversight but regulatory loopholes *(Transparency International, 2021)* 2. Complex regulations difficult to enforce *(World Bank, 2020)* 3. Interplay between public and private sectors *(OECD, 2016)*	1. Low moral acceptance of corruption *(Brown, 2020)* 2. Risks in subcontracting *(Klitgaard, 1988)* 3. Ethical considerations in public-private partnerships *(Rose-Ackerman, 1999)*	1. Managing integrity in privatization and outsourcing *(Smith, 2018)* 2. Ensuring compliance in a robust economy *(OECD, 2020)*
Europe	1. Generally robust anti-corruption measures *(OECD, 2020)* 2. Varying effectiveness across countries *(Hough, 2019)* 3. Complex EU-wide regulatory frameworks *(Klitgaard, 1988)* 4. Lobbying and undue influence *(Søreide, 2002)*	1. Strong legal frameworks *(Rose-Ackerman, 1999)* 2. Weakened by lobbying *(Marquette & Peiffer, 2015)* 3. Cultural nuances impacting policy application *(Jain, 2020)*	1. Balancing EU-wide standards with national practices *(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2019)* 2. Inequality in legal enforcement across regions *(Smith, 2018)*

	5. Enforcement issues *(Transparency International, 2021)*		
Americas	1. Diverse regulatory contexts *(Søreide, 2002)* 2. Strong regulations in the U.S. *(Klitgaard, 1988; IFM, 2016; Komakech, 2019)* 3. Weaker systems in parts of Latin America *(Johnston, 2005)* 4. Political interference *(OECD, 2020)* 5. Lack of institutional continuity *(Transparency International, 2021)*	Corruption is influenced by socioeconomic disparities and high levels of impunity *(Neshkova & Kalesnikaite, 2019)*	Addressing corruption in decentralized procurement systems *(Johnston, 2005).*

Source: *Compiled by the author from reviewed literature (2024)*

3.1.1   Africa

In Africa, the prevalence of procurement corruption is significantly influenced by systemic vulnerabilities and deeply rooted cultural norms. Weak governance structures (Amundsen, 2019; Komakech, 2019; Bandiera, et al 2021; Basheka, 2021), inadequate accountability mechanisms (Klitgaard, 1988; OECD, 2018; World Bank, 2020), and widespread political patronage create an environment conducive to corruption (Klitgaard, 1988; Johnston, 2005; Amundsen, 2019). These challenges are further exacerbated by post-colonial legacies and persistent political instability, worsening procurement systems' difficulties (Lassou, Hopper & Ntim, 2021). Additionally, the societal acceptance of bribery and nepotism, coupled with widespread moral disengagement, underscores the deeply ingrained moral factors that drive corrupt practices (Ariely, 2012; Smith, 2018; Tanner et al., 2022). A more comprehensive strategy that goes beyond conventional regulatory compliance and punitive measures is necessary to address these issues. Combining systemic reforms with targeted behavioral interventions that challenge the cultural acceptance of corruption is crucial. This approach should not only strengthen legal frameworks but also work to shift cultural norms to combat the acceptance of corrupt behaviors. This dual strategy is essential for addressing institutional weaknesses and the moral dynamics perpetuating corruption, providing a more holistic solution to the complex corruption problem in African public procurement systems.

3.1.2   Asia

In Asia, the convergence of intricate bureaucratic systems, substantial discretionary powers, and regulatory disparities create a fertile environment for corruption (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Søreide, 2002). The lack of transparency in government operations exacerbates these vulnerabilities, allowing corrupt practices to persist and complicating the implementation of anti-corruption measures. Cultural norms prioritizing reciprocity and loyalty to familial and social networks further entrench corruption in both public and business sectors, reducing the effectiveness of standard anti-corruption strategies (Jain, 2020; Smith, 2018). Additionally, the region's rapid economic growth and extensive infrastructure projects increase opportunities for corrupt activities, highlighting the need for robust governance frameworks tailored to the diverse cultural and economic landscapes of Asian countries (Khalil, et al, 2015; World Bank, 2020; Henke et al, 2022). Henke et al. (2022) have argued that corruption can enable businesses by providing shortcuts through bureaucratic procedures and enabling businesses to gain unfair advantages through corrupt practices. This perspective suggests that corruption is a tool to facilitate business operations in some contexts, especially in regions where regulatory frameworks are inefficient or overly restrictive. Therefore, effective anti-corruption strategies in Asia should aim to reduce bureaucratic discretion and enhance transparency while promoting a shift in cultural attitudes towards integrity and accountability. These initiatives must be adaptable to local conditions, moving beyond a one-size-fits-all approach to address the unique challenges posed by varying levels of governance quality and cultural norms across the region. Tailored strategies are crucial for dismantling entrenched patronage systems and normalizing gift-giving practices that currently hinder anti-corruption efforts.

3.1.3   Australia

Despite robust oversight mechanisms in Australia, procurement integrity faces challenges due to regulatory loopholes and ethical concerns in public-private partnerships. Such loopholes, along with the risks associated with subcontracting, where interests may diverge from public welfare, highlight the necessity for stricter regulation (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Klitgaard, 1988; Khalil et al., 2015;

Transparency International, 2021; World Bank, 2020). Addressing these gaps requires bolstering regulatory frameworks to close loopholes and promoting ethical practices within public-private interactions to align subcontracting activities with public interests. These measures are crucial for enhancing accountability and upholding high standards of integrity in public procurement processes in Australia, ensuring that procurement practices are both transparent and aligned with the public good.

3.1.4 Europe

In Europe, the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures varies significantly across regions due to historical legacies, institutional robustness, and cultural factors. Eastern European countries often struggle with systemic corruption linked to weaker institutional frameworks and historical state capture. This calls for strategies that strengthen formal institutions, rebuild public trust, and challenge the cultural acceptance of corruption (Fazekas, 2021; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Moreover, the involvement of organized crime in procurement processes complicates anti-corruption efforts, particularly when these groups evade traditional legal frameworks. This highlights the importance of comprehensive strategies that combine legal, institutional, and community-driven initiatives to dismantle corrupt networks (Fazekas, Sberna, & Vannucci, 2021). Despite the development of robust anti-corruption frameworks, the broader European region faces challenges in uniformly enforcing these measures due to the complexity of EU-wide regulatory frameworks and the varying influence of lobbying and corporate interests. This disparity underscores the need for harmonized enforcement across the EU to ensure that anti-corruption policies are consistently applied, thereby limiting undue influences and enhancing accountability across all member states (OECD, 2020; Søreide, 2002; Hough, 2019; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2019). Such an approach would promote a more effective and uniform anti-corruption landscape throughout Europe, supporting broad-based integrity and public trust.

3.1.5 Americas

The differences in regulatory environments between North and Latin America pose distinct challenges in addressing corruption. Unlike the weaker systems in many Latin American countries, the United States has more robust and more stable regulations, which often experience political interference and lack institutional consistency (Søreide, 2002; Johnston, 2005; Fazekas & Dávid-Barrett, 2015; Transparency International, 2021). Effectively combating corruption requires addressing the vulnerabilities of decentralized procurement systems, which are particularly susceptible to local-level corruption. Additionally, promoting regional cooperation and fostering shared anti-corruption initiatives can help establish a consistent framework across the Americas. By prioritizing regional collaboration, targeted strategies for institutional stability, and addressing weaknesses in decentralized procurement, the fight against corruption in these diverse contexts can be significantly enhanced.

The comparative analysis of systemic and behavioral factors affecting corruption in public procurement across different global regions has revealed a complex interplay of institutional and cultural dynamics, highlighting the need for targeted anti-corruption strategies. This study emphasizes that while systemic factors such as weak governance, lack of transparency, and inadequate legal frameworks are prevalent across regions, cultural and moral aspects significantly impact the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. For instance, in regions like Africa and Asia, challenges are exacerbated by cultural norms such as patronage and a high tolerance for corruption, deeply rooted within the societal fabric. These moral factors call for reforms that extend beyond traditional regulatory frameworks to encompass behavioral changes addressing ethical standards and public integrity. Similarly, despite robust anti-corruption measures in Europe, effectiveness varies significantly due to regional disparities and the influence of powerful interests, underscoring the need for harmonized enforcement across the EU. Australia's situation underscores the importance of maintaining stringent oversight and addressing loopholes allowing for undue influence and conflicts of interest, particularly in public-private interactions. These findings advocate for comprehensive reforms integrating legal, institutional, and ethical dimensions to combat procurement corruption effectively.

3.2 Synergies Between Systemic and Behavioral Approaches in Anti-Corruption Strategies

The fight against corruption in public procurement has traditionally involved systemic and behavioral approaches, which have been seen as separate strategies addressing different aspects of corruption. Systemic approaches focus on institutional and structural reforms, such as strengthening legal frameworks, increasing transparency, and improving oversight mechanisms. On the other hand, behavioral approaches seek to address the psychological and social factors that drive individuals to partake in corrupt activities. However, recent literature suggests that these two approaches are complementary and can work together synergistically, resulting in a more comprehensive and effective anti-corruption strategy. This section delves into these synergies, outlining how systemic and behavioral approaches can be integrated to create more robust anti-corruption strategies.

The combination of systemic and behavioral approaches creates a powerful synergy in reinforcing compliance through aligned incentives. Systemic reforms, such as performance-based contracting and enhanced oversight, establish an environment that discourages corrupt practices by minimizing opportunities and increasing the likelihood of detection and punishment (OECD, 2016; OECD, 2023). The probability of compliance is significantly heightened when coupled with behavioral insights, such as incentivizing ethical behavior and acknowledging integrity in procurement practices. This integration establishes a feedback loop where institutional incentives and individual motivations are harmonized, facilitating ethical conduct for officials (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Williams, 2024). Research indicates that integrating systemic controls with behavioral interventions, such as recognizing honest behavior and promoting transparency, substantially improves compliance rates within procurement systems (OECD, 2016). Klitgaard (1988) and Bicchieri & Xiao (2009) argue that this synergy deters corruption through institutional means and positively reinforces ethical behavior, making compliance the most natural course of action.

The systemic and behavioral approaches to combating corruption can work together to enhance trust and legitimacy. Systemic measures like transparent procurement processes, independent anti-corruption agencies, and public reporting mechanisms help build institutional trust. When paired with behavioral strategies such as community monitoring, public awareness campaigns, and feedback loops that actively involve citizens, they create a participatory environment that reinforces the credibility of anti-corruption efforts (Klitgaard, 1988; Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). Citizen engagement in anti-corruption initiatives can leverage social norms to discourage corrupt practices further. When the public sees effective monitoring and punishment of corruption, their trust in government institutions increases, and social norms shift against corruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). This synergy is particularly effective in contexts where systemic reforms alone may not be sufficient to rebuild public trust, demonstrating the power of combining these approaches to foster a broader cultural shift toward integrity (Williams, 2024; OECD, 2018).

The effectiveness of formal whistleblower protections can be significantly improved by implementing behavioral interventions that promote reporting. While legal frameworks provide a structural safeguard, the willingness of individuals to come forward is crucial. Implementing behavioral strategies, such as anonymous reporting tools, supportive communication, and reducing the stigma associated with whistleblowing, can increase the likelihood of individuals reporting corrupt activities (OECD, 2018; Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). The combination of systemic protections and behavioral encouragement creates a more comprehensive reporting environment. These combined approaches ensure that more corruption cases are detected and addressed by addressing the legal and psychological barriers to reporting. Thaler & Sunstein (2008) and Klitgaard (1988) this dual approach not only enhances the effectiveness of reporting mechanisms but also reinforces the perception that the government is committed to combating corruption. This synergistic application of systemic and behavioral strategies underscores the importance of a holistic approach to tackling corruption. This approach ensures that efforts are comprehensive and adaptable to the evolving challenges within public procurement systems globally.

The critical synergy between systemic and behavioral approaches lies in their combined ability to cultivate a culture of integrity within public institutions. Systemic measures, such as codes of conduct, compliance audits, and regular oversight, establish the formal expectations for ethical behavior. However, Mungiu-Pippidi (2011) and Klitgaard (1988) observed that these measures are most effective when reinforced by behavioral strategies that promote integrity as a core value within the organization. Ethics training, leadership development, and the promotion of role models within the organization can help internalize the principles of integrity, making ethical behavior the norm rather than the exception (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Ntayi et al, 2013; Basheka, 2021). When systemic and behavioral approaches are aligned, they create an institutional culture that supports long-term change, reducing the likelihood of regression into corrupt practices. Williams (2024) highlights that the interplay between systemic reforms and behavioral modifications creates a sustainable framework for anti-corruption efforts. This synergy is essential for sustainable anti-corruption efforts, as it aligns formal rules with everyday behaviors and attitudes.

Systemic reforms often incorporate robust monitoring mechanisms, such as internal audits and external reviews, to detect and address corruption. Behavioral approaches can further enhance these systems by integrating feedback loops that utilize real-time data to adjust and improve anti-corruption strategies (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). For instance, utilizing behavioral analytics to identify patterns of non-compliance or areas prone to corruption enables targeted interventions that are more responsive and effective (Williams, 2024). Feedback systems integrating behavioral insights can also enhance the adaptability of systemic controls, making them more responsive to the dynamic nature of corruption. This integrated approach ensures that anti-corruption measures evolve in response to changing behaviors and emerging risks, thereby increasing their overall impact and sustainability (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; OECD, 2018). By integrating systemic and behavioral approaches, anti-corruption strategies can achieve significant synergies, enhancing the effectiveness of efforts to combat corruption in public procurement.

4.0   Conclusion

This research illuminates the intricate relationship between systemic structures and individual behaviors that underpin corruption in public procurement. The comparative analysis across different regions emphasizes that while systemic reforms such as enhanced legal frameworks and transparency are crucial, they must be complemented by behavioral interventions that alter cultural norms and individual ethics. The findings underscore that no single approach is sufficient in isolation due to each region's diverse contexts and unique challenges. This study enriches the theoretical discourse on corruption and offers practical insights for policymakers and international organizations, advocating for integrated strategies that harness systemic and behavioral changes.

4.1   Study Implications and Future Research Directions

This study sheds light on the complex connection between systemic structures and individual behaviors that drive corruption in public procurement. The comparative analysis across different regions highlights the importance of not only systemic reforms, such as more robust legal frameworks and transparency, but also behavioral interventions that can change cultural norms and individual ethics. The findings emphasize that a single approach is insufficient due to each region's diverse contexts and unique challenges. This research contributes to the theoretical discussion on corruption and provides practical insights for policymakers and international organizations, advocating for comprehensive strategies that address systemic and behavioral changes.

It is imperative for future research to prioritize longitudinal studies capable of evaluating the prolonged impact of integrated systemic and behavioral anti-corruption strategies across various contexts. Furthermore, there is a pressing need for more empirical research to evaluate the efficacy of specific interventions in mitigating corruption within public procurement processes. Additionally, investigating the influence of technological advancements, such as blockchain and artificial intelligence, in bolstering transparency and curbing corruption could yield invaluable insights. Another area warranting attention is the exploration of psychological and cultural interventions that have the potential to reshape individual and collective attitudes toward corruption. These studies could pave the way for developing more comprehensive anti-corruption frameworks that discourage corrupt behaviors and foster a culture of honesty and answerability.

IRB/ REC Statement: The Researcher did not subject the study to ethical clearance because it involved the use of existing data, documents, or records that were publicly available both online and in print form, and the study data were not linked to any identified individuals or communities.
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