Beyond Lobbyists: Artificial Intelligence and the Reconfiguration of Informational Power in Parliament

Abstract

The growing institutional use of artificial intelligence (AI) in parliamentary work raises new questions about lobbying and political influence. Traditional informational models of lobbying explain influence through informational asymmetries between interest groups and legislators, whereby organized actors supply specialized knowledge that public officials cannot easily produce on their own. This article examines how the institutional application of AI within parliaments may reconfigure these asymmetries. Using a conceptual-analytical research design, the study maps five functional areas of AI use in parliamentary work – analytical support, support to the legislative decision-making process, administrative support, support for procedural transparency, and support for communication with the public – drawing primarily on the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Guidelines for AI in parliaments as a reference institutional framework. These functional capacities are analytically related to the core assumptions of informational lobbying theory. The analysis suggests that institutional AI can strengthen internal parliamentary capacities for information production and processing, thereby reducing structural dependence on external informational intermediaries. At the same time, this reduction of traditional informational asymmetry is accompanied by the emergence of new asymmetries related to technological infrastructure, algorithmic design, and institutional capacity for AI governance. Rather than eliminating political influence, institutional AI reshapes the conditions under which informational mediation and lobbying operate in contemporary legislative processes. The article contributes to the literature by shifting the analytical focus from lobbying actors and tools to the institutional conditions of informational sovereignty in contemporary parliaments.