
RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Implementation of Executive Toolbox during Jokowi-JK Administration in the Post-2014 Presidential Election

Syafril Efendi¹ ✉ and Aditya Perdana²

^{1,2}*Departemen Ilmu Politik, Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia*

Corresponding Author: Syafril Efendi, **E-mail:** esyafriiseruntting@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This research will look at the dynamics that happened post-presidential election of 2014 in Indonesia, which indicated a divided government in the parliament which caused a deadlock at the beginning of the chosen presidential candidates, Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, for the 2014 - 2019 period. This was the aftermath of the combination between the presidential system and a multiparty system, which showed the executive-legislative relationship in a multiparty presidential system. It could also reveal the inability of the government and the opposition to reach common ground multiple times. However, the case in Indonesia is quite different and interesting to explore how the government aimed to reach a balance and run their administration. The executives were using the executive Toolbox to offer politically strategic positions for the opposition to join the governmental coalition and to intervene in the internal works of political parties. The approach used for this research was a qualitative design. The concept of divided government which was put forward by Hughes & Carlson (2015), was chosen to be the theoretical framework to analyze the dynamic factors of the case. And the theory of executive toolbox usage by Raile et al. (2011) was used by the writer to analysis the presence of executive power in suppressing the dynamics that happened. The results of the research showed that the usage of the executive Toolbox was part of a response from the regime of Jokowi to create stability in facing the dynamics that happened and to gain the support of the opposite parties in the parliament to join the governmental coalition of 2014-2019's Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla period. This indicates that the government under Jokowi, which combined a multiparty system and the presidential system, can be considered a success, especially in terms of gaining support from the coalition through the usage of the executive Toolbox.

KEYWORDS

Divided government, executive Toolbox, presidential election, multiparty, coalition

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1. Introduction

The general problem of a country using a multiparty system is a weak political stability condition because of the number of political parties involved. This multiparty system demands especially good management of a government (Pamungkas, 2014). Some previous researchers, Mainwaring (1993), J.Linz & Arturo Velenzuela (1994), Cheibub (2002), as cited in Taufiqurrohman (2020), explained that generally, the presidentialism system is unfriendly and more prone to be the more defective option of the governing system. Especially for new democratic countries because of the deadlock potential and the chance of misuse of executive authority. This combination of presidentialism and the multiparty system is considered as a "difficult" combination because of the segregated legislative and executive selection, which often yields a representative of a minority from the winning party of the presidential election in the legislative.

A few other countries in Latin America that applied similar multiparty presidential systems, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay, were experiencing a shock of political instability (Pérez-Liñán, 2007). John Carey (2008) on his study also found that in some Latin American countries like Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, there was military intervention due to executive and legislative conflicts in the multiparty presidential system. Aside from that, Jose Antonio Cheibub (2002) mentioned that the weakness of the

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presidential system in Latin America countries was a huge potential of a deadlock happening because the executive could not control the majority and legislative.

The problem regarding the dynamics that occur in the multiparty system is that the presidential government system is considered inappropriate when compared to the multiparty system because it would cause instability in the government. The chosen president is unlikely to have parliamentary support (Widayati & Winanto, 2018). Therefore, in this case, at least political stability must be sought after, either by the simplification of political parties or permanent political party coalitions as an alternative solution.

A multiparty presidential system tends to create a division between executives and legislative (divided government) because both of those institutions are controlled by two different groups and could potentially cause dual legitimation of government since both executives and legislatures are chosen by the general public. One of the adverse effects of the previously mentioned division is the potential for deadlock due to the inability of the executive to control the majority and the legislative (Cheibub, 2002). The option to get out of a governmental crisis in a divided government is by cooperation and building a coalition initiated by the president (Elgie, 2011; Chaisty et al., 2014).

The issue of political instability is mentioned by Umanailo (2020), who stated that a multiparty system implies that there is a coalition with an orientation to gain power or to pass a certain proposed policy which will be beneficial for the reigning party. This phenomenon happened in various countries, including Indonesia, during the 2014 presidential election. Bargaining the ministry seats in the executive cabinet and trading interests in the distribution of 'a wet chair' in the committee of legislatives. The presence of various kinds of party backgrounds within the cabinet also existed in the 2014 Presidential Election (Umanailo, 2020).

Meanwhile, the relationship between the executives and the legislatives in Indonesia was also influenced by the dynamics in the parliament between the Red and White Coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih, which will be referred to as KMP) and Great Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat, which will be referred as KIH). Even it was causing a deadlock after the 2014 presidential election. Democracy in Indonesia has come along way through various kinds of dynamics from an especially authoritarian regime and then towards a civil democracy (Horowitz DL, 2010; Hidayatullah, M Ngarawula & Sadhana, 2022). The issue of dynamics between the executives and legislatives in 2014 indirectly showed the development and how different it was from the Suharto era. However, this situation also raised questions about the implementation of the multiparty system and presidential government system in Indonesia. Both the legislative and executive are chosen through a direct election from the general public, so the executive and legislative wield the same legitimacy.

Table 1.1 the Percentage of Votes of the Political Parties at the Legislative General Selection of 2014

POLITICAL PARTY	LEGISLATIVE GENERAL ELECTION
PDIP	18,94%
Golkar	14,32%
Gerindra	11,82%
Demokrat	9,66%
PKB	9,19%
PAN	7,48%
PKS	6,92%
Nasdem	6,89%
PPP	6,66%
Hanura	5,44%
PBB	1,61%
PKPI	1,06%

Source: Data of KPU RI (2014)

The political dynamics in the post-presidential election of 2014 can actually be seen from the result of the Legislative General Election 2014. The data from table 1.1 shows that PDIP gained the most vote, followed by Golkar, Gerindra, Demokrat, PKB, PAN, PKS, Nasdem, PPP, and Hanura. While PBB and PKPI did not pass and get any spot in the Parliament. From the voting results mentioned above, there was no political party that could nominate its own pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. This refers to Article 9 of Law of Election No. 42/2008 which states that candidate pairs are proposed by political parties or coalitions of political parties participating in the General Election that meets the requirements for obtaining seats of at least 20 percent of the total seats in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) or obtaining 25 percent of the valid votes in the General Election of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, a coalition is a solution that the political parties come up with to nominate their president-vice president candidate.

Forming a coalition was a must in building a working government in the 2014 presidential election. The common and dominant topics of discussion in the talks of the elite coalition members are 'who gets what, when, and how.' In fact, it could even lead to the calculation of the mobilization of political party funds to prepare for the next presidential election. However, the elected government of the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla pair presented the reality of the theory previously explained by Cheibub (2002) that the elected executives would have difficulty gaining support from the legislative. A few political parties supporting Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, like PDIP, Nasdem, PKB, Hanura and PKPI, were minority parties in the legislative. Meanwhile, the parties supporting Prabowo-Hatta, like Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, PKS, PPP and PBB, were the majority winners parties of the Legislative General Election in 2014 either at the center or in the regionals. The implication of this situation was the political instability issue which disturbed the running of the government. This is because, in a democracy, the executives and the legislative certainly have roles that are closely related to each other. Executives need legitimacy or approval from the legislators in running the governmental gear, for example, in determining the budget or even legislation products. This issue is the one hindering national development from being carried out. Hughes & Carlson (2015) stated that the conflict which occurs would certainly have implications for the relationship between the executives and the legislative, such as decreasing legislative productivity and government inefficiency.

Further implications for the dynamics between coalitions in parliament, especially in accommodating seats and power, were motivated by one of the reasons behind the revision of the law regarding the People Consultative Assembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR), House of Regional's Representative (DPD) and House of Regional People's Representative DPRD (Law of MD3). As a legislative winner, KMP utilized MD3 Law by making revisions after the 2014 Legislative General Election and ratified it the day before the Presidential Election of 2014. The KMP group succeeded in changing the rules for electing the leadership of the House of Representatives based on a package system so that the PDIP, which was the winning party in the legislative, did not get a seat in the leadership of the House of Representatives. Likewise, there was no KIH representative in the institutional structure of the commission leadership and House of Representatives bodies, which were only filled by KMP representatives. This became proof that the majority of the winners in the legislature were the parties that lost in the 2014 presidential election.

However, the multiparty issue that could cause deadlock in the parliament and internal political party issues opened a gap for the executive to take advantage of by using their power. In this case, political stability could be achieved by the usage of the executive Toolbox as Raile et al. (2011) explained that in order to overcome the adverse effects of the multiparty presidential system, the important aspect of the emergence of the coalition building phenomenon in the presidentialism system Coalition of Presidentialism is the inseparable role of the president as the executive leader in using a set of executive Toolbox. Raile et al. (2011) explain that the usage of the executive Toolbox is often shown in several ways, such as budgetary power, distribution of patronage, giving of profits (pork), and other things that can provide incentives for parties within the government or coalitions outside of the government to maintain government stability. Through the use of this executive power, the dynamics that occur in parliament between KMP and KIH can be suppressed.

Some literature found that political coalitions are usually present because they create government efficiency (seek efficiency), control holders (seek control), and secure themselves (seek security) (Isnaini, 2020; Kunkunrat & Priangani, 2019; S. Pamungkas, 2011). What is interesting to see from this problem was the Jokowi government's efforts to prevent a multiparty crisis between the executive and legislative as seen from the indications of the use of the executive Toolbox, one of them is through position offers. In this case, the executive Toolbox is a set of arrangements for formal and informal aspects of the executive institution used by the president to maintain coalition stability and support the government in the midst of the fragmentation of the party system due to poor party institutional management. (Chaisty et al., 2012). In short, this effort was made to suppress the ongoing dynamics, especially in the tactical coalition that was built before the General Election.

This study analyzes the dynamics of the multi-party presidential system during the leadership of President Jokowi, which experienced a divided government, specifically the executive-legislative relationship and presidential coalition that occurred during the administration of the elected president and vice president. Compared to the previous government, the condition of Jokowi's government was different from that of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)'s government, which didn't experience a divided government because Demokrat was the majority party in the parliament. Djayadi Hanan (2012) explained that during SBY's leadership in 2004, SBY openly invited all opposition parties to join through a persuasive accommodation approach which resulted in the formation of a large coalition at the beginning of the government with the aim of controlling the majority of legislative votes. While the leadership of Jokowi at the beginning of the 2014 administration did not choose to persuasively invite an open coalition to all parties, including the opposition, as shown by SBY during the 2004 administration. Because of this, Jokowi did not get the majority of support from the parliament. Jokowi was holding on to the motto of Koalisi Tanpa Syarat (Unconditional Coalition), which was often campaigned during the General Election. The motto of Unconditional Coalition was attached to Jokowi when it was conveyed at the declaration of Jokowi supporters on the 14th of May 2014. The Unconditional Coalition motto was Jokowi's determination to start a new political culture, namely the concept of a coalition without transactional politics (Herdiansah et al., 2017). This indicates that Jokowi wanted to start a new political culture by deciding the working group of his government

cabinet. Jokowi decided to accommodate the opposition political party into the government coalition after the government tended to be ineffective over time due to conflict with the legislative in the divided government.

This study will try to show the dynamics that occurred, starting from the KMP and KIH conflicts in parliament to executive and legislative relations in a multiparty presidential system. This study will also try to refute the assumption of failure in the multiparty system, which is indicated by the difficulties and conflicts that occurred in building the relations between the executive and legislative parties through the aspects of President Jokowi's ability to utilize the executive Toolbox they owned by attracting opposition parties to join the government.

2. Literature Review

Several literature reviews in this study discuss the dynamics that occur not only after the General Election but empirically that this can happen in the parliament and could affect the roles of the executives. Hiroi & Rennó (2014) start by discussing the dynamics that are happening, especially in the Brazilian legislative, which focuses on the management of coalition. This literature signifies the situation that is happening in the multiparty system in Brazil. Aside from that, Hiroi & Rennó (2014) also highlights the intra and inter-coalition conflicts and coalition management, which indirectly influence the process. The study of Hiroi & Rennó (2014) puts attention to various dimensions of legislative bottlenecks in newly democratic nations that have, until now, slipped through scientific attention. This literature mentions how the law creation in Brazil is able to easily face opposition because there are political party members of the coalition that still have electoral competition in the parliament. This indicates that understanding internal cohesion and coalition management is considered necessary in observing the lawmaking process.

The view is also complemented by Fischer & Traber (2015), which involves political actors as strategists, especially in positioning their political parties in a conflict. In short, Fischer & Traber (2015) mentions that the political actors in a coalition are an inseparable part and able to exert greater influence in the policy creation process. Actors playing a role in the coalition also play an important role as part of the decision-making structure, especially in understanding patterns of conflict, collaboration, and power amongst other actors.

Meanwhile, Lee (2016) provides a broader picture of the dynamics of the conflict, which is not limited to the legislative realm. Lee (2016) gave an example of how the dynamics of conflict between the executive and the legislative can also occur in the United States. From his view, there are often many differences and inconsistencies between federal agencies and congress. The polarization of ideology, which is considered to be too extreme among political parties, and also the prevalence of a divided government have indirectly contributed to disharmony. Federal agencies have a normative obligation to propose laws, but their regulatory decisions can easily be overturned by Congress. And it is difficult to secure a policy without having sufficient resources to prevent the intervention of Congress.

Some of the views above can already explain a dynamic that occurs, especially in the emergence of conflict, which is not limited to the institutional scope. However, the actor's roles, management and the function of a coalition in the parliament, also the relations between legislative and executive, are also inseparable from the dynamics. If we look at it further, the multiparty system applied in Brazil has its own unique dynamics. This also applies to the multiparty system in Indonesia. Especially on a few phenomena that led to the dynamics that occurred in Indonesia in two different General Election periods, the General Election of 2009 and the 2014 presidential election.

An example of the previous view from Djayadi Hanan (2012) in his dissertation explains that the presidential system could be a successful form of administration. Even though Hanan (2012) does not deny that there will be a level of congestion between the executive-legislative, it can be overcome by the existence of formal and informal institutions that are built in between the two political institutions, in this case, joint secretariat (Sekretariat Gabungan, Setgab). However, the view of Hanan (2012) does not discuss deeper findings related to the pragmatism of political parties in it. The literature from Aminuddin & Ramadlan (2015) mentions that there was an emergence of the match-all parties in political conditions that are pragmatism in nature. This is in line with his evidence regarding democracy in several developing countries, including Indonesia, which also experienced a very dynamic journey. In his study, there is no guarantee that the coalition will survive even after being in parliament. As long as there is a benefit to get, both the opposition and supporting coalition will be fluid because there will always be compromises and accommodations from all parties involved.

This view was later observed further by Sumadinata (2016) by explaining the phenomenon of the occurring dynamics at the political party coalition in Indonesia, especially in the 2014 Presidential Election. Sumadinata (2016) evaluated the coalition that occurred during the 2014 presidential election, which showed that ideology could not be used as a preference for the formation of a political party coalition. He stated that the formation of a coalition is more of a political interest without any participation in it or referred to as office seeking. This was based on two reasons: 1) there are many political parties in Indonesia that are considered unable to independently fund their own parties; 2) many political parties cannot stand to be in opposition to the government.

The factor of political party pragmatism indirectly took part in the conflict. If some of the previous literature above gave an example of the dynamics that occur in several countries because of the large factor of ideological polarization, the case in Indonesia actually indicated that the conflict is not necessarily influenced by the polarization of the ideology but rather by the pragmatism of political parties in taking advantage of the situation to play the role of parliament which was filled with political parties that have a majority vote in the Legislative 2014 presidential election. Of course, this was proven by the failure of the Unconditional Coalition that was proclaimed by Jokowi previously, so Jokowi had to abort these ideals and try to accommodate opposition political parties such as PPP, PAN, and Golkar Party.

The views mentioned above are attempted to be expressed by the literature from Herdiansah (2015), which holds the view that the dynamics phenomenon after the 2014 Presidential Election is related to how the motto of Unconditional Coalition was often uttered by Jokowi during the 2014 campaign General Election became a paradox and even considered as just campaign rhetoric. According to Herdiansah (2015), the motto became completely inoperative when Jokowi tried to gain the power of the majority of the parties, including accommodating the opposition parties to join the government coalition. This was an effort to achieve government stability with the aim of gaining the party's majority power by providing guarantees in running the government. Aside from that, Efriza (2018) elaborated on the phenomenon that occurred, especially in looking at the relationship between the President and the House of Representatives along with the management of their coalition. This literature describes how the ideology of a coalition and programmatic, which is Jokowi's desire, cannot actually be realized due to the instability of the government at the beginning years of their administration. These two views indirectly emphasize that the multi-party system in Indonesia clearly requires dominant political power in the hands of the President.

What becomes the continuation of the literature above is reviewed by Mietzner (2017), in which while Jokowi was in power for one year, he was faced with a series of contradictory trends. Jokowi tried to consolidate political power by accommodating opposition political parties such as PPP, PAN, and Golkar Party. Meanwhile, the abandoned opposition group tried to shift its concentration of emphasis through 'street opposition' Likewise, Beso & Rahmawati (2021) examines the implementation of the presidential system in a modern democracy in the executive and legislative relations at the 2014-2019 era of President Joko Widodo. Both the views of Mietzner (2017) and Beso & Rahmawati (2021) explained how Jokowi's political accommodation that he did is to increase support in the parliament. This then narrows the role of the opposition in parliament as an effort to carry out checks and balances against the ruling government.

The views of Mietzner (2017) and Beso & Rahmawati (2021) could be elaborated further, especially regarding the occurring coalition dynamics to have implications for the use of power through the executive Toolbox as an effort to reduce political instability. This research tries to complete the various pieces of literature, including looking at the dynamics and role of executive power. The 2014 presidential election implied a big question mark when the Unconditional Coalition did not prove the success of the elected government of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer look at the executive position in the dynamics that occurred at that time.

3. Methodology

This research is qualitative research with the aim of obtaining a comprehensive picture of the aspects studied. The qualitative approach was chosen because it is used to explore and understand the various meanings contained both in certain groups and individuals in social or humanitarian problems. (Creswell, 2016). Through this qualitative approach, the author tried to see a number of meanings implied in the dynamics of the coalition that occurred after the General Election at the beginning of the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration. This also makes it possible to see the meaning contained in the usage of executive Toolbox, especially the ones correlated with the occurring dynamics.

As for the data collection technique, this research used in-depth interviews and literature studies. According to (Habsy, 2017), a literature study is a method used to collect data or sources related to the topic raised in a study. The data in question can be in the form of related research literature, including previous literature, additional documents, to news related to the topic of this research.

In conducting the analysis, the author used concepts and theories related to the topic of this research. The concept of divided government by Hughes & Carlson (2015) was chosen to see the factors that influence the dynamics, especially the relationship between the executive and legislative, which still reflects both sides of the coalition between KIH and KMP after the 2014 presidential election. While the theory of executive Toolbox by Raile et al. (2011) was chosen to see the efforts of the elected government in responding to the dynamics that occur. This is in line with how a government intervention had happened to give ministerial seats to opposition parties that joined the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla government coalition.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 The Dynamics Post-2014 Presidential Election

The presidential system applied in the multi-party system will result in complications which lead to an unstable democratic life. (Mainwaring, 1990; Linz & Arturo Velenzuela, 1994). This hypothesis can be seen through different study cases. First, the increasing number of parties that emerged would raise unhealthy competition between parties in the Liberal Democracy period. This might result in the ideology or the political interests between parties becoming biased by an individual's or an elite's political interests. Second, the political instability that emerged from the multiparty system would cause numerous conflicts between parties. The multi-party system also has an impact on the role of political parties not being implemented as it should be. The reason is that the focus of the political parties is no longer on national integration but on achieving the party's interest. The ways used by political parties to reach their goal can also be considered unhealthy, in which the parties bring down other parties, as well as money politics which taint democracy (Adryamarthanino, 2022).

The process of alliance or coalition resulted from numerous political parties merging into two different political camps to nominate two couples of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. KIH side, which was initiated and led by PDIP, merged with PKB, Nasdem, Hanura, and PKPI. KIH appointed Joko Widodo as the presidential candidate and Jusuf Kalla as the vice-presidential candidate. KMP side, which was initiated and led by Gerindra, merged with Golkar, PPP, PAN, PKS, and PBB. KMP appointed Prabowo Subianto as the presidential candidate and Hatta Radjasa as the vice-presidential candidate. On the other hand, Demokrat became the only party which did not take any political sides by not joining either of the political camps.

In the beginning, the dynamics faced by Jokowi surely did not come only from external political parties. In this case, the dynamics within the political parties that appointed Jokowi as the presidential candidate became one of the challenges for Jokowi at the beginning of his regime. The chairman of the party, ex-president of Indonesia Megawati Soekarnoputri, hoped that Jokowi would agree with her terms for important matters, and if Jokowi did not comply with Megawati's terms, the relationship between them would worsen (Mietzner, 2017). Especially at the beginning of the process of presidential candidate appointing, PDIP's internal demeanor in supporting Jokowi was still considered half-hearted. Puan Maharani, which is the daughter of Megawati Soekarnoputri, which also a descendant of the Soekarno family, supported Jokowi only by the end of the presidential candidate campaign (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). Therefore, it can be said that the dynamics faced by Jokowi in the first half quarter of 2015 were coming from both the attacks of his own colleagues and his political competitor. This was apparent from the only 37% of support Jokowi got from the parliament members, based on Jokowi's populist program, which was named as pro-poor program (program pro masyarakat miskin). This initial program suggested by Jokowi was not considered in line with the internal plan of PDIP. Therefore, Jokowi was asked to comply with the terms of the head of the PDIP party. However, behind the scene, Jokowi had his own strategy to gain back political control. By the end of 2015, the strategy run by Jokowi was starting to come to fruition. Jokowi used his prerogative right to support the legality of the new head of the party, which was having internal conflicts, namely Golkar and PPP (Mietzner, 2017).

Six months after being elected as the president and vice-president, Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla issued several policies that created polemics in the community. The policies were: the rise of the subsidized gasoline prices as well as the revocation of the subsidized gasoline, the postponing of the inauguration of Commissioner General Budi Gunawan as the National Police Chief, the establishment of Presidential Regulation No. 39 of 2015, and the execution of narcotics convicts. As a balancing force, KMP in parliament gave a standing point for this policy by rejecting several policies, which were: the rise of the subsidized gasoline prices as well as the revocation of the subsidized gasoline, the postponing of the inauguration of Commissioner General Budi Gunawan as the National Police Chief and the establishment of Presidential Regulation No. 39 of 2015. However, KMP supported the last policy, which was the execution of narcotics convicts (Putra, 2015).

The dynamics between KIH and KMP also happened in the MD3 Law issue. The matter started with PDIP, which issued a lawsuit against MD3 Law to the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK). The lawsuit was issued because even though the MD3 Law is carried out, no matter how much the drafts of the law proposed by the government, those will not become law if the House of Representatives does not want to discuss the drafts (CNN Indonesia, 2014). The implications of the existence of MD3 Law and its relationship with the KMP can be seen from the dominance of the strategic positions by the members of KMP, which leaves only 5 positions out of the 63 leadership positions available for the members of KIH parties. As a result, KIH parties protested by stating the fact that they owned 44% of the House of Representatives' vote, while KMP owned 56%. With such a percentage, KIH supposedly has around 22 seats for commission leadership and other Complementary Organs of the House of Representatives (Admojo, 2016). With such power in the parliament, it was worrying how KMP would disrupt the performance of the Jokowi- Jusuf Kalla regime, especially when it was related to budget policies or legislation. That matter was still worrying even though KMP had stated they would not disrupt or go against the governmental program proposed by Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla (VOA Indonesia, 2014). During that time, the parliament was controlled by the KMP camp with a majority of seats, as shown in the table below.

Table 1.2 Number of seats occupied by KMP in 2014

No.	Political Party	Seats	Percentage
1.	Gerindra	73	11.81
2.	Golkar	91	14.75
3.	PAN	49	7.59
4.	PPP	39	6.53
5.	PKS	40	6.79
6.	Demokrat	61	10.19
Total		353	

Source: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (2014)

As shown in table 1.2., the KMP camp dominance is in line with the theory proposed by Hughes & Carlson (2015), where the dominating party camp is able to create a coalition between parties in a parliament controlled by the KMP. Not only become the majority, but the members from the KMP camp were also occupying the House of Representatives (DPR) executive seats. To be exact, five executive seats in the House of Representatives were dominated by KMP members. Besides dominating the executive House of Representatives seats, KMP also tried to build a permanent coalition plan. The plan was apparent when the discussion of the People Consultative Assembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR), House of Regional Representatives (DPD) and House of Regional People’s Representative DPRD draft bill was being discussed (MD3 Law). As a result, the draft bill was approved, which led to the decision that the position of House of Representatives chief would not be given to the party that won the election, and in this case, it was PDIP. The turn of events provided proof for the theory proposed by Hughes & Carlson (2015), in which the affecting factor in creating a divided government is the presence of politic polarization. Politic polarization can be based either on the parties’ ideology or the stance of the members of the parties. The drafting of MD3 Law which was heavily influenced by the interests of the dominating party, KMP, was signifying the presence of politic polarization as well as proving the members’ strategy to fulfill their interests.

In 2016, there were only two parties left in the KMP camp, which were Gerindra and PKS. However, looking back further, the conflicts between the legislative or executive, KMP and KIH, had been heating up since July 2014. The heat between these two camps did not even subside during every plenary meeting in the House of Representatives. The table below illustrates the heating conflicts between the two parties.

Table 1.3 Sequences of Conflicts in Legislative Circumstances

Date	Conflicts
8 July 2014	House of Representatives approved MD3 Law. The electing mechanism for the chief of the House of Representatives and MPR was changed. PDIP felt oppressed by Article 84 Verse (1) states that the head of the House of Representatives consists of one chief and four vice-chiefs who are selected from and by House of Representatives members. It is in contrast with the previous law mentioned in Article 82 Law Number 27 the Year 2009, which stated that the head of the House of Representatives is selected from the winning party in the election.
9 July 2014	The presidential and vice-presidential candidates proposed by the KIH camp, which are Joko Widodo (Jokowi)-Jusuf Kalla, received the most votes in the election.
16 September 2014	House of Representatives plenary meeting approved the House of Representatives’ rules and regulations, which consist of the elaboration of the MD3 Law.
1 October 2014	Elected legislative members were inaugurated as members of the House of Representatives.
31 October 2014	The opposing House of Representatives executives held a meeting.
29 October 2014	KMP camp swept the leadership seat in Complementary Organs of the House of Representatives. As a form of protest, the KIH camp built an opposing House of Representatives team of executives.
28 October 2014	A fraction member of PPP slammed the table during a plenary meeting discussing about the inauguration of the list of the candidate members’ names receiving House of Representatives apparatus.
7 October 2014	KMP camp regained the association they proposed for the MPR executives.

2 October 2014, in early days	KMP camp succeeded in promoting the House of Representatives executives; they proposed, which are Setya Novanto from Golkar party fraction as the chief and the vice-chief accompanying are Fahri Hamzah from the PKS fraction, Fadli Zon from the Gerindra fraction, Taufik Kurniawan from PAN fraction, and Agus Hermanto from Demokrat party fraction. KIH camp walked out during the election of the House of Representatives executives.
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Source: Detik News (2014)

The cases mentioned above often resulted from political deadlock situations. Political deadlock refers to the condition where two legislative boards or executive and legislative branch is being controlled by different political parties, or in contrast, they are not able to reach a common ground (David W Brady, 2006). The series of conflicts that happened during the 2014 election are also confirming the view of Hughes & Carlson (2015), which stated that politic polarization happening in the parliament would have implications for the tardiness of parliament in their performance of approving laws. The series of conflicts that happened from the 9th of July until the 2nd of October in 2014 slowed down the formation of the board-style structure, which led to the limitation of the running agendas in alleviating public problems, as predicted by Hughes & Carlson (2015). The legislative splitting, which was emphasized by the emergence of opposing House of Representatives executives initiated by PDIP, indicates that it would complicate Jokowi's regime. One of the possible complications was the issue of determining the national budget, in which House of Representatives members are expected to attend the meeting (BBC News, 2014).

However, Jokowi showed his own way of preventing the political deadlock situation by maintaining intensive communication between the government and the parliament. The periodic meetings held in formal and informal situations became a part of the actions to reduce the politic polarization between the coalition camp parties. The action made by Jokowi resulted in the political deadlock starting to subside and ending with the shift of three political parties. The three shifted political parties were PPP, Golkar, and PAN parties which were once opposing the government but now shifted to the pro-government party side.

As time went by, the pro-government party coalition increased in number with the shifting of PPP, Golkar, and PAN to the pro-government party side. This event was followed by the power sharing between the three parties and other pro-government parties during the ministry arrangement. Besides, to build the loyalty of the supporting coalition, the president was inclined to act soft – accommodative by giving incentives to the supporting coalition parties, which was previously described in research by Sendhikasari (2014). In the end, the two coalition parties in the parliament used their rights to negotiate in the parliament. The negotiation needed an enormous coalition which might create more stabilized politics, which is vital for the government to be able to shift its focus on national development instead of worrying about internal conflicts.

To conclude this section, it is apparent how the splitting of the parliament was indeed a part of the politic polarization, as shown by the KMP and KIH members and their actions. The output of the politic polarization was tardiness, as well as the deadlock of the legislatives work performance. Previously, Hughes & Carlson (2015) implied that the conflicts between political branches—in the form of split administration—affected the legislative outcomes. The dynamics that happened, which was mainly because of the deadlock situation in the parliament, gave implications to the parliament's productivity, as well as politic destabilization.

4.2 The Use of Executive Toolbox as a Respond to the Dynamics after the 2014 Presidential Election

At the beginning of the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla regime, there were only 37% of the parliament members supported them. However, Jokowi used his prerogative rights in supporting the legality of the newly inaugurated party head and held acknowledgement from the other plaintiffs. By doing so, Jokowi intervened aggressively in the internal conflicts of opposing parties which are Golkar and PPP (Mietzner, 2017).

The shifting of three big parties, which were PPP, Golkar, and PAN, from the KMP camp to the KIH camp, could not be separated from the factor of the relationship between President Jokowi's representatives and the parties' representatives. With the president title, there were some indications that Jokowi used the Executive Toolbox to avoid the crisis between the executives he leads and the executives from opposing parties. The Executive Toolbox actions were shown by approaching and communicating politically to the representatives of KMP camp parties, which was apparent in the scheduled meeting between Jokowi, Aburizal Bakrie, Romahurmuzyi, and Zulkifli Hasan (Arief Setyadi, 2014; detikNews, 2015b; TEMPO.CO, 2015). attempt mentioned is assumed to be the first step of the shifting of three big parties, PPP, Golkar, and PAN, to the government's coalition.

The three big parties, which finally took Jokowi- Jusuf Kalla's side—PPP, Golkar, and PAN, were suspected as the outcome of the use of the Executive Toolbox by Jokowi. However, the shifting of those three parties was not solely in the interest of Jokowi- Jusuf Kalla's regime, but there were also some benefits gained by the parties. In short, there were some mutualism processes behind the shifting of the three big parties to take the government's side. This parties shifting event justified the theory from Raile et al. (2011), which stated that there is a possibility of the distributive politic phenomenon in the parliament by using coalition advantages or even pork barrel politics to gain parliament's support. It is apparent that this action was a part of the strategy pattern used in the

politic exchange between the executives and the legislative. The president would use Executive Toolbox as a political strategy to gain support in the parliament.

The shifting of those parties was apparent since the beginning of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's regime. As an example, PPP and PAN delegated their members to the national meeting of PDIP in Semarang, which strengthened the prediction that the head of those political parties would take Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's side. Moreover, these two parties were known to always be involved in the government. The parties' track record also implied that PPP and PAN parties' interest in taking Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's side is way higher than Jokowi's interest in accommodating PPP and PAN (Hermawan, 2014).

On the other hand, the indication of Golkar joining the government was apparent since the internal conflicts of splitting factions and dualism inside the party. Moreover, the ex-vice chairman of Golkar, Jusuf Kalla, was the vice-president of president Jokowi. At the same time, Golkar, led by Aburizal Bakrie, was a part of the KMP camp. After MK's decision rejecting the lawsuit coming from Prabowo-Hatta against the presidential election result, a number of Golkar figures and representatives stated that Golkar was not ready to become the opposing side towards the government. Jusuf Kalla, as elected vice-president, added that Golkar's tradition is that they are always involved in the government or taking the government's side (Laksono Hari, 2014).

The base factor of those three parties joining the government's side, stated by Pramono Anung, was based on the habit of those parties always taking the side of winning candidates. Pramono Anung mentioned that the majority of political parties are not willing to support the losing candidates, but they always want to take the side of the elected candidates. Looking at the heaviness or the baggage, at the beginning of Jokowi- Jusuf Kalla's regime, there were more parties opposing them as the candidates winning the election. However, along the way of the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's regime, the parties were adjusting themselves to the regime, and it resulted in some parties wanting to join the government. As a result, the Executive Toolbox becomes the utility for those three parties to adjust themselves and finally decide to join the government. The adjustments were also based on the adjustments of interest and benefits of both sides, including the three political parties and Jokowi's administration.

The shifting choice made by opposing parties during that time was not the first time it happened. During the previous period, in the regime of SBY-Boediono, some opposing parties were also shifting to take the government's side. Previously, Golkar stated publicly that they were taking the SBY-Boediono side some moments before the result of the 2009 election were announced. That statement was made even though Golkar proposed Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto as the candidate. However, during the dispute, the number of Golkar members supporting Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto was depleted. Moreover, minutes after JK was announced to lose the election, the urge to hold an Extraordinary National Meeting (musnalub) within Golkar escalated (Gunawan, 2009). This event then became an experience for Golkar, which was then repeated in the regime of Jokowi- Jusuf Kalla.

1. The Use of Executive Toolbox on Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

The beginning of PPP shifting to Jokowi- Jusuf Kalla's administration side was apparent during the meeting of the representative of United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, which is referred to as PPP) with president Joko Widodo (Jokowi). During the meeting, the PPP representative did not refute that they would be joining KIH political camp. The meeting was held in Jakarta Governor's Office House, which was Jokowi's temporary residence after officially resigning from the position of Governor of Jakarta. The general deputy secretary of PPP, Syaifullah Tamiha, said that his party had been conducting political communication with the KIH camp (detikNews, 2014c). he meeting, PPP refuted the assumptions that there was some kind of transaction within the meeting and stated that they were ready to follow the rules set by Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration. The hint of PPP taking Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's side was getting stronger after Romahurmuzyi was chosen as the chairman of PPP by acclamation. The tug of war signs of PPP shifting from KMP to KIH was apparent even before Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla was elected as the winning candidates until they were officially announced as the winning candidates. Additionally, Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla notably promised ministry seats to PPP (Virdhani, 2014), which was then refuted by Jokowi.

The previously mentioned matter started from the splitting of the leadership within the PPP. These resulted in hardships for PPP, and they lost votes in the 2019 presidential election as well as the regional election. Through the political observers' eyes, this splitting was projected as an opportunity for Jokowi- Jusuf Kalla's government to entice PPP to take the governmental coalition. The internal conflicts within the political party as the consequence of split political choices happened within PPP. The internal conflict started because the party chairman, Suryadarma Ali, stated that he supported Prabowo-Hatta candidates during the 2014 presidential election. Suryadarma Ali declared his political support and gave the statement that PPP was officially in coalition with the Gerindra party, which was supporting Prabowo Subianto as the presidential candidate (BBC, 2014). The support declaration was notable through the meeting of the general chairman of the Gerindra Party, Prabowo Subianto, with the general chairman of PPP, Suryadharma Ali. The action taken by the general chairman of PPP, Suryadarma Ali, supporting Prabowo as the presidential candidate, was considered a party rules violation by the other PPP executives. The general deputy secretary of PPP, Romahurmuzyi, did not agree with the action made by the chairman of PPP, Suryadarma Ali, and in contrast, Romahurmuzyi supported Jokowi as the presidential candidate instead. Romahurmuzyi stated openly that PPP was ready to be in coalition with PDIP and referred to

the camp as 'watermelon colors' (Jawapos, 2018). Other than Romahurmuziy, the previous ex-chairman of the PPP, Hamzah Haz, was also giving support to PPP for joining the coalition with PDIP. Hamzah suggested the PPP members discuss coalition opportunities with Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's government during the party's conference (detikNews, 2014a).

The general vice chairman of PPP, Achmad Dimiyati Natakusumah, emphasized the party's commitment towards the party members to keep the PPP coalition statement with Prabowo Subianto and to not betray the statement. Achmad warned the cadres for those who wanted to support Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla was welcomed to resign from PPP. Achmad stated that PPPs have to be committed and loyal to the coalition they have built together with Prabowo (Tempo, 2014a).

After the 2014 presidential election, there was dualism in the internal management of PPP; one followed Romahurmuziy, and the other followed Suryadarma Ali. These two groups within the PPP claimed to be the official executives of the party. These two groups also held the PPP party conference of each own. The group led by Romahurmuziy held the conference in Surabaya, which appointed Romahurmuziy as the general chairman of PPP through acclamation. On the other hand, the group led by Suryadarma Ali held the conference in Jakarta, which appointed Djan Faridz as the general chairman of PPP through acclamation as well. Apparently, the two groups within PPP had different approaches toward Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration. Romahurmuziy camp chose to support the government, while the Djan Faridz camp chose to oppose the government.

Romahurmuziy stated that based on the conference decision held in Surabaya, PPP would not oppose Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration. Romahurmuziy also disclosed the will of PPP cadres on his side in which they wanted to be a part of the government. The members who joined the PPP conference held in Surabaya stated that they would give full support and were ready in a succession of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration. The statement given by Romahurmuziy, as mentioned, was considered as a sign of the PPP joining the coalition within Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration. PPP was the first opposing party that shifted its side to support the government. As a token of appreciation, Jokowi gave one of the ministry positions to one of the PPP cadres, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, as the Ministry of Religion (Liputan6, 2014).

After joining the coalition within the government, the internal conflicts within PPP had not come to an end yet. To resolve the dualism conflict between the groups within the PPP, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Yasonna Laoly, suggested PPP hold the VIII Reconciliation Conference (Muktamar Islah) in Pondok Gede, Jakarta, 8-10 April 2016. issued a decree (Surat Keputusan or SK) to reactivate the organization structure of PPP from the PPP Bandung Conference in 2011, when the term was already expired during that time. The purpose of reactivating the structure organization through the decree was to give a chance for the two groups, Romahurmuziy camp and Djan Faridz camp, to come to an agreement during the Reconciliation Conference. Once the decree was issued, the members of PPP from the two groups which previously held the conference in Surabaya and Jakarta agreed to attend the Reconciliation Conference. However, Djan Faridz and some of his followers, such as Dimiyati Natakusuma, were not willing to follow the reconciliation steps through the conference (Kabar24, 2014). The absence of Djan Faridz did not disrupt the conference, as stated by the Steering Committee of the PPP Conference, Arsul Sani. He also mentioned that the absence of Djan Faridz would not create any effect on the reconciliation process. The reason was that the beginning of the dualism started from the conflicts between Romahurmuziy and Suryadharma Ali instead of Romahurmuziy and Djan Faridz.

The internal conflict of the PPP was resolved through the rivalry between the head of two groups arguing to gain the title of general chairman of the PPP. During the general chairman of the PPP election, Romahurmuziy was appointed as the general chairman of DPP PPP for the 2016-2021 period through acclamation.

After being appointed as the new general chairman of PPP, Romahurmuziy expected that the final decision agreed upon by the majority of the party members would be the final point of the internal conflicts within the organizational structure of PPP. Furthermore, Romahurmuziy pledged that he would be open to reconciliation choices and processes from the members of the Jakarta conference, which was under the lead of Djan Faridz. Romahurmuziy guaranteed that he or his representatives would not call out the PPP cadres in the parliament, who previously disagreed with or opposed him throughout the conferences.

Even the Reconciliation Conference was held where Romahurmuziy was chosen as the General Chairman of PPP, and the representatives from the Djan Faridz faction (Epyardi Asda and Fenita Darwis) attended the conference, the faction was still against the decision. The faction led by Djan Faridz stated that the PPP leadership by Romahurmuziy is not valid. To put the statement into action, the Djan Faridz faction issued a lawsuit to the National Administrative Court (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara, or PTUN). After the lawsuit was issued, the National Administrative Court decided that the decree of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Menteri Hukum dan HAM, Menkumham) No M.HH-06. AH.11.01, the Year 2016, regarding the inauguration of DPP PPP structure organization for the 2016-2021 period, was invalid and cancelled by the law. The decision stated that "The defendant is obliged to revoke Decree of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia Number M.HH-06. AH.11.01 2016 Regarding the Inauguration of Central Leadership Council of the United Development Party (PPP) structure organization for the 2016-2021 period".

Romahurmuziy camp issued an appeal against the National Administrative Court's decision. Arsul Sani as the representative, stated that the faction, as well as the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, would issue an appeal. The representative said that the National Administrative Court's decision did not have enough law power because there would be three stages of courts which are appeal, cassation, and review court (Peninjauan Kembali or PK) (Mediaindonesia, 2016). The appeal coming from the Romahurmuziy faction was approved by the National Supreme Administrative Court (Pengadilan Tinggi Tata Usaha Negara (PT TUN). The appeal stated that the structure organization of PPP led by Romahurmuziy as the General Chairman and Arsul Sani as the general secretary was valid and in accordance with the decree from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights.

Finally, Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla announced the cabinet of Indonesia named Working Cabinet (Kabinet Kerja) on Sunday (26/10/2014) in the National Palace, Jakarta. The announcement announced the names of the member of the Working Cabinet and one of the ministries chosen as a part of PPP, Lukman Hakim, as the Ministry of Religion (Asril, 2014). The indication of the use of the Executive Toolbox can be seen through the tug of war of PPP joining the government's side. Moreover, Romahurmuziy, being known as one of the political figures that with a good relationship with Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, was already giving out signs of internal conflicts within PPP and the possibilities of the party shifting their side. This was proven by one of the members of the PPP who was chosen as a cabinet member after Romahurmuziy was elected as the General Chairman of the PPP.

2. The Use of Executive Toolbox on Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)

The hints of PAN taking Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration side started with the rise of internal conflicts within PAN during the PAN congress in 2015 between a faction led by Zulkifli Hasan and Hatta Rajasa. The congress resulted in a decision in which Zulkifli Hasan was chosen as the general chairman of the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, which is referred to as PAN) for the 2015-2020 period. The vote earned by the two chairman candidates was not much different in percentages. Zulkifli earned 292 votes, while Hatta earned only 286 votes, and the other 4 members abstained (Ihsanuddin, 2015). Once chosen as the general chairman, Zulkifli Hasan published a statement right away that they would join the Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla's administration. However, Zulkifli Hasan uncovered that his side was not supporting, but he legitimately wanted to contribute together hand in hand with the government to resolve the Indonesian economic situation, which was shaky during that time.

Previously, the hints of PAN joining Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration were apparent in the statement given by Jokowi on Tuesday (19/8/14). Jokowi mentioned that there were some possibilities that PAN and Demokrat would join the government. However, Jokowi stated that the two parties joining the government joined with the condition that they would be in coalition without any exchange, in which the two parties had no right to ask for a Ministry seat quota. PAN joining the government also was in line with the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration's interest to strengthen the parliament as well as run the government's programs smoothly. This was because, during that time, Jokowi's administration was after 5 supporting seats to gain 5 House of Representatives executive seats (Republika, 2014). As a result, in September 2015, PAN officially announced that they joined the government swiftly.

On the other hand, PAN Party's interests were not far from aiming for the Ministry seat and preserving their power by joining the government. The indication of PAN getting a Ministry seat was once commented on by the general vice secretary of the PKB party. During the beginning of PAN joining the government, Lukman Edy suspected that PAN's support was definitely not free of charge; there must be some bilateral advantages from the government. He even suggested including PAN in the cabinet during the reshuffle Part II (Alvin, 2015).

Other than PKB, PDIP politician Eva Kusuma Sundari mentioned that it was logical if PAN received a Ministry seat quota within the cabinet. She said the matter was an aftermath after PAN gave their support to Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration (Paat, 2015). The suspicion then was proved by Jokowi appointed one of the PAN cadre, Asman Abnur, as the Ministry of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform. Asman replaced a politician named Hanura Yuddy Chrisnandi, taking the seat. Even though PAN only received one Ministry quota, PAN did not see that as a problem. The bilateral advantages happened to show how Jokowi made use of cabinet reshuffling as a platform to accommodate the parties shifting their sides to support the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration. Finally, the interests of the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration to strengthen the parliament was accomplished by making use of the executive Toolbox.

Even though there was no splitting of factions or dualism within the internals, like what happened in Golkar and PPP, the internal conflicts or factionalism related to supporting the idea of becoming the opposing party or joining the government also occurred in PAN. During the 2014 presidential election, PAN officially joined the KMP camp, which proposed Prabowo-Hatta as the candidate (Hatta Rajasa was the general chairman of PAN). However, most of the PAN cadres chose to give their support to Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla candidates. Even the ex-general chairman of PAN, Soetrisno Bachir, was one of the PAN cadres supporting Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla as the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Soetrisno was also involved in the successor team of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, together with the general Chairman of DPP PDIP, Puan Maharani, the ex-general chairman of PBNU Hasyim Muzadi, the vice chief of House of Representatives Pramono Anung, and General Army Retired Luhut B. Panjaitan (Tribunnews, 2014).

Similar to what happened to PPP and Golkar, throughout the conflict's progress, PAN also joined the government's coalition. After Zulkifli Hasan was chosen as the general chairman of PAN, PAN officially joined the government's coalition (BBC News, 2015). Zulkifli disclosed the reason behind the coalition, and it was to protect the political stability and also the government, especially when the world economy was in an unstable condition. Once joining the government, fairly similar to the other parties, PAN also received the ministry seat quota. The chosen cadre to fill the Ministry seat was Asman Abnur, which was appointed as the Ministry of Empowerment of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform, replacing Yuddy Chrisnandi (Hanura Party), which was dismissed. Previously, Hanura had two cadres in the cabinet of Indonesia. However, during the cabinet reshuffling Part II, both cadres Yudi Chrisnandi (ex-Ministry of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform) and Saleh Husin (ex-Ministry of Industry) were dismissed by Jokowi. During the reshuffling, Hanura Party only received one seat quota in the cabinet, which was the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, which was occupied by the general chairman of Hanura, Wiranto. Besides receiving the Ministry seat quota, PAN's Chairman of the Advisory Council, Soetrisno Bachir, was also appointed to lead the non-structural institution, which was the Committee of National Economy and Industry (Komite Ekonomi dan Industri Nasional, KEIN) (CNN Indonesia, 2016).

3. The Use of Executive Toolbox on Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)

In the previous literature, Mietzner (2017) explained that the reason why the government was involved in the pro-government faction within the Group Working Party (Golongan Karya, which is referred to as Golkar) was because of their influence in Suharto presidential Election. The pro-Jokowi faction within Golkar was against the idea of Aburizal Bakrie becoming the lead of Golkar. This was because Bakrie took Prabowo Subianto's side as the popular rival of Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election and kept the alliance even after the election was finished. As the government took the side of its rival Bakrie, it forced Bakrie to come to numerous extensive courts. Finally, in January 2016, Bakrie surrendered, and he agreed to step back from the chairman position. He also stated Golkar is leaving Prabowo's coalition. At the same time, Agung Laksono was chosen as the general chairman of Golkar for the 2014-2019 period during the IX Golkar National Conference in Bali.

However, Golkar's political interest was based on the dualism factional interest between the group supporting Agung Laksono versus the group supporting Aburizal Bakrie as the general chairman of Golkar during and after the 2014 presidential election. Additionally, the two factions within Golkar also supported opposing candidates during the presidential election. Agung Laksono camp supported Jokowi, while Aburizal Bakrie camp supported Prabowo.

Finally, the government approved the faction under Agung Laksono through the decree issued by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. The approval was seen as something filled with political interests since Jusuf Kalla, who was the ex-general chairman of Golkar, was also a member of a faction under Agung Laksono. However, the faction under Aburizal Bakrie did not accept the decision wholeheartedly. The faction under Aburizal Bakrie issued a lawsuit against the previous decree to the National Administrative Court. Even though the National Administrative Court approved the lawsuit at first, in the end, they decided to cancel the approval (Dieqy Hasbi Widhana, 2015).

The dualism started to subside in 2016, which was foreshadowed by the signal given by the general chairman of the central executive board (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, or DPP) Golkar, Aburizal Bakrie, to join the KIH camp. Aburizal Bakrie gave a statement based on the meeting attended by DPD I from every province in Indonesia, which asked for DPP to join the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration (AntaraNews, 2016).

Actually, there were numerous times Golkar have shown their support to Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. One of them was during the national visit (silaturahmi Nasional, or Silatnas) to Golkar at the end of 2015. Around that time, Golkar started to find opportunities to join the government reigning the country. The other one was during the ceremony of the 51st Anniversary of Golkar. The chairman of Golkar tried to mention the support Golkar had given to the government. The shifting of Aburizal Bakrie's camp was also related to its own camp position, which was in crisis because of the faction duel within Golkar's dualism. This makes the choice of taking the government's side and signing out from KMP the best option for the Aburizal Bakrie faction during that time. Additionally, Jusuf Kalla, as a Golkar cadre who was expected to be neutral towards the two factions within Golkar, was siding with Agung Laksono's camp throughout the Golkar internal conflicts.

Interestingly, the support given by Golkar to Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration became more apparent right when the reshuffling issue came to the surface. Because of this issue, it was suspected that Golkar was aiming for the bilateral support they once gave to the government in the form of giving the Ministry seats to Golkar. Apparently, the government under Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla also had their own interests in getting support so they would have more support within the parliament in their administration. Golkar taking the government's side was also considered as a way to improve the political relationship between Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration and the parliament (Moerti, 2016). Besides, it seemed that Jokowi was aware that taking over Golkar would advantage him in running the administration, including being the candidate for the second period of the presidential election.

Therefore, it is interesting to look at and analyze how the structure of the cabinet of Indonesia changed after Golkar gave their full support, as well as see how Golkar's interest was accommodated by the government. Golkar, which only joined the government coalition in 2015, received 2 quotas for a Ministry seat, namely Kabinet Kerja under Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. These two seats were occupied by Airlangga Hartanto at the Ministry of Industry and Idrus Marham, who occupied the reshuffled seat at the Ministry of Social Affairs. Having the two seats occupied by Golkar's members added to the composition of the Golkar cadre under the cabinet of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. Other than those two cadres, Jokowi has chosen a senior politician from Golkar, Luhur Binsar Panjaitan, as the Head Presidential Staff early in Jokowi's regime.

Aside from the seat quota, it is assumed that there were other factors. One of the factors was Aburizal Bakrie's interest in the case of Lapindo mud. Not long after Golkar joined the government's side, Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla issued government rules (PP) Year 2015 regarding the bailout fund for the Lapindo mud casualty, which advantaged the ex-general chairman of Golkar, Aburizal Bakrie (Maharani, 2015). The Lapindo mud casualty fund was one of the porks initiated by one of the executives and was justified by Golkar politicians. The pork barrel politics became one of the triggers for the attitude changes of the Golkar Party. This change led to the submission of a statement and/or declaration letter by Aburizal Bakrie stating that the Golkar Party supported and joined the government of Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla during the closing of the Golkar Party's national executive board meeting.

The Golkar party held a National Executive Board Meeting (Rapat Pimpinan Nasional, Rapimnas) on 23 – 25 January 2016, which was attended by the DPD-DPD Provincial executives of the Golkar Party. The result of the National Executive Board Meeting was the agreement to end the internal conflict of dualism within the Golkar Party by holding a national conference. The Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Luhut B. Panjaitan and President B.J. Habibie were also present during the commence of the National Executive Board Meeting. Meanwhile, the National Executive Board Meeting closing was attended by Vice President Jusuf Kalla, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Luhut B. Panjaitan, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights Yasonna Laoly, and Ministry of Home Affairs Tjahyo Kumolo. During the National Executive Board Meeting closing, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia received the statement and/or declaration letter stating that the Golkar Party supported and joined the government of Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla.

4.3 Executive Toolbox as a Dynamics Consequence within the Multiparty System in Indonesia

Combining the multiparty system and the presidential resulted in the coalition becoming an essential matter within the presidential system. This is because the party system in Indonesia is an extreme multiparty system with the belief that no party is a dominant party. Based on that fact, the professional relationship between the president and the parliament tends to be conflicting. As a consequence, in taking public decisions, the president is expected to be involved in compromising and accommodating the interests coming from different parties in the parliament, which are different from the president's own party. This phenomenon happened at the beginning of the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla regime.

The support given by the political parties in which the majority is a part of the government and the parliament is something that guarantees the presidential system would run effectively. The tactic was used by Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla to invite the political parties opposing the government to join the government's coalition by giving the parties strategic seats in the executive in return. The parties joining the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla administration were PAN, Golkar, and PPP. During the rivalry of the 2014 presidential election, these three parties supported Prabowo-Hatta. The shifting of these three parties was started by PAN, which took the government's side on September 2015, followed by PPP on January 2016. Lastly, on 16 May 2016, the Golkar party officially announced that they were leaving KMP camp and turned to support Joko Widodo. The shifting of the parties was seen as an effort to give a dynamical demonstration of the use of the executive toolbox strategy. This also includes the temporal factor, which also shaped the relationships between the coalition equipment as well as pork barrel politics. The distribution of coalition equipment, such as a cabinet or parliament seat quota, was also seen as related to the relationship and the harmony in getting political support from the executives (Raile et al., 2011).

Obviously, the three parties added to the Jokowi administration's voice power in the House of Representatives. Moreover, the presence of Golkar, which had the biggest proportion of seats in the House of Representatives on Jokowi's side, will enhance the parliament's affinity to the government. With the additional support, Jokowi was supported by 69,2 percent of members occupying House of Representatives seats. It was much different from the beginning of Jokowi's regime, where he was only supported by 37 percent of members of the House of Representatives. However, numerous political observer has predicted that the three parties would join the government. It was based on those three shifting parties' previous experiences, which were never taking the opposing side of the government. Historically, after the reformation, Golkar, PAN, and PPP always keep intact with the central government.

The voice power from the three parties was big enough when combined. As an example, in 2014, the accumulated seats from these three parties were at 32,1 percent. This percentage was almost on par with the percentage of the coalition of parties

supporting the government at 37,1 percent. This resulted in the power of the opposing party's side in the first year of Jokowi's administration. Once the three strong parties join the government's side, the discussion of government policies in the House of Representatives will run smoother without any significant problems. As publicly known, with the minimum support from the House of Representatives, it is quite hard for the government to publish government policies.

The executives' bargaining position in the presidential system has big power because the executives hold an extensive number of financial resources in managing the state budget. This fact is interesting enough for the political parties to occupy the executive seats. The bargaining position was used by Jokowi's administration to accommodate the opposing political parties to join the administration's side. However, the main objectives were to make the government run their policy smoother, and the interests of political parties shifted their side to get a strategic position in the Ministry to manage the state budget's financial resources.

5. Conclusion

The coalition dynamics after the 2014 presidential election during Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla's regime is called a divided government dynamic, which resulted in a deadlock situation. This can be seen from the support given by the political parties on the government's side, which were not dominant. The opposing party, named KMP, was very dominant in the legislative, which is in line with the statement from Hughes & Carlson (2015), which said that the majority of parliament seats were occupied by the opposing parties. However, throughout the administration, there were some political consolidations and compromises from the executives' side to gain support from the legislative. The tug of war phenomenon of the revision of the MD 3 law, and the internal conflicts within the political PPP, Golkar, and PAN, exhibited that the executive Toolbox was used. Their bilateral advantages from the compromise in which Ministry seats were given by the executives to the parties which were opposing the administration, PPP, Golkar, and PAN, were very apparent. This phenomenon can be said to be a part of the pork barrel project because the executives were aiming for opposing political parties. The government's executives have more than enough resources to give the offer to the opposing side to join the government's supporting side.

The use of the executive Toolbox becomes part of how the executives respond to the political dynamics to ensure the precision of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's governmental agendas. How Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's administration gave the Ministry seats and intervened in the internal conflicts of the opposing parties hinted at the executives' power towards the opposing political parties. This was based on several matters. First, the Unconditional Coalition (coalition without any transactional politics) motto, which was one of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's campaigns, seems used only for the tactical campaign during the presidential election season. It seems that the motto was not the ideal goal once Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla won the election. This is apparent through the use of the executive Toolbox when the opposing parties, PPP, Golkar, and PAN, join the government. The use of executive Toolbox became the antithesis of the Unconditional Coalition motto.

Second, the executives' intervention in the opposing parties' internal conflicts hinted at a power-relation which legitimated the enormous executives' power. Through their power, the executives can make use of coalition advantages, as in the political seats or make use of pork barrel politics to handle ongoing legislative needs. The use of their power was to reduce the dynamics happening in the parliament by connecting the substitutive politics between the pork barrel politics and the seats in the government or parliament to ensure stable politics. (Raile et al., 2011). The presence of a coalition party in the government's cabinet opens more opportunities in gaining more political support to be gained by the executives. This was the strategy run by the executives to gain support from the parliament to ease the approval of every policy proposed. This implies that Jokowi's administration succeeded in gaining support of the coalition using the executive Toolbox. The use of the executive Toolbox was apparent through the action of giving Ministry seats for the opposing parties shifting their side, PPP, Golkar, and PAN, as well as intervening in internal conflicts within opposing parties, PPP and Golkar.

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