
RESEARCH ARTICLE

Political Philosophy and Moral Thinking as Phenomena and/or Personages: An Essential Short Guide of a Pragmatist Reader

Malik Kareem Hassoun

Wasit University, Iraq

Corresponding Author: Malik Kareem Hassoun, **E-mail:** mkareem@uowasit.edu.iq

ABSTRACT

Despite their similarity in style, language, and performance, symmetry, repetition, and the game of arbitrariness are represented by parallel intentional paths. After years of amorphous searching through the compilation of ruins and rubble, we could, with this study, carry out the situational need for the signifier and the signified by establishing a short theoretical framework that helps illuminate the striking appearance of pragmatic phenomena. For underlying concrete acts of interpretation, to understand the meaning to the required extent, alternatively constructed enactment must manage moral thinking and political practice to rationalise the symbolism on the map at the core of the theoretical construction. Since reports, as Mehan and Wood (1975) scholarly warrant, are decoded on behalf of the facts, not of social beings, certain pragmatics of a linguistic complex, according to Saussure (1959), show that word order alone expresses the thought.

KEYWORDS

Politics, philosophy, thought, moralism, pragmatics, illocution, personage, and phenomenon.

ARTICLE INFORMATION

ACCEPTED: 30 August 2024

PUBLISHED: 31 August 2024

DOI: 10.32996/ijllt.2024.7.8.26

2. A Decipherable Notations: An Overview and Introduction

Philosophers and thinkers, in ancient philosophies and languages, have speculated and are concerned with such distinct ideas as human nature, mind, ethics, moral dilemmas, and so on. So, it has been potentially suggested that modernity and its compounds have adopted an examination of language and world/or meaning rather than the mechanism of the search for truth. However, Bradley and Swartz (1979) show that possible worlds are, nowadays, when stripped of the proposition that the actual world is incomparable over any others, oftentimes invoked as mechanisms of strongly illuminating other areas of philosophy. Otherwise, psychology, language, ethics, epistemology, logic, etc., are all advantages from the insights of what is entitled philosophy, logic, and possible semantic attitudes.

Investigations of language with a broad horizon of discourse reflect, as shown by Ricoeur (1976), that the search way for a comprehensive use of the philosophy of language can participate in accounting, firstly, multiple functions of the human act of signifying and secondly, for all their interrelations. Although the problem itself is not a new one, Ricoeur (ibid.) shows that the problem of language as a (treatise or) discourse is discussed in modern terms of sense. So, Plato, in his *Cratylus*, as it is cited in Ricoeur (ibid.), has shown that the problem of words and/or names (viz., truth) must remain undecided since naming does not exhaust the function of speaking to either conveying pragmatic information or expressing agent's feelings and thoughts since words have deep connections to the world, names (which are either naturalistic or conventionalist), or meaning of things within an order of arbitrariness/less of signs or separate factors. How we perceive speech and the language logos have evolved to facilitate the intertwining of these two which frame the first philosophical unit of language and thought. The question raised by Plato and Ricoeur (ibid.) is to understand "how error is possible" and if to speak, on all occasions, means to say something due to conclude

that a word in particular or intended discourse (in general) is neither performatively true nor false even though the bearer of this paradox (of a combination of words) may mean x thing yet grasp nothing, viz., nothing does not necessarily equal not x.

In one of an Oxford pioneer's philosophies, some sort of contrast occurs between what the ordinary man believes and, for the most part, what philosophers believe. We have to look at both sides of this contrast, and with special care at what is presumed in and implicated by what is indeed said. In other words, it is obviously inexplicit that that ordinary man believes what he perceives of the material things, even that things are not material things or expressions that the ordinary agent would use nor perceive. Otherwise, those material things assumingly represent the class of things, in a general way, not of which the ordinary man believes and perceives, from time to time (Austin, 1962). Moreover, there are two interpretations to what any person perceives at some thoughtful age, namely when the ordinary agent believes that he is being deceived, taken into consideration, by his senses because of not perceiving material things, on the one hand. When that agent does not perceive his target things, he believes he is being deceived sensationistically. Consequently, both of these are wrong since an ordinary agent who saw a rainbow, for instance, would not conclude that he is being perceived as something of the world wrongly and his senses are deceiving him. Thus, there is, by the way, no more an uncomplicated contrast between when something is amiss and when all things are well, on the one hand, than that is to say that there is between what he perceives that he believes and what philosophers are prepared, viz., the ground of the two contrastive interpretation is being prepared for two bogus dichotomies.

Ultimately, in a lesser degree of distinctions and controversies, Russel (1954) unambiguously exemplified, in two different readings, that if two Americans are candidates for the United States Presidency, one of those politicians must be absolutely disappointed at the end of the voting process. But, if those undifferent men, both in different circumstances, wish to be rich agents, one of them can be rich by growing x plant. At the same time, the other can also reach his target goal, subsequently, by manufacturing that one's x plant; by the way, there is no logical reason why both of them should not succeed. Therefore, it is conspicuous that compossible worldly grails (or purposes) of different individuals or groups are likely to be happier and felicitous than ones in which they are discordant. It is conditionally effective if those aims are part of a judicious system of community that encourages possible evident purposes and refuses conflicting ones via means of education, social regulations, etc., which are designed to this extent. In whatever way we (all) agreed on our aversions and wants, there would be (hence) no ethical and/or moral conflict. But Slater (1992) observes, in *his introduction of human society in ethics and politics*, that peoples disagree; therefore, we have to attempt to find reasons showing, firstly, that our needs, desires, etc., have got some property which our contenders' wants do not have. We hope that this will persuade them to evaluate and consider circumstances differently and to feel, secondly, a different eagerness, which will cause them to harmonize with us on the value that will be available in the meticulous circumstances. So, then, ethics represents the conscious attempt to find reasons and justifications to persuade peoples as a group to desire the same performative things. Russell thinks, as Slater (1992) mentions, that ethics fails to accomplish agreement in a largeish number of cases if its argumentation only comes into function (and work) when there is disagreement. Therefore, and by its nature, ethical logic is closely, attractive, to politics, since both of them endeavor to develop pragmatically collective desires and bring them, indeed, to bear upon those, executively, not yet within the fold.

3. Two Intersecting Probability: A Generic Illustration

Because words have limits beyond algorithms, and have a feeling that surpasses their meaning, philosophical pragmatics has transcended the limits of meaning to make thought the horizon of the sensational world and has accomplished, with it, what was amorphous politically or poetically in the phenomenal aspects. Thus, pragmatic phenomena came into play to create the event's helm with the one who accomplished it, as we shall deeply care about below, since specific languages, as shown by Scovel (1998), are essential examples of language in general, their particular characteristics are related, in terms of pragmatics, to universal ones.

4. The Ecology and Power of Communicative Perspectives

For Professor John Dewey, as cited in Sabine (1930), the center of thought lies necessarily in the act of creative imagination, the former assures, by which a new way of treating a difficulty is invented. Then, Sabine (ibid.) adds that Veblen logically observes that economic behaviour is determined principally by institutions that represent socialised habits, and undergo cumulative procedures of such evolutionary changes as forces, social, and physical, which modify economic institutions, at any given time, by new habits, via psychological process, are formed. Furthermore, as a resultant one, this process involves two patterns of reactions and modification of these former reactions by habituation, where men or agents' action mature their power and bring them to forms of apparent behaviour. Although the innate (reaction) factor is virtually unchangeable, the physical environmental part is chiefly changeable. Respectively, the most changeable (which is the most important for social evolution) condition of forms of habit consists of the institutions of us themselves, i.e., indeed, institutions, in their psychological construction, are habits such as various kinds of skill and knowledge, standards of taste and well-being, types of industrial or organization of commerce (but they have represented the most significant part of the social environment in which each agent matures his performative behaviour). Thus, this whole body of habits, namely habits of thought and action, forms the trajectory of human culture or civilization.

Our claim, Austin (1961) confirms in saying we know what sort of thing does indeed happen when ordinary agents are asked how we know, is to recognize this sort, at least, which consists of seeing (or sensing) features that are similar to something named before on some occasions in our experience. Meanwhile, some varieties of behaviour, (and some ways of acting or putting into words the doing actions) are being classified if they are of more practical importance, i.e., when we interpret, for example, someone or an agent's angry behaviour being only a pretense, this pretended anger of that one, is ordinarily being contrasted in our minds, is his real emotion, attitude, feeling which is strictly not real anger, namely, it is meant that the difference in (conscious) behaviour constitutes the difference between two facts, the first one is related to the factual anger. At the same time, the other is concerned with pretending anger, therefore, the formula, according to Austin, must be as in the following:

"He must be claiming, not only that once he has taken the bite, we cannot (truly) say 'He is only pretending to be angry', which seems false, but also that if he merely stamps and goes no further, we cannot (truly) say 'He is really angry', which seems patently false" (p.203).

Thus, the essence of the occurrence in pretending is that x public behaviour is meant to disguise some actuality. Namely, it oftentimes persuades throughout some veritable behaviour. Obviously, there is a pure performative utterance and perspicuous other utterances, connected with it, are descriptive rather than performative. So, there are a good many, but in between, we are not sure which they are, i.e., in some situations, they have explicitly used the one way, whereas they are used the other way on some other occasions; hence, they seem to revel, on some situations, in ambiguity. Otherwise, there are some tackled questions, as in

"In the case, let us say, of a verdict or an estimate: was it a good estimate, or a sound verdict? And these are questions that can only be decided by considering how the content of the verdict or estimate is related in some way to fact, or to evidence available about the facts. This is to say that we do require to assess at least a great many performative utterances in a general dimension of correspondence with fact" (p.237).

I think that if we pay any attention to the matters or descriptive inquires, we can explicate some of these mistakable inquires in philosophy via parading mistakes which are really infelicitous of performative matters, i.e., since philosophy is used as a scapegoat, it clears up mistakes, especially those are actually the mistakes of everyone, since life, truth, and things do tend, really, to be complicated, philosophers are tended to simplicate them. In handling these performative matters, the only thing that we have been putting them must be felicitous, not to be an abuse or not to be a misfire. So, it is worth remembering that many things are part of the conventional kind, wherein philosophers are apt to assume that performative action is always making of a physical movement whilst it is usually a traditional matter. Thus, there are multiple ways in which language develops, in a harmonized, with the society of which – it is the language. Also, societal social habits can affect the query of which (verbs or) performatives are evolved and which are not.

Since it is able to relate its signs or codes to every portion and every ilk of human being experience, and all the furniture of (un)conscious world, it is more critical to read pragmatically special characteristics and unique position of language, as well as all other systems of symbols are interpreted and explained by reference to it. According to the philosophy of communication, as Robins (1964) realises that personages' languages are infinitely modifiable and extendable, accompanied by their changing needs and conditions, in all their forms and manifestations; this is obviously embodied and took place, historically, in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, in the immediate adaptation of the English and other languages' vocabularies via concomitant changes and scientific discoveries. Away from symbolising conduct such as gestural sets of expressing, on the one hand, and communicative systems of some creatures like bees, on the other, sets of human language fascinated and revealed all these connected topics. All organized or unorganized societies have practically perceived the massive power of human language. Furthermore, the realisation of power's range of human language is no doubt somewhat responsible for the magical associations felt in particular words relating to things fearful in their effects or vital to their lives since such magical outlook, on language nowadays, is to be seen in certain familiar attitudes to certain things, expressions, and words in most (thoughtful) groups or communities.

Innuendos in political discourse, as shown by Fraser and Turner (2009), arise at critical junctures of intentional interaction, which require personages to performatively act to impact immediate addressees or unbeknown to others, yet to disguise their intentions to avoid the troubles that would be involved in their undisguised expression. It is mainly about hypocrisy, which penetrates the (recent) political scene. Thoroughly inviting the counter-agent and the prospective observer to drive other socio-political implicit innuendous is suitable. So, in the doubtful event, the agent of the action may deny all of such aspersions to save his/her face pragmatically if what has happened so far offends. Thus, In the very gestural (innuendous) approach of language, we are already interceding in it in a politically powerful sense, i.e., it looks, according to academic works, that pragmatics is a politically self-conscious way of engaging with (power of) language.

Strictly speaking, a word is a picture; Crystal (2010) logically assures, by narrating the story, the following:

"Here's a word picture. It comes from a story written by Charles Dickens called 'A Christmas Carol' about a miser called Scrooge. It's been made into a film several times, including one starring all the Muppets with Michael Caine. This is how Dickens describes Scrooge. Every word is carefully chosen, like adding an extra brush-stroke to a painting maintains that it comes from a written story is done by Dickens (Charles) entitled 'A Christmas Carol' (p.222).

It is a potent marker of the social class to which the agent's action belongs. Suppose there are obvious class divisions in a community. In that case, they will have reverberated in the style of agents' action use of language, i.e., we can see those with a good education speak and write the forms of language that are felt to be the best. Whether oral or written, politicians, authors, instructors, etc., attempt to use language via its most effective forms and persuasive ways to be powerful, beautiful, histrionic, memorable, authentic, and to move our thoughts in some way, viz., they want to cause us feeling happily or melancholy, or thrilled or skittish or any of a hundred others of emotions, and thus to make us hate some characters and love others, viz., they want their audiences, readers, addressees, etc., to admire the sound and style of what they have been done, in the same way when they are marveled with a picture or any artwork, except their actions are painted with words rather than colours.

5. By the Way of Politics May (Not) Apply in Particular Moral Instances

Since political performance involves cognition, will, and choice, what we perceive as humanizing objects know only or describe, only, as general complicated attributes. Likewise, the individuality of the human-agent(s), as a recognition aspect we get, accomplish(es) in the various nexuses into which the agent(s) inter(s). Consequently, we recognize multiple elements of the capability of that expression and/or action. So, since all sides of the expressible nexuses are socialised (have adequate descriptions of the individualistic objects), the number of interpreted forms of recognized nexuses increases. In contrast, the less interpreted ones reluctantly become the unexpressed surplus. As peoples' lives grow complex, politics pragmatically should answer their new needs, multiplex unconstituted groupings, and so forth, since this represents the essence of community being recognition and intercommunication of some public interest. Therefore, there has been an orientation to make one form of society with authority commensurate to its comprehensiveness. In the early stages, society was controlled by the patriarchal or the tribal relation that determined human activity, i.e., in the Middle Ages of the Eastern countries and Europe, there was a rule as a claim to comprehensively control based on, at least the ecclesiastical relation, the relation of the man to state, viz., the political relation. It was so in Aristotle's days when he called man, which has been adopted by civic society as the agent's action and rules of state as politics, as a politician or a political animal, but Greeks did not distinguish society from the political organization of state or civic society where they supposed that ethics was strictly speaking a political and therefore it has measured conduct relatively, namely the Greek conception in practice has been held for summing up the individual and the family in their relation to be one with the state. Thus, Marver (1909) observed, following the term of state in its association with the organization of a society, that it is not misleading to call the State an objective mind or spirit of ethics or the actualisation of freedom and so on.

Since the 1970s and the 1980s, Austin, Wittgenstein, Searle, Schiffrin, Tannen, Hamilton, Fairclough, Blommaert, Verschueren, Zelinsky-Wibbelt, Brown, Reisigl, Wodak, Culpeper, Gruber, Chilton, etc., discuss multiple attempts toward objectivizing the process of distinction of word sense. Throughout some discoursing rules, it is important to characterize utterances from diverse social and political contexts that represent a convoluted network of similarities that intersect and overlap on the one hand. Based on social contradictions which are resulting from the process of understanding (political) discourse in the sense of social practice, agents' actions seem to be perfectly competent in communicating the nuances of their mind/mental faculties or representations of whatever perplexity these contextual elaborations may be, on the other hand.

Otherwise, the delimitation of topics and senses, in the context of language and politics, is difficult by its nature, i.e., the distinction between political policies and language planning is blurred (it deals with two main areas, for instance, the prohibition of specific terms firstly as political measures that purpose usage of an individual language influence the agents' awareness via the relations among different languages, discourses and powers and their important functions and relevance to comprehensive communication, and manifestations) since the pragmatic homogenization via terms of regulating specific vocabularies and prohibiting particular modes of expressions, according to Wodak and de Cillia (2006), has to be imposing such (previous) measures which require, to be done quickly in totalitarian systems, extensive political power.

In the philosophical conversation of Plato's Cratylus, Socrates, as shown by Joseph (2006), discusses the essence of the natural nexus between words and things to reach the conclusion with Plato that the words exist for two significant reasons, they are used to discriminate among things, via picking out the true essence (ousia) that belongs to them alone; and to transmit that questionable knowledge, from the few (addressees) who can perceive it and directly, to the many of other (perceivers) who cannot. It should be noticed, according to Oliveira (2008), who acknowledgedly assures, that politics is done chiefly by pragmatics since the former

requires the latter in its constructional process, and vice-versa does not correct, since Joseph (2006) appears that the interpretations are typically given whereby a positive moral account of words are traced (evidentiality) back to roots which are expressing motion, whilst those words of a negative moral significance have roots representing immobility. Again, Oliveira (2008) consequently affirms that peoples are conscious of the situations they live in, but this does not mean that those peoples base their thoughts upon its practical insertion within the society movement, i.e., the consciousness could not be different from the consciousness of human beings. Since it is one option for the pragmatics of social transformation bound to the political capacity in use, one should comprehend the discourse of politics that represents a cognitive form of the socio-historical dimension whose surpassingly interactive character, enables one to arrange a strategic role in the communicative context and the war of socio-ethical voices.

6. The Two Agents-actions

Every agent lives in mediated contact or face-to-face with other participants or agents in a world of social rendezvous. On face work, according to Goffman (1967), the agent manages to act out what is occasionally called a pattern of such verbal and nonverbal acts as social, political, ethical, etc., by which he reflects his/her view of the situation and evaluation of the participants. Otherwise, the other participants will presuppose that that agent has more or less willfully taken a stand, therefore; he must take into consideration the impression, if he is to deal pragmatically with their response, they have potentially formed of him, since the fundamental of human society, as it is shown by Jaspers et al. (2010), is concerned with human language, whilst the interaction which is based on human beings need not only oftentimes involve human language, but it is evermore predicated on it.

Each voice or event tries to redefine the contextual situation, and those who do so conflict with opponents of dissuasion and, to a lesser extent, according to Wertsch and Mehan (1988), compete with each other. In both historical contexts and current circumstances, (disarmament) proponents and competitors, throughout discourse as a medium for (political) action and (moral) thought, are asked about, as follows:

"How do proponents of various positions assert the primacy of their point of view? By what devices do prevailing positions attain their ascendancy? Do they ... invite or persuade others to join their side or silence opponents by attacking their positions?" (p.8).

Besides moral voices, it is crucial to understand how they think and to shed light on the medium that constrains their thoughts, actions, and relations. Moreover, using particular expressions or vocabulary, syntactical constructions, and authenticated procedures to knowledge constitute different versions of the presumed or political world. By the way, this will enable the language of politics to be an active political vehicle rather than a passive force for transmitting thoughts in use.

Under these, in-between circumstances, it is evident that there is primary agreement among Wittgenstein 1958; Austin 1962; Foucault 1972, and Fairclough 1990, as it is shown by Mehan, Nathanson, and Skelly (1990), about a language in use as a neutral medium connected thoughts and actions, but otherwise they do not activate the meaning of objects, by which, they refer to discursive practices, and then concentrate attention on the social-uses of target discourse, since these considerations, between voices in public speeches of political discourse, take the conversation form, via generating relations, executing political actions as well as performing activities.

Thus, the pragmatics process from the central core of behaviour to a more irregular one, as a discoursing gradience, according to Crystal (2006), upon politics, generally represents a matter of communication, i.e., Mey (2001) may potentially refer, via a communication matter, to politics, therapy, anthropology, and so on. Throughout the usual sense, the agent of the action has a message, such as an opinion about an event, a description of an experiment, an elective campaign or program, etc., to communicate to (an) addressee(s). Still, on the other hand, the addressee(s) communicate(s) with the agent's action by, for example, approving the opinion proffered, ratifying the experiment described, voting the program suggested, and so on.

According to DK (2011), the values that have evolved within the ruling or political classes have become little gestures in the disintegrating society or world. Traditional readings and philosophies have attempted to return to the ideals and moral issues by persuading the rules to restore a just government. The persuading process, believes in the power of ethics or benevolence, and argues that those agents of the actions (viz., Rulers), should be an exemplar or an idea to be imitated, by others, rather than by fear would strongly inspire the addressees to follow moral orders and a similarly virtuous life. Thus, we can adopt these principles to govern nexuses between peoples, i.e., personal ones.

7. Camouflageable Meaning and Encyclopedic Meaning

The process, by which voices in public performance of political discourse, is virtually dialogic inasmuch as the actions of one voice of the personage are oriented to the previous (political (moral)) performances of other voices (i.e., anticipating the discourse of other personages or voices). Agents of the action, strictly speaking, do not only speak as a private personage; it must/may be

understood that they communicate as institutional officials in events with situated parameters and cultural parameters historically and simultaneously. Mehan et al. (1990) assure that agents of the action or personages in political discourse generally generate their speech, which is not entirely original or spontaneous, by the history of their position in class, morals, sex, and institutional arrangements.

Then, since they lead, via their philosophies, languages, signs, periphrasis, etc., situations, practitioners, communicators, politicians, and philosophers present the broadest interpretations via their vital ideas to the pragma-cognitive world, which are subsequently liable to be met with variable observations commencing "Yes, but ..." or "What if ...", but in fact, philosophers have fiercely disagreed, about well-nigh every aspect of philosophy, with one another. Before the emergence of the schools of thought in hundred numbers, the world and its detailed ingredients, as shown by DK (2011), had been explained historically by mythology, religion, power, and moral authority, which were accepted (in general) to be sent by God as a source of moral order. According to ancient philosophies and traditional thinking, human beings are the agents who have been chosen, by God or Heaven, to embody God's will and to unite the (political) world with moral issues. A virtue, according to traditional philosophies, like Chinese, Latin, etc., is not, something, sent by the Master of the world for upper political classes, namely ruling classes, but assuredly maintains that it can be cultivated, and developed by anyone. However, it was a duty and property for the middle classes and the ruling ones alike to endure an act of virtue and benevolence to accomplish a performative, evenhanded, and stable community.

In addition to being well-formed constructions, political discourse, as shown by Dedaic' (2006), can be categorized and somehow classified throughout, firstly, commemorative, farewell, inaugural, proposing and/or disputing a bill, etc., viz., the occasion; whereas secondly via national leader, political candidate, parliamentarian or politician, a national/international leader of political organization, etc., viz., the personage or the action's agent; and the addressee which subsequently represents local, national and/or international, immediate communication, or combined, and so on. Considerable presidential speeches and (un)scrupulous debates in parliament have attracted the most attention from pragmaticists, politicians, and linguists. The presidential philosophy of speeches represents a specific discourse genre in concert with the governable genres. These discoursing genres pragmatically include, in the Western world, presidential inaugural discourses, veto messages, rhetoric to forestall impeachment and denunciation, pardoning rhetoric, and so on. All these genres, which recur through different periods of time, become habitual behaviour in the manner of a ritual. Considerably, those presidents' enactment establishes themselves, via their roles, as symbolic and the real head of state as well. On the other hand, Aristotle has said, as it is cited by DK (2013), as in the following:

"Politics was not merely about the struggle to meet material needs in conditions of scarcity. Once complex societies emerge, different questions arise. Who should rule? What powers should political rulers have, and how do the claims to legitimacy of political rulers compare to other sources of authority, such as that of the family, or the claims of religious authority?" (p.12).

Thus, the basic idea of politics represents "a unique collective activity" aimed at definite everyday purposes.

8. Argumentative Persuasion

All cultures and societies have perceived the immense power and range of human language, and the realisation of these adaptable mechanisms is undoubtedly partway responsible for the stupendous associations felt among some persons in sure signs or words relating to things or events vivacious to their lives or fearful in their effects. However, within the scope of meaning in use are involved with, semantic, political, or moral, relations between spoken and written utterances and the world at large since the meaning of words, signs, or expressions is an attribute of all sign and symbol systems; therefore, it embraces a comprehensive range rather than language only. To fulfill their communicative and symbolising functions concurrently, political rhetoric, in particular, and languages, plainly, besides the meanings of pragmatic utterances, may relate to the whole world of the potential and actual experience of the personage; the whole range of common sense is unlimited. Thus, the relations of deference (or ethics) and social gradation, as shown by Robin (1964), are part of the relevant contextual environment, being determined by the use of specific forms of addresses with personal categories. The limits of familiarity within which the appropriate second-person forms are used naturally and, with individual varieties of use between peoples within communities, consequently, vary from language to language and from community to community.

Most peoples are knowledgeable about only one personal naming system as well as their practices differ greatly from language to language. When persuasive communication was on a discorsal issue of high personal relevance, behavioural attitude change would most likely be controlled by considering the issue-relevant arguments presented. When a target message was on a genre of low personal relevance, the circumferential characteristics of the persuasive contextual situation would be more potent. Therefore, Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) specifically adduced what follows means:

"Specifically, when a persuasive message concerned an issue of high personal relevance, the effectiveness of the appeal was more a function of the cogency of the arguments presented in the message than of such peripheral cues. On the other hand, when the message concerned an issue of relatively low personal relevance, effectiveness was more a function of peripheral cues than of the arguments presented." (pp.852-3)

Thus, a personage might awarely find it easier to assess the quality of an argument reasonably in a genre of high rather than low involvement.

It seems reasonable to say that the dichotomy of political-moral contrastive functions can add more compressed inconsistencies and exclamatory claims within that of seeking the maintenance of human interactional relations. According to Aristotelian determination, the basis of rhetoric falls into three classes or elements in speech-making. Lanham (1991), consequently, shows that an addressor, a subject, and an addressee either governs the speech's end in the past and future as a jurymen or decides on the orator's objects and skills as an observer. Therefore, there are three partitions of discursive rhetoric: the first is political, the second forensic, and the ceremonial is the third one. As a formal rhetorical technology, Lanham (ibid.) adds that introducing a seeming vocab can create an expanded combination of words for which the addressee can invent an expanded understanding of reality; throughout particularizing an assertion, amplification participates with a chance. Consequently, the amplification evaporates, elevates, or diminishes a subject if the new reality is convinced and thriving by making a difference or arguing. In other words, a rhetorical concept in general, and political-moral concepts in particular have been adopted in Aristotle's works and extended advancingly by Cicero, Quintilian, Goffman, Mehan, Kennedy, Mey, and others, and should suit the advanced idea of the subject, addressee, personage, as well as the occasion.

Among the central issues in the opacity of actions, Nietzsche's argument of morality is deeply involved with the starting point of impossibility of knowing, e.g., ethical or otherwise, more than superficially the causes or the consequences of specific actions. Both of these denotations are too complicated to describe precisely. Nietzsche says, as it is cited by Mey (1998), that every action is unique, irretrievable, open to many interpretations and exegeses, unfathomable, and, in more complex cases, it is like artistic creation that subject to laws that defy all formulation through concepts, since our actions, follow laws which cannot be interpreted, have two thoughts, viz., the first concerns a private language argument which can refer conceptually to what is publicly shared, whilst the second refers to the empirical concepts which are being supposedly shared and picked out predicates of a level of generality and ambiguity via mechanisms that underlie every action. This interpretation respectively shows how consciousness has developed under the pressure of the competent need for communication, as well as conscious thinking takes the form of words to understand ourselves as individually as possible, has given the best will in the world, and, by the way, each of us will succeed in becoming aware of what is average. Thus, our thoughts are continuously governed by consciousness's (nature or) character.

First of all, argumentation, according to Al-Juwaid (2019), represents an influential phenomenon, especially when it is concerned with approximately all fields of virtuous human life since it reflects a performative aspect of real life throughout communicative situations, viz., the context of the situation(s). However, in the political discourse of debate, arguments can be measured via the personage's practical way of resolving the contrariety, which is caused by incongruity with his contender, i.e., an argumentative discourse genre, unlike Al-Juwaid's viewpoints, is understood as a pragmatic exchange of reasons in the political-rhetoric context where the arguments' agents wrap these reasons in a ritualistic manner.

9. Pragmatic Ideology of What Is (Un)Said

Although it distinguishes human agents' characteristics from animals, symbolism constitutes the standard spring of religion, art, myth, and science. Pêcheux (1975) accordingly shows that each element is a language. As it is cited in "Language, Semantics, and Ideology", Pêcheux, quotes Saussure's detailed course of bits of reference, shows that ideas can be expressed by a system of signs, viz., langue, and is hereby comparable to multiple systems as writing, symbolic rituals, the alphabet of deaf-mutes, military signals, the formulas of politeness, etc., but, he adds, its primary origin is the most significant of all these systems. Therefore, the science that hardly interprets the signs' world reflects the ability to receive the input focus and a focusable centre of socio-psychology. To uncover what any addressor or agent's action would have to assume, know, and infer to comprehensive the working communication, Saussure (1959) utterly affirms conceptualisation. Still, no course of reasoning, of course, is possible without the simplification of contextual data. Moreover, the political codes, viz., signs or cores of ideologies, are natural objects and concrete entities rather than abstractions and are, therefore, what semantics, pragmatics, semiotics, as well as ethics, politics (and so on) study.

By ideology, for example, persons from such cultures as Latin or Indo-European countries impress the native citizens from other countries like America, Ireland, or Scotland as being more foreigners than the other European or North-West countries. But Asiatic and African peoples are distinctly different from the American, Irish, or Scottish since those peoples who derive from England, Scotland, or Ireland will be following in their rapprochement to the national core culture or ideology, followed by individuals who

derive from the other European countries. So, this makes ideology, Ruesch (1972) observes, constitutes the target culture's cornerstone, and by this way, the individuals' lower class, as well as the upper class, are less sufficiently integrated into the middle class, taking into consideration, communication, social system, and culture. Since the two agents' actions, viz., addressor and addressee, are involved in communication, which is based on:

- i-The need to draw on specific bits of their epistemological knowledge,*
- ii-The attempt to make and enhance certain assumptions,*
- iii-By certain inferences, their sense would be of what they hear,*
- iv-What is said based on what was said and the context of it,*

The broadest procedures of the use of communicative sense, as it is shown by Ruesch (1972), are sensationalistically being used by which one mind may ideologically affect another, and this pragmatically involves not only spoken and written speech but also the ballet, the pictorial arts, the theatre, the music, the political ceremonies, the ethical ideologies, and indeed all Humanimal behaviour.

As a concept conceived in the formula of objects or perception, politics, Mehan and Wood (1975) observes, involves essentially within many (if not all) social systems of life. Meanwhile, these words are used, by radical theorists, as a weapon on the one hand, and as a philosophical issue on the other. Also, a better use of them in the everyday experience illustrates politics as actions peoples do rather than something persons have. Mehan and Wood (ibid.) assure to treat those agents as abstract categories, not illustrating the alienation of those the theorist talks about, but the theorist's alienation. And since politics and ethics are oftentimes the politics of everyday life and they do occur in certain social scenes, peoples are reality participants and create their lives in accordance with others since the political struggle (nowadays) concerns new perspectives of power and interest on what is real, and elaborates ultimately the relations between concrete agents and their ideological ideas and propositions. Must we, therefore, show the image of language hermeneutically sees language as the house of being, and, as a result, speech forms or gives form to the world and vice versa does not correct. Accordingly, Marx, as it is cited in Mehan and Wood (1975), avers the following:

"Ideas do not exist apart from language, Marx avers, just as the value of goods does not exist apart from the labor of those who produce goods. But in certain times language is reified. It is treated as a thing divorced from the practical circumstances of its speaking. Language becomes a commodity which is bought and sold as if it had a value apart from the speaking labor of those who produce it during their "essentially practical" "ensemble of social relationships." (p.522)

In other words, it is not the case that ideas are transmuted so that their precise nature disappears and their communal attractiveness subsists alongside them in language. Therefore, ideas (viz., actions, meaning, and interpretations) do not live apart from their effervesce, viz., language.

For any communication and interaction, the actions and their interpretations have a sense when they guide the actions by referring to expressions and communication firstly, and they have meaning when the actions and objects are interrelated via referring to experience and knowledge secondly. Here, we are concerned with these actions and their meanings in a much broader sense, whether they are closely attached to language and speaking or are not inherently verbal. Consequently, according to Deely and Lenhart (1983), sense and meaning are given on three levels: individual, group, and cultural. On the group level, the group members' agreement and disagreement create variations of sense. Secondly, on the cultural level, the sense is realised by referencing the action patterns a community accepts. Ultimately, on the individual level, the attainable actions of the individuals have an impact on and are impacted by the other two levels. Sumer is considered, as it is cited in Deely and Lenhart (1983), that men and institutions are carried out as in the following:

"Habits are acts that men carry out around their main interests: conservation, protection, perpetuation and security; reasons for which they form groups and establish social institutions ... the teleological character of every social action to make reference to the goals, thus, making reference to meaning in its deepest sense. On the one hand, institutions have the following integrating elements: opinion, belief, knowledge (myth, popular legends, religious concepts, moral beliefs ...) and expression (articulated language, rites, ceremonies ...), all of them interlinked and acting among the members of the society that participated in relation to competence, conflict and cooperation." (p.375)

To communicate, understand, and express experience and knowledge, as well as emotions, Deely and Lenhart (1983) show that the study of personage, in terms of sociology, can be interpreted, in terms of conflicts and laws, in a secondary way, following function and meaning. In terms of psychology, the study of personage can be understood, in terms of performance and

psychophysiological standards, in a secondary way, from conflict and meaning. Fundamentally, in terms of pragmatics, the study of personage's uses can be interpreted and understood secondarily via not only the above functional coinherence, but it is linked to the articulated knowledge and experience, or the study of ideologies, as Deely and Lenhart (ibid.) show in below:

"Ideology plays a central role for the human sciences. It is ... where we can visualise the natural relation that can and must be established between pragmatics and the sociology of knowledge". (p.376)

Thus, the reality of the situation, throughout human interaction, presents dissimilar levels of depth and reveals itself as a group of meanings like imposing and rejecting standards, keeping a functional coherence, destroying agreements, and generating social disagreement meanwhile the persuasive value that establishes rational and irrational basis resorts to the passions and of feelings of the public, and can correspond or not to the ideological propositions or contents, which can take advantage, to enroll the most significant number of public of societies for the attainment of the collective benefit.

10. Thought Is a (Un)Organized Moral behaviour

Although the personages' thoughts cannot be true, Descartes (1985) logically realised that the truth they possess, strictly speaking, has to be found in their thoughts inexorably. For reference to names, Wittgenstein observes, Winch (1969) cited, that no expression, even names, can have a reference out of the context of propositions. Since Wittgenstein, subsequently, does not even think in terms of complete or incomplete parts of thought, the basic distinction via the ways, he makes, is between the signifying of defined signs and undefined signs. Strictly speaking, a propositional sense is the thought that it expresses; thus, all that sense counts for constituent expressions, which play a part in constructing sensational propositions, which then, is their use; therefore, the personages needed to use signs carefully since the sense a sign (or signage) has is constrained by the role it has been given pragmatically in context. Depending on its pragma-semantic function, a name has a reference only if the personages know how to use it in sentences to refer to an object constatively, primarily when it occurs in proposition since names refer to objects (whereas predicates refer to what holds of the objects), this is only because the importance of proposition sticks around in which the name can occur. Thus, the names can be treated, via the class of propositions obtained, as constant, whilst treating the other expressions, which are constructed propositions, as variables.

When pondering the nexus between thought and language processes, particular linguistic notions explicitly tended to impact thought processes and human perceptions. Sapir and Whorf maintain that Baugh (2006) cites that these constructions varied from language to language via alternative ways of describing and perceiving the same notion. In this area, fragmentation, as being principally important in the representation of (language) and thought, is very communal in direct interaction. By the personage and the medium of communication, fragmentation has the role of making the dialogue appear realistic, to indicate rhetorical emphasis. Emmott et al. (2006) link the representation of thought with crucial changes of perspective via performing multiple functions, especially when these functions enable a personage to think over his/her thoughts or to react to the thoughts of another. Pragmatically, they also enable a personage to gradually get details of his/her surroundings and can give him/her the pondering sense over a contextual topic, then making the direction of thoughts somehow evident to the recipients via the guidance of the personage's thought.

From a logical viewpoint, a pragmatological nexus must be performed between language and the world or thought through, which determines the success or satisfaction of fit. This nexus is (somehow) justified by arbitrary matches of its fragments in accordance with the performative need of political and moral acts, to determine, via propositional content, a direction of fit. According to Vanderveken (1990), the personage's propositional content would fit the recipient's thought (or state of affairs) when the act of illocution is justified. Representative performing is based (in its performativity) on presuppositional politics and identifiable ethics. Depending on circumstances, the personage expresses psychological states of what he/she thinks, believes, politicises, etc., by the propositional content, to get expressive kinds of illocution to be (morally) actual in the world. To distinguish the institutional role of the personage, the latter's thought is transformed by the present action to justify the fact (as being transformed) via the propositional content. Otherwise, the propositional content illustrates the changes by the words to thought. Since the personage, as the agent of the action, either he/she is the addressor or addressee, attempts to make the idea fit the propositional content. This kind of illocution can be performed, commissively or directive, by the personage alone or by the personage as a member of a group. Thus, the successful transformation of most directions of fit of thought and the performance philosophy distinguishes performative illocutionary acts from thought-to-logos-to-thought. Otherwise, Austin admits, as Sbisà (2023) mentions, that illocutionary thoughted categories may contain peculiar cases, and there are sturdily overlaps between them. Therefore, Austin's classification overlaps may have particular hybrid-generating potential, which Hassoun (2018) asserts in "iii" and "iv" under the title of the researcher's modified version.

Since communicative genres (or norms) and conscious thought are internalised speech and are part of the social routine of knowledge, the personages or participants may choose various major, minor, or alternative options, in particular situations, for

solving communicative problems. In other words, some personages, in some situations, are obliged to use specific communicative norms. In some others, they can avoid its use, which, as a result, reflects a considerably significant role of pragmatic genres as ready-made plans in moderately unproblematic communicative situations. Thus, when pragmatics transforms thought into internal dialogue, as Goody (1995) opines, internal processes of dialogue supply a manner for responding to cognitive biases of humane problems. On the other hand, violating the humane norms of behaviour, and impinging the agent of the action, Goffman (1967) morally links, discussively Culpeper (2011) cites, directly, as obligatory norms, as a parameter, establishing how the personage is morally constrained to conduct himself; and indirectly, as expectational rules, for, how others or recipients are morally bound to act regarding him, and the deviations from such expectations usually are judged negatively. Therefore, impoliteness can contain such volitions, since personages' perceptions of fairness are usually not determined by three social norms: equity, reciprocity, and social responsibility. When procedural matters are perceived to be fair, violating these norms, as a foundational pragmatic success of logic, is perceived to be far less critical. Thus, future action in the state of affairs is as vital as Locher and Watts (2008) and Culpeper (2011) potentially agree, if not more significant than the personage's innovative thought.

11. Expression, Meaning, and Mind of the Philosophy's Substance and Form

In point of fact, Le Bon (1896) said, that the reason has invariably shown, via the most attentive facts of history, that social organisms are being complicated as those of all beings. Nature, basically, has recourse, at times, to radical measurements. Explained how these measures can affect the social phenomena, as in:

"How it is that nothing is more fatal to a people than the mania for great reforms, however excellent these reforms may appear theoretically. They would only be useful were it possible to change instantaneously the genius of nations. This power, however, is only possessed by time. Men are ruled by ideas, sentiments, and customs-matters which are of the essence of ourselves. Institutions and laws are the outward manifestation of our character, the expression of its needs. Being its outcome, institutions and laws cannot change this character" (p.vii).

So, these phenomena, according to Le Bon (1896), cannot be detached from that of the personages among whom they have come into existence. However, these phenomena, from a philosophical viewpoint, may have an absolute value; they have a relative value on the practical side, i.e., the philosopher, as a pragmatist, should calculate the practical value of his phenomenal study side by side with their theoretical value, since, as a pragmatist, the philosopher should be very circumspect with regard to the ethical hypotheses and results that logic would appear to enforce upon him. Moreover, there is more truth, in certain cases, in the unreal than in the real since, by taking into consideration, the fictitious shapes, which present objects with their geometrical forms, are more important than that of the real shapes, even though they would render it unrecognisable. Thus, it would be difficult for addressees to attain a precise idea of their form, since the knowledge of these forms is accessible only to a definite number of personages (agents, and addressees).

Philosophically, Mead (1934) states that the philosophy of a period is, in any event, an endeavour to interpret its most secure knowledge. This approach concerned the structural constancy with an attention to the developmental change. Since the mind has to appear within conduct presumably, the implication has appeared that the entire life of the mind, as well as the human organisms, have to be understood and interpreted, which arising in the interactivity of political and ethical organisms and environment, by sharing the quality of developmental change, within evolutionary growth. Societies have to be envisaged and fitted into the evolutionary categories as complex entities. Mead (1934) implicitly affirms, in his introduction, that the philosophical purpose of pragmatics (or pragmatism) has to reinterpret the concepts of mind in terms of biology, psychology, and sociology, on the one hand, and to reconsider not only the problems, but the task, of the philosophy from this perspective, on the other. This philosophy of act has identified the nexus of the personage with the physical within the mechanism of the experience of things. This identification in response to the thing, according to Mead (1938), is given in embracing or grasping a thing, i.e., the thing presses against us, and we hereby press against ourselves. The something more is the location of the act (of pressing) in the thing, and this capacity for the location of the act, within the act, is what has passed over to our physical conduct, from social conduct, by way of abstraction, for a social object, is also physical. Moreover, the location of the act, in the thing, takes place, in the appearance of the physical self, as a condition. So, to distinguish, the qualities of the act, from the colour, or smooth, or rough, surface, taste, or odour of the thing, the consciousness of the thing is there, too, viz., we are conscious of the thing means that an act which arises, in our organisms, is located in the thing. Thus, the action of the thing is defined in terms of resistance or response, which exists, in our organisms, as an other or others, giving rise to the physical self as an object, or as a form of a presentation of the thing. In its central consideration, Mead (ibid.) categorized the act mindly, and concluded, that more and more agents guided their lives, throughout growing the body of knowledge. Because of the territories that were ruled (ethically) by the philosophy of the period, there are four dimensions appeared:

i-Logically, where meanings of the acts, of the things, become means, the thought of beings, in conduct, is a phase. Meanwhile, there is a selection of meaning which represented the consequence, in intelligent beings, which is involved in the means.

ii-Metaphysically, things are their meanings (mentally), and the consequence of beings' interactions which, represented the forms they take on, are responsible for the appearance of new meanings, viz., new forms. Ceaselessly, the world is becoming what it means. In other words, thought is humbly the communication to others or ourselves of what is (intended or) said.

iii-Psychologically, the philosophy of the individual does not exist in the individual, but in nature. So, this doctrine has recently been realised by the science of physics and enunciated it in the principles of relativity.

iv- Mentally, a system of philosophy has indicated that it is the technical function to state the universe, via our conscious life, can be realised as a face, of its creative advance. Ancient philosophy has represented the theme of otherworldliness via reason, the Christian doctrine via the soul, and the Renaissance dualisms via the mind (1938, p.515).

As will be shown (below) in more detail, the reality of things via their being experienced, in general, does not depend upon their existence in the mind since the independence of an object of our thought about is constituted throughout its connection with experience in general, viz., an idea's coherence with experience, in general, does not be contingent at all upon its being essentially present to the mind. Accordingly, Apel (1981) discusses a pragmatic meaning in light of Peirce's doctrine of categories. Because the sheer existence of things, regardless of their nexuses to our minds, is associated with the indicative function of language, therefore; the expressions independently of a situation cannot be used as symbols, while the reality is represented in symbols and related to possible knowledge, i.e., the reality is seen as an intended meaning, provides the framework, with the pragmatic maxim, for semantic pragmatism. Essentially, the real is that which information and reasoning would ultimately result in, since the earthly life or human race does not represent the end result of truth. Still, it extends to the fundamental communion of minds, to which we belong. Apel (ibid.), throughout Peirce's philosophy about the mind and essential ethics, characterized two things:

First, Normative principles (of Kant) deal with an embodiment of reasons in an ideal sense. It must be equal to the business of possible progress in cognition.

Second, an Indefinite community embodies reason, an ending combination of beings that possess some intended senses and can communicate in signs; it is not consciousness in general (pp. 28-9).

In the context of aboutness of mind and philosophy, the coreness of language is heeded as a mirror of the (moral philosophy) of the political world.

12. Performativity and/or Accidentality of a(n) (In)Compatible Culture

Although it is one thing, a ritualistic process, to observe (others or) peoples when they are singing the cryptic songs and performing the stylised gestures of (ritual) performances, it is quite essential to describe what we have seen as accurately as possible, and reach a sufficient understanding of what do these words and actions mean to receivers or addressees. In structure and anti-structure of the ritual process, Turner (1969) has shown at this performance that it is hard to understand, a set of economic activities, like hunting, for instance, without a grasp of the target idiom pertaining to the chase, and the accumulation of signs which indicated the power and virility of hunting and the hunt's agent, as well, for example, which has given general insights of social features and contemporaneous links. Although numerical analysis data such as village (or environmental) genealogies, censuses, and records, of property inheritance and succession inheritance, have become thoroughly understandable in the light of matters embodied and expressed in signs and codes at pathway performances, rituals reaffirm the order of structure, and restore relations, as well, between the actual historical agents who occupy statuses in the abovesaid structure. Since the essence of language, as it is shown by Bolinger (1968), is a way of acting, and since our habit of viewing it, for sending and receiving, as, a thing, is probably unavoidable, the ultimate desideratum, accordingly, is to act in relations' terms of *communitas* values while playing essential roles, especially what one ethnically does is perceived of as merely influential at the aim of attaining and retaining *communitas*. In social life, all human societies refer to two divergent social models. According to Turner (1969), the first is of the community as a structure of ethical, political, and economic positions, statuses, and roles, wherein the individual is grasped behind the social persona. Whilst, the other one is of society as a concrete idiosyncratic individual, who, are nevertheless considered equal in terms of mutual humanity, though its members have differed in physical and conceptual donation. Thus, an individual's behaviour tends to drift away from behaviour in its relation with the other, on the one hand, and to deal with rituals as a thought of bringing the structure of *communitas* into the right shared relation once again, on the other.

Human philosophy and politics, consequently, as universal tools of language, decipherable parts of human behaviour, most essential to human life, are two of the most influential human capabilities in relation to the whole context or area, of mankind's

attainments, and how they are organised to perform the needs they are served and the purposes they are performed. Accordingly, the vast majority of their uses involve two or more performers in social interactions. Therefore, those agents, manifestly, differ in their abilities to understand the target of back-and-forth communication, analyse meanings, and pick out the significant features, within a material, to reach satisfactory ways of explaining how words are uttered, sentences constructed in particular speeches, or adaptable actions are (sometimes accidentally) performed. To realise their symbolising and communicative utilities, Robins (1964) points out that an understanding of conditionate power can exert among agents of the action, and of the different techniques in which this power has proved to be a persuasive weapon if it is exploited with the aid of media, which are engaged in detail opinions, views, exercising influence, etc., on their associates, whether politically, philosophically or socially. Besides, the understanding of these essences, in human life, inevitably requires, both, an understanding of the ceremonial structure of utterance (i.e., ethical techniques), and their associations with the rest of the (political context) world, outside language. Consequently, we should notice the vast involvedness of the agents' actions or speeches, their vast abilities, and their vast flexibilities to manage the entire range of human beings' experiences. Since logical inference and philosophical discourse are the significant issues of the (politicians) agents' uses, in general concern, in several cultures and civilisations, they are by no means the only ones at the manners of daily living, and social collaboration, by members of groups. In a philosophical manner, Durkheim (1953) has pointed out, that the phenomenal occurrence in the relation of behaviour of the agent or personage is considered, within a society to which it belongs, as a general and normal type, since the characteristic of generality refers to a particular type of a phenomenon within the average society, since performing the target action within each community is measured, the numerical proportion of individuals, even it is small, and the average rate for societies is being normal for this type, since the term "general" refers to the purposelike nexus between a definite phenomenon and the frequency form of a particular society type of the personage, that the phenomenon (by moral commitments) assumes in this society, i.e., the form of a particular phenomenon with a specific community may be general, depending on its frequentativeness, in relation to the behaviour of agents, their characteristics, and the considerations (even if they are accidentally prototyped) which serve to construct this/that social type.

Since the existence of political and philosophical phenomena give rise to puzzlement, as shown by Searle (1995), since the puzzled existence ambuscades at how these prototypes can be states of consciousness or meaningful acts within our physical world, the development should lie in large part of reality (or mental), a world of intentionality or consciousness, and values of morals to fit into a world of physical particles which consisting the target tips entirely in fields or forces of investigative objectives. Then, Searle (1969) regards the word as used, by way of philosophical explications, to act. In general cases, philosophers explicate this sort of performativity, via the meanings of words, and offer an analogy between, form, the words that personages drew in most cases and discussed and, substance, performative verbs of each pattern, since it is possible culturally to perform the act or thing with no need to an explicit device, even it is accidentally cultured, where the utterance and the context make it compatible or incompatible that the essential condition is satisfied. Since the performative use, according to the condition of proposition which embodies the content of culture, is the primary use, the condition of adequacy of the agent's action does not need to show that literal uses of utterances are not performances of the act, which stand, firstly, concerning performances, and stand, secondly, concerning standard utterances, of the act which is performed.

Opinions and perspectives are varied on whether some or all language exhibits, in any event, a performative dimension for human action. Shapiro (2003) shows that different personages, may, like politicians, scientists, philosophers, etc., have different capacities to form different desires and purposes, and those different aptitudes must be as morally tainted as any other capacities, for instance, Archie Bunker has little luck in the circumstances of his background and upbringing, in comparison with Donald Trump who is able to develop his ambitions more far-reaching and influentially.

13. Why Does (moral) Presupposition Discuss the Secrets of Politics in Pragmatics

Phenomenon and personage can be explicable by the very nature of language, even though language, as Bréal (1900) mentioned, undergoes outward variabilities in innumerable ways. The fact that dominates the whole subject is that, by a necessity, our languages are condemned to a perpetual lack of proportion between the idea of a word and the sign of a thing. In this process, expression is sometimes too narrow, whilst sometimes else is too wide. We overlook this desire for accuracy because, for the personage, expressing phenomenon adapts itself to the thing through the situational conditions, the place, the action's time, and the discourse's apparent intention. The addressee's attention, therewith, which counts for half in all language, adopts the thought behind the associating result, without dwelling on its literal bearing. The latter subsequently confines or lengthens a shift according to the intention of the agent's action.

Philosophers, pragmatians, and even politicians presuppose some views of meanings upon anythings; therefore, actualistic changes of views will involve changes in all their views. Ogden and Richards (1923) divided the philosophical idea of meaning into three generalities: the first embraces phantoms linguistically generated, whilst groups; the second one distinguishes erratic usages and signs and symbols; the third covers situations in a general manner. In the Neo-Platonic viewpoint, language (or its bits) can be made to express, by the presupposition of language, the soul's nature via constraining its purposes for which most personages

never even think of utilising it. Since the soul as a core idea can be described, only, via nonsensical phrases, if they are applied to determinations of special bodies or their qualities, such exposition forces us to abandon the term meaning of a core idea, and to substitute either other expressions like value, intention, emotion, and referent for that it is being used as a synonym, or the expanded symbol which materialises after a miniature trouble. In other words, when the language's impact upon thought is understood, and the phantoms' misconception linguistically has been uninvolved, the way to fruitful (moral) interpretation is open and the communicants or personages, in a political manner, can enjoy a conversation more than the customary stones and scorpions, since giving a meaning, or every idea, to the sensations, has a nucleus or core of images, and a fringe of concomitant images, which consequently give meaning to the core descriptions (or phantasmagorias).

The relations in question, according to philosophers' viewpoints, presuppose the cognition of certain events of facts, not of right, since the elements of right arise from the cognitive element of fact, since the element of right is involved in the relations, i.e., personages' thematics of relations, according to Raphael (1947), arise from the right (viz., the right's cognition) which have arisen from the fact's cognition. For this reason, Hume (1960) discussed the most resembling instances of species' relations with moral turpitude and deformity. Hume showed that the human species are criminal whilst animals are innocent even if they, both, have the same actions and relations; since phenomenologically there are insufficient reasons to discover those animals' turpitude, it is evident to personages, who are being endowed with this faculty, that should restrain them to their duty, thus, the same action instantly due to be criminal to them. Even though the core of morality, involved in these target relations, can never hinder those personages' duties from existing, their want of a necessary degree of (insufficient) reasons may constrain them from understanding the duties and perceiving obligations towards morality, since these cores must antecedently exist in order to, their being, perceived and entirely decisive.

For Lyons' sake, there is a fundamental distinction between the notion of having meaning and the notion of meaning (proper). But, for semantic reasons, an utterance can have meaning to the extent where it is not determined by context (at the same, Lyons has said that there are some differences between situational context, and environmental (verbal) context) since there is no discrimination between language and speech. Langendoen (1968) maintains that even though Lyons takes the opposite of Firth's context of situation, which is based on eliminating meaning from utterances, he is concerned with the proper use of language via identifying repetitions of contexts and isolating major elements from them. Semantically, context of situation, Lyons and Langendoen contend, must be established on the signifier of discourse, since conventions and presuppositions of a particular type of (ethical) behaviour, by mutual knowledge, can define the political discourse of communicating subject, and, via the personages and their addressees, situate the utterance, as a bit, in its context. To be mentalistic treatment, the addressee is enabled to obtain the intended utterance meaning from the semantic (propositional) content of it, and of enabling the personage, in order to be understood, not to have, to mean, what he says in all places and at all times (Langendoen, 1968). So, each of the personages' dialogues has the implication of utterance, Firth mentioned, and can be referred, according to Plato's written works, to a particular (viz., moral, political, or phenomenological) context of situation. Lyons (1969) showed that the behaviour of the personages with non-verbal activity, and as Plato's description, and to link with specific features of utterances, several dialogues can occur in a generalistic situational (pragmatic) context of philosophic discourse.

Since the plight of preserving the meaning of semantic properties of deep structure representations presupposes part of what may be meant by what one inexplicitly says as to force, as Stampe (1975) observes, Austin, Wittgenstein, Quine, Ryle, as well as, others whom they influence, show that the idea that the meaning of the expression x or word x referred to any genus of entity. Behaviour, of these words x or mean and meaning which take the things (or phenomena) personages actually say about meaning, and things those agents' action say with mean, as shown by Gamer (1975), constructed arguments, which are based on these words or things are used and understood actually, by those who use and understand them, from day to day. On the other hand, the interpretation of the notion of a referring term or position is based on presupposition rather than on the basis at which (for) coreferential terms may be, via the standard notion of a term or position, substituted preserving truth. By the way, as Katz (1979) explains, presupposition is construed as a guaranteeable condition for a nonempty domain for a prediction. If the predicates as cited, with the position the term occupies, make assertions about its referent; a term is a referring term. Correspondingly, if readings determine the objects, a position is referential, in which the predicates related to the position make assertions. Thus, according to Van der Auwera (1981), the interpretation of mental state is valid for some common problems of pragmatics, like pragmatic presupposition where the personage believes to be shared knowledge, between him and his addressee, viz., the personages, via pragmatics, often intend to communicate much more than the semantic (conceptual) implications of what they say.

14. Discussions and Conclusions: Lucifying, Else Theoretical, Cataractal Aspects

The four most influential items of this work are politics, morals, philosophy, and thought; it is important to understand Hume's (1960) philosophical parameters of logic, morals, criticism, and thought are signified in pragmatic, phenomenal, and/or personable manners. Since the soul end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our faculty of thinking, and our ideas' nature as well; morals and criticism are concerned with our sentiments and discriminations; and politics, in a general view, points out that

men, as united in society, can obtain important practices, depending on each other, Hume (ibid.) affirmed, the use of words, viz., actions, which unaccompanied with any meaning do not make any addition to our knowledge nor are of any advantageous to the immaterial doctrine of the soul. Likewise, Plato, in his Republic, is concerned with virtue; Bloom (1968) tackles, as an essential term of politics and discourses, to mean social virtue, i.e., the disposition of it would lead personages to be dutiful and well-agents to civil authority and live together peacefully. So, we can guide that the use of virtue, or action, or its alternatives, and when its intended sense is compared to Mussolini, Hirohito, Loubet, Heidegger, Berlin, Nishitani, etc., the true history of political and social thought comes to light. Those personages use a series of conscious alternatives; other personages refer to the same issue and present it to the mind, in which those performatives are still political issues.

Since the degree of the rapprochement, is historically, recognized, and usually depends upon, both, the writers' views, and the entity of the State, whether it is a jural, moral, or a combination of both, ancient systematic writers have recognized, Garner (1907) affirmed, that the two, politics and morals, have a close nexus. Then, those writers accorded the reconfiguration of significations a conspicuous place in their political discourses. Strictly speaking, Baker (1959) has shown a significant Aristotelian formula, as in the following:

"Nor shall we do justice to Aristotle unless we remember that the Politics also is meant to be "the delight of whoso wisheth" to found a colony, or to reform a State. As the Ethics [or morals]¹ is intended to make men good, so the Politics is meant to preserve and improve States" (p.9).

On the other hand, MacIver (1909) went on to show, Aristotle's doubt about the core excellent and bad subjects accompanied with politics and morals, that thinkers and statesmen, alike, have stated that the laws (and jurisprudence) of ethics do not only coincide, but occasionally must essentially conflict with the moralities of politics. Therefore, we shed some light on some sophisticated, events and personages, of approximately the most influential events (viz., personages and/or phenomena) of the twentieth century age, and may also trace other areas, before, after, and its effects to materiate and bridge, by the way, this work's conspicuous issues. And, since words, which once, created, via constituted, and endowed with a definite code or meaning, are induced to transfer, either restricting or extending, meaning from one order of philosophies to another, i.e., to change, to raise, or to lower the dignity of the word's meaning, the language of politics, as Bréal (1900) has shown, retained, in a manner of exceptional, the synonymous semantic code, that had elsewhere dropped out of phenomenal usage.

There are basic possibilities; we need to recognize the philosophical problems of politics under the title of "common scene." Rancière has defined politics, as Mey (2001) mentions, as the "battle for the common scene of understanding" (p.217). Mey shows that the common scene is not basically a matter of agreeing or some conceptual framework on a common ground. But, I think, Rancière and Mey essentially refer, that the scene happened, at the intended illocution, between understanding and misunderstanding events, viz., performatives, which have given rise to imperatives. Therefore, the undermentioned dissimilar excerpts of unearthed historical speeches and maneuvers can supply several developmental studies with significant factual data. For example, Mahatma Gandhi's moral thought represents dynamic means of conducting human affairs and a well-prototype example, as in the following:

I am always reminded of one thing which the well-known British economist Adam Smith has said in his famous treatise The Wealth of Nations. In it he has described some economic laws as universal and absolute. Then he has described certain situations which may be an obstacle to the operation of these laws. These disturbing factors are the human nature, the human temperament or altruism inherent in it. Now, the economics of [khadi]² is just the opposite of it. Benevolence, which is inherent in human nature, is the very foundation of the economics of khadi. What Adam Smith has described as pure economic activity based merely on the calculations of profit and loss is a selfish attitude and it is an obstacle to the development of [hand-spun cloth]³; and it is the function of a champion of khadi to counteract this tendency (Brown and Parel, 2011, p.230).

Grammatically, one of Gandhi's most influential arguments is embodied by using the first person singular, namely recognition, onus, and power. Conceptualised concepts of the abovementioned speech, for instance, famous treatise, wealth of nations, human nature, khadi, etc., to accommodate conflicting themes of the universe, have not been overplayed, in a semantic manner, rather have decoded discursive overlapping at the expense of several possibilities. Since there are natural classes, as Webster (2003) asserts, phenomena can resemble each other in the perceptual world. There are innumerable ways of categorizing and transforming physical choices into meaning, which reflects completive variation between personages who need to feel they

1 square brackets are mine.

2 khadi glossarially means hand-spun cloth (Brown and Parel (2011, p.x)

3 It is glossarially used (ibid.).

contribute something to social context or out of it. The central principle's concern is to investigate situations that may arise, as Verschueren (2012) points out, by agents whose decisions and actions are based on assessments of an argument over a prior context or a present, as well as their hopes for the future. Therefore, Gandhi's philosophy, as Power (1971) quotes, represents pragmatic presuppositions, in a sense, about a reconstruction of what must have been performed, as in:

I want the freedom of my country so that other countries may learn something from my free country, so that the resources of my country might be utilised for the benefit of mankind.... My love therefore of nationalism, or my idea of nationalism, is that my country may become free, that if need be, the whole country may die so that the human races may live (p.81).

In his interview with David Barsamian, Chomsky (1994) hesitatingly refers to some positive things about what Gandhi performed, such as Gandhi's emphasis on help-self and village development as well as communal projects. In comparison with the policy of the Stalinist model, Chomsky (ibid.) prefers what Mahatma suggests, which has been a more successful and humane model for the development of India. Obviously, based on context, a sense, based on what you know about the agent of the action and the previous interactions, you may put a good deal, according to Gee (2011), in your mental portrait than this. On the other hand, counterparts (viz., addressees may be as an individual or a group) may take the picture, they form, in their minds, to be real, possible, or unreal, based on context as well as the way utterances are built. Thus, a good context for studying personages and phenomena, in the forms of politics and moral approaches, is pragmatic status.

Second: Since Cornelis Tiele accents the piety attitude, as Peterson et al. (2013) show, Francis Bradley assures the link between religion and goodness; James Martineau links the belief to the ethical monotheism, the scheme of moral thought of Mother Teresa, as Michael Gomes show it, as it is quoted by Doig (1976), is represented an area of her inquiry, viz., Teresa's organized work falls within her professional competence, as in the following conversation with Gomes:

"You know, Michael, my main work is not all this. My concern is my Sisters⁴. If they don't have the right spirit and the right approach then all our work is in vain" (p.97).

Since the context of world supplies, personages, and phenomena alike, with certain performative entities that explain the truth of moral and political illocutions, there must be a correspondence between the structures of the propositions and the right bits of fact with the same structures and constituents. Therefore, González (2018) assures that the propositions, which represent the contents of a belief, reflect mirror reality by corresponding to the right felicitous nature of the structured entities. On the other hand, in terms of pragmatics, Peterson et al. (2013) discuss three characteristics of belief, viz., true, meaningful, and probable, depending on four philosophical aspects: consistent, coherent, explanatory power, and implication. In 1975, Robert McNamara accordingly, assumed to have been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize before, wrote eloquently of Mother Teresa:

Many public personalities—government officials, diplomats, members of international communities, and others—advance the cause of peace, and deserve recognition. But I believe that Mother Teresa merits the unique honor of the Nobel Peace Prize because she advances peace in the most fundamental way possible: by her extraordinary reaffirmation of the inviolability of human dignity. She does so by serving the needs of the absolute poor—the poor who are so disadvantaged that they have nowhere else to turn. She serves them irrespective of their religion, their race, their nationality, or their political beliefs. She serves them simply because of their intrinsic worth as individual human beings. Her work is not sentimental. It is realistic and effective. And it is expanding. A growing number of others around the world—in an international ecumenical association, the Coworkers of Mother Teresa—are undertaking similar efforts under her inspiration. But more important than the organizational structure of her work is the message it conveys that genuine peace is not the mere absence of hostilities, but rather the tranquility that arises out of a social order in which individuals treat one another with justice and compassion (Slavicek, 2007, p.69).

The emphasis of the 1960s and the 1970s, according to Duranti and Goodwin (1992), is on formal structural definitions of the genre (viz., personage or phenomenon genre) and "on culturally established systems of classification discovered through the techniques of ethnoscience" (p.127). Since a personage, indeed, needs an addressee, the availability, as well as the orientation of an addressee, is typically something (viz., a process of performative interaction) in which participants (and recipients) actively achieve (with some psychological issues) and negotiate as an utterance unfolds. Thus, Peterson et al. (2013) affirm that this reality can be understood by unity or a plurality, personage or nonpersonal (viz., phenomenal).

4 The word "Sister" is as it is in its original source.

Third: It is a symptom of the performative 'concept-forming' influence of the word, as Leech (1981) embarks, that once derived, a new, political, moral, or any genre, word is "launched on a semantic course of development independent of the meaning of the elements which compose it" (p.32). In this way, we can see how the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King's words embody inventing verbal constituents outside the assortment of conceivable investigations:

"The pattern of [the martyrs'] feet as they walked through the Jim Crow barriers in the great stride toward freedom is the thunder of the marching men of Joshua. And the world rocks beneath their tread . . . The battle is in our hands!" (Miller, 2012, p.47).

The political revolution, which King does want, does not only strike the historian, as Le Bon (2013) essentially observes, and it does not, just, need to change the names of governments. Since the overthrows of the peoples' institutions is not re-shaped its soul, King, in terms of philosophy, believes in the great revolutions which embody, where they are happened, manners and thought, and transform the mentality of peoples. For persuasive purposes, on the other hand, Allan (1986) shows that explicit performatives express indirect illocutions, whether these performatives are interrogatives, imperatives, or declaratives if those personages are able to and intend to put those manifestations of the existential conflict on.

In particular, the use of a target tense, as Kempson (1977) essentially affirms, does not indicate a habitual repeated as a result of this action of consideration, but indicates a target time consideration, which explains the relation between the sentences in use and the linguistic acts which the target sentences are used to perform. In this course and after President John Kennedy's assassination on 22 November 1963, King's declared, in *Why We Can't Wait*, a symbolic and emotive speech, some of these are below-mentioned by Washington (1986):

we were all involved in the death of John Kennedy. We tolerated hate; we tolerated the sick stimulation of violence in all walks of life; and we tolerated the differential application of law, which said that a man 's life was sacred only if we agreed with his views. This may explain the cascading grief that flooded the country in late November. We mourned a man who had become the pride of the nation, but we grieved as well for ourselves because we knew we were sick. (p.518)

Thus, the interpretation between what cannot be talked of and, intelligibly, what can demonstrate to be what the personage has referred to since King's message of nonviolence morally sounded like the voice of a prophet at the shocking assassination time of the president. Therefore, Ogden and Richards (1923) clearly show that unless the recipient can distinguish, an image or sound, as well as utterances, from another, consciously or unconsciously, no use of target words is possible, i.e., accordingly, they divide the functions of language into symbolic and emotive groups.

Fourth: Otherwise, history is not entirely history, and it only justifies its inner mission if it accomplishes a suitable understanding of personage in his period. Particularly, Ortega Y Gasset (1960) has conditioned an understanding via components of that life which has no meaning and no rational structure. Therefore, history is assured to justify, whatever that may be, all periods, and it gives complete sense (viz., connotations and denotations) to each relative position that personage takes. The curiosity about the inconstant and changing which is happened across history can be seen in Hitler's philosophy of national salvation throughout religious politics, as in Gushee's (2013) sacredness of human life:

What we have to fight for is the necessary security for the existence and increase of our race and people, the subsistence of its children and the maintenance of our racial stock unmixed, the freedom and independence of the Fatherland; so that our people may be enabled to fulfill the mission assigned to it by the Creator. (p.346)

It is impossible to trifle with the most devastating and bloody events in the twentieth century of world history. At the outset, one of the major powers of that time is Nazi Germany. After he tried to copy Mussolini's example, during the next decade, Hitler built the political base of power. And by the name of the Nazi party, Hitler proclaims, as Langer (2002) opines, his political version of racial superiority. For these reasons, the actual racial Germans, who should rule the world, are said to be supermen, whilst, undesirables of others would become slaves of the super race. It seems to Frankfurt (1988) that discovering what we are is essentially a matter of (realising) what we must be. And it is, thereby, a personage, as an agent of the action, can have no identity unless he is bound to the will, whose shape coincides with and divulges what he is. To fulfill their symbolising functions, Bolinger (1975) assures that inborn capacities are not enough. Indeed, there has to be a power. Since all language systems of symbols are explained, according to the changing extendable needs, and the personages' conditions, by reference to it, which has been perceived by all societies and peoples, the meaning of a word or a symbol reflects the idea which arouses in the political philosophy of personage or recipient. Otherwise, the form of Hitler's linguistic message grammatically requires a question mark, but it has none. It is important to note, Jenny (1995) observes, that personages tend to use philosophical punctuation for the force of their pragmatic message rather than grammatical ones.

Fifth: The memorable events of history, as Le Bon (1896) mentioned, represent the visible effects of human thought, in which the inherited groundwork constitutes its (moral) reason. For dealing with social problems of minority politics, the importance of pragmatics, as Blommaert and Verschueren (1991) emphatically discuss, is a social scientific study. In this approach, the expected behaviour, of the personage, of face-to-face communication, at the performance of any political decision, is usually ignored, since, at the political debate, less attention is paid to the conceptual groundwork. Therefore, the auxiliary verb 'will' is intensely used by Dalai Lama, as he (1990) assures, to express a threat of moral obstacle:

It may happen that here in Tibet, religion and government will be attacked both from without and within. Unless we guard our own country, it will now happen that the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, the Father and the Son, and all the revered holders of the Faith, will disappear and become nameless. Monks and their monasteries will be destroyed. The rule of law will be weakened. The lands and property of government officials will be seized. They themselves will be forced to serve their enemies or wander the country like beggars. All beings will be sunk in great hardship and overwhelming fear; the days and nights will drag on slowly in suffering. (pp.33-4)

Since the words Dalai Lama, a simple phenomenological man, mean diversified things to different people, Blommaert and Verschueren (1991) add that choosing deep alternatives enables politicians or personages to accommodate a persuasive trend in the public context. Those politicians, also, have not abandoned their tolerant rhetoric, according to which the exilian population is here to stay. According to the quoted Dalai Lama words, Ayer (1963) describes a situation without absurdity, in which a personage could predict when, and where the fights would occur, and what their consequence would be. Indeed, as Ayer (ibid.) does, we should expect the personage, and his getting the general description of the situation right. Since the personage referred to the conflicts by name, Ayer thinks that Lama used language (accompanied by political games) strangely.

Sixth: Since language is so closely related to social identity, a personage's language change can be uneasy, as Schendl (2001) may potentially refer to it, and a ubiquitous attitude is to see it as a revolution for the worse. Written texts provide us the most critical documentation for historical events, as van Ree (2002) quotes, Joseph Vissarionovich, for example, has ideologically explained the pact, on 7 September, to, an important Bulgarian communist leader (who became a prime Minister of Bulgaria after the Second World War), as the latter has recorded:

"This war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries...for world domination! We have no problem with it when they fight each other well and weaken each other. It is not bad if the position of the wealthiest capitalist countries (especially England) will be undermined by Germany. Though he doesn't understand it himself and doesn't want it, Hitler is throwing the capitalist system into chaos, undermining it...We can manoeuvre, incite one side against the other, so that they would fight better. The pact of non-aggression helps Germany to a certain extent. The next moment we will incite the other side." (p. 225)

It is subsequently observed that the Soviet leader's careful tactics have expressed his gradual disappearance to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, told their leaders, van Ree (ibid.) mentions that:

"One should assist Greece if there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla movement." (p.251)

Schendl (2001) shows extensive shifts of meanings, which may often cloud the connotations between the original and modern meanings. Throughout the coexistable connotations, van Ree (2002) gives a stigmatized insight, of moral obligation, into Joseph Stalin's reasoning as "You must not be afraid of some kind of a "categorical imperative" of moral obligation...We go into battle not when the enemy wants us to, but when it's in our interests." (p.251). Amongst these is the fact that meanings have been classified, as Schendl (2001) remarks, the post-distinction relates to the extension and narrowing, with regard to personage evaluation, as positive (change), negative (change), or neutral (change), and such variables are correspondingly subject to change.

Seventh: In terms of persuasive argumentation, old outlines, Myhill (2003) shows, generally precede new outlines that have been based on pragmatic claims. For The wilderness years 1930-39, Churchill (2003) is cognitively realised:

During the last four or five years the world had grown gravely darker. ... We have steadily disarmed, partly with a sincere desire to give a lead to other countries, and partly through the severe financial pressure of the time. But a change must now be made. We must not continue longer on a course in which we alone are growing weaker while every other nation is growing stronger. (Churchill, 2003, p.145)

According to the laws of propositions, Vanderveken (1991) remarks that there are two cognitive reasons of why an assertion of the first proposition might not include the assertion of the second one, i.e., this occurs, for competent personages, whenever the second propositional content is not necessarily contained in the content of the first proposition, i.e., personages' propositional content is contingent and firmly achieved to fit the world to words. For Strawson (1952), sentences are differentiated from statements of personages according to the possibility of verification since, according to Macagno and Walton (2010), sentences have a meaning but don't have truth value and, therefore, cannot be verified. Thus, presupposition, as Strawson claimed, are conditions for the statement's verification, viz., those conditions, as a particular type of act, depending on the personage who performs it.

Eighth: While psychological, affective, social, and interpersonal aspects are influenced by the choices that personages adopt, the rules of pragmatic language tell them which forms are available (Thomas, 1995). However, ordinary personages use ordinary language, Austin (1961) assures, in everyday life. Using their sharpened cognizance of words to their cognition of the phenomena, personages should examine what they say, when, and which words they use in which situations. Since personages should look at the realities, they use words, to talk about, rather than mere words, whatever they may be; Vatanka (2021) quotes statements of the Iranian (or Khomeinists) Leader Khomeini while he was in exile in Paris, in 1978, as an instance in the following:

"With people's revolutionary rage, the king will be ousted and a democratic state, Islamic Republic will be established." (p.17)

Arnold (2006) mentions that a national State whose law is authoritative and sovereign, and its settled and firm course of public order, is essential if personage (of State) is to bring to precocity anything valuable and lasting now, or to establish anything precious and lasting for the future. For a State to be in a compellingly loyal way, Vatanka (2021) remarks an essential doctrinable coincidence of foreign policy of Khomeini, as a Leader in power in Tehran, with institutionalised processes, in 1979:

"Don't listen to those who speak of democracy. They are all against Islam. They want to take the nation away from its mission. We will break all the poison pens of those who speak of democracy, nationalism and such things." (p.17)

For Fillmore (2006), personages' words signify categorizations of experience. Each of these groups is underlain via a prime situation of a background experience and knowledge, since it is very often to define and understand the meaning of a word, by its frame or background, depending on the surrounding culture, of what the polemical world is like. Fillmore (ibid.) intrinsically states that words, utterance, context, and culture (of course, potentially involve politics and ethics) come into the status of performativity for the most human reason experiencedly and institutionally. Using these words in actual utterances is the best way, to understand the use of these sense-bearing elements, and to understand those categories (experiences and institutions) expressed by the words, since cultures or pragmatic languages may consequently differ with respect to the conduct in which words, texts, or contexts whose specific communicative goals can imply particular conventionalist forms.

Ninth: In 1945, the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union fell apart as soon as World War II ended. Because the coalition's proxy war dominated the scene via political maneuvering and propaganda, morals and human rights, economic aid, as well as, military unions, arms buildups, espionage, etc., John F. Kennedy, in his presidential campaign, adopted a Cold War rhetoric. Douglass (2008) states Kennedy's dialectical discourse on September 25, 1961 at the United Nations:

"The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us ... It is therefore our intention to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race-to advance together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament has been achieved." (p. xxii)

In dialectical reasoning, Kennedy discourses the political constellation of recipients, and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) analytically assure that his subject in question must start from acceptable premises. When the personage appeals to reason, the good logical sense, is shared by the community of peoples, is for persuadedness. To convince, Kennedy is based on the phenomenality of evidence, rather than argument, since, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (ibid.) inexplicitly assumes, the intended pragmatic meaning is more worthy if the ambiguity of the words has been premised, morally, as Einstein said, Douglass (2008) quotes, the atom's unleashed power has changed everything across our world except our manners of thinking, and thus unparalleled catastrophes will be our outcomes. Moreover, Schiebe (1979) shows that the time of the utterance relates to context presuppositionally firstly, and the existence of relevant information secondly, being uttered, fits in with the speech situation. Therefore, as evidence, the first supports the personage's claim, and the second, dependent on the first, must be fulfilled by the time (is taken for granted where the fact whose existence is required with appositive background).

Tenth: Beyond civil society, Lichterman and Cefaï (2006) discuss conventional signs by using Lakoff and Johnson's metaphors and abstract concepts, like personages, nexuses, positions, or phenomena, of a large society, in terms of war, which consists of large parts of political communication trying to win an argument and putting the other side, by not natural moves, on the defensive, via the deep cultural codes which structure the debates of politics. On July 2-7, 1991, Nelson Mandela was addressed, at the opening session; 2,361 delegates, agents, and guests from thirty-five countries, said:

"The ability to conduct struggle is gained in struggle. The ability to score victories is a function of experience that we gain in struggle. Experience also means mistakes and failures. It is by learning from these that we are able to struggle in a better way. Fear of mistakes and failures means only one thing. It means fear of engaging in struggle."
(Mandela and Clark, 1993, p.102)

Mandela's ideology, as shown by Mandela and Clark (1993), is based on the foreseeable future of constitutional principles, the establishment of South Africa's national government, and his noble purposes and legal and moral protection; this personage hopes that the international community support will be forthcoming. Therefore, Mandela has shown:

When we decided to take up arms, it was because the only other choice was to surrender and submit to slavery ... We were always ready, as we are now, to seize any genuine opportunity that might arise to secure the liberation of our people by peaceful means. We are ... conscious that the process could not be smooth since we are dealing with ... a culture of racism, violence, and domination. We are dealing with a group of politicians who do not want to negotiate ... out of power and representatives of the state who fear the impact of democratic change ... [We]⁵ must be (...) understood is that the struggle is not over, and negotiations themselves are a theater of struggle, subject to advances and reverses as any other form of struggle. (pp.102-3)

In such context, the utterance can often be considered the focus, according to Ward and Birner (2001), since it refers to the utterance that represents new information or updates the addressee's view of the presupposed information. Ward and Birner (ibid.) maintain what can be nationally realised by the focused constituent. As a part of the common ground, presupposed information represents the complement of focus that the personage assumes, either salient or inferable in the pragmatic context. On the other hand, Mandela's methodology or conduct reflects, in the discourse domains, everyday morality, which is mainly apparent to justify actions; Cook-Gumperz and Kyratzis (2001) opine, to recall past struggles and negotiations, and events, or to express positive opinions and secret ideas about others, since moral means or matters depend on awareness, of the limited opportunities, for actions, Cook-Gumperz and Kyratzis (ibid.) assure, that follow in response, to sequences of talk. Thus, as the last one of the selected influential personages, Mandela represented this study's pragmatic core.

Understanding essential pragmatic perspectives and their satisfying explanatory are as contentious attempts, and in this course, unique interpretations, have been applied. The crucial insight in this research is that communicability is a primary standard of linking signals to which politics and morals are willing to satisfy their usages in terms of pragmatic philosophy. Since the primary standards of any distinction, at the raise of an interpretative question, is required, Conison (1997) comes up with a personage's account for political or moral will focus, in the maximizing scope, on potential obligation, even non-voluntary one.

In this course, the political constellation in which the discourse took place, embracing the theoretical perlocutions that come to support the fundamental changes in question, are the reasons to follow the discourse carefully and recruit its logos in assaying the implicit concept politically. Since the argument does not only mean the expression of judgment on what is morally appropriate or not (viz., right or wrong), but it also intends to influence the policy of the government, it can be so-called political. In other words, as Raphael (1990) shows, philosophy is the subject of argument. It can only do little except clarify the moral ideas involved since political argument requires working out a multifaceted set of facts and ethical, economic, and psychological issues.

However, regardless of the policy, after the World War II decisions and fearful consequences on the traditional powers and ideologies, the matters that have remained (non-arbitrarily) undecided stand out more plainly. Those things, in the undecided area, which accordingly concern world government as a whole, are moving toward a historic decision that will once more be enforced into political and moral categories that are, in all regards, impoverished of possible consideration and reflection. Therefore, Heidegger (1968) has respectively recognized and may refer to the historical decisions that we know nothing about. Today's personage will look for these decisions to enable us to see how pragmatically logos of thought are used in actual world contexts. When the task of illustrating the intended conclusions from the awareness of this necessity, cannot be delimited, solely, to the authorities of government, but it is fundamentally embedded in the concepts, themselves, which enhance it as a matter of

⁵ Square bracket is added for emphasis.

general conviction. Accordingly, Hegel has shown, at a speculative thought, that what has been rigidly historically handed down to us, for the educational disciplines, socio-sciences, and awareness attitudes toward the domain of rights, by tradition, that, most entails profound appropriation and logical investigation since, as cited in Pippen and Höffe (2004), Hegel supposed, insofar as human consciousness is concerned, that the further actual development of the freedom, right, and humanity concepts are necessarily required in and for itself. Since opinions, beliefs, or judgments are closely molded thought on the recognition forms of quality in perception, recognition of a group in reflection, and recognition of a rival in the possibility of communication, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) have adopted Hegel's and Heidegger's thoughts, as they postulate history as a form of interiority to the personages, thus developed the concept or unveiled its destiny, since the unforeseeable constructions of concepts are nowadays poorly understood.

Because of the justifications and hermeneuticians in general, and of the philosophy of moral, political, and social, particularly, which have been pertained, not with categorising rules to the impact that definite ways of acting are always right, and others which are always wrong (nor yet with electing sets of things which are good, whereas sets of other things which are evil), Moore, (2005) observes, the difference of opinion, when we discussed more fundamental questions, is even more patent. In their extreme forms, Moore (ibid, p.16) has distinguished, that the relation of the positive concepts, like "right" or its alternatives like "ought to be done" is not on an equivalence with the other relation which occurs between the concepts which are negative like "wrong" or its alternatives like "ought not ..." since the two negative conceptions are coextensive in their perlocutions, whilst the other positive conceptions are not so. As well as, when, a parallel process happens in the philosophy of pragmatics (or practice) like moral, political, and social, Raphael (1990) affirms, stereotypes of these sorts are concerned with beliefs or principles, about what is good, right or beneficiary, for interpersonal and intergroup, as Crystal (2006) mentions, in all types of contexts. Therefore, by saying that an illocution is intrinsically good, it means, I think Moore (2005) potentially refers to the existence of the illocution in meaningful contextual possibilities that would be good without any effects or accompaniments whatsoever. It is clear that the illocutions cannot always be good or satisfiable even if they existed pretty alone; for instance, when we say that an illocution is satisfiable, we mean that (it is pragmatic) because of its effects, viz., its locution and perlocution.

From a pragma-linguistic point of view, Lyons (1977) recounts that the utterance is a symptom for the target receiver of what is in the cognitive sender's mind. Even though, some argue that, every utterance is interpretationally symptomatic of the internal state of the personage in a somewhat different sense, many symptoms are either conventionally or naturally motivated, whereas others are arbitrary. In its sense and its being, according to Bakhtin (1993) and Lyons (1977), the act conceptualistically defines the meaning of a word or other (meaningful) expression to be the communicative concept associated with it in the mind of the personage and addressee. However, the wide sense of the conceptualistic terms, the one to which the terms are applied in a more restricted sense by philosophers or pragmatists, may have psychological validity, constructed by the mind. Regarding the basic principles of politics and ethics, along with pragmatics, a referring expression is successfully employed in accordance with the rules of the language. This will enable the addressee in the context in which the effective reference is made, primarily, to pick out the actual performative referent from the class of the potential ones, since, as far as the expression is a definite one, the description manner, will depend on the assumption of the intentional personage, will determine the specific information about the referent, that decoding is in the addressee's possession. Nevertheless, it is necessarily to replace those senders' and receivers' hazy awareness of how language should logically be used in the less familiar situations by a more sensitive, controlled, and responsible reaction, since, as Schendl (2001) mentions, the personage constantly must adapt language to changing communicative desires in changing environment, and also have to appreciate the potential role of language, Crystal and Davy (1969) affirm, in a pragmatic manner, for constructing successful communication and establishing social management – ends which language may help its users to perform if they used well, which requires a honed consciousness of the language's form and function, as well as, its place in humane society, and its powerful in performative context, i.e., indeed, (intentional) words play an enormous role in our political and moral lives, and consequently deserving of the closest and deepest study since that words, Hayakawa (1977) reports, have power to mould personages' thinking, to guide their willing and political acting, and to canalise their conscious feeling. So, the conduct and character of the personages are principally determined by the words' performative nature that those agents use to discuss context-dependent and context-independent.

In much of the previous discussion, the most common use of power, Raphael (1990) mentions, is simply the ability to perform an illocution, which is derived from the verb "to be able." Because of this general meaning, the word power can be used for will-power, dynamo, political, or thought power. Depending on what Raphael (ibid.) has mentioned, we need to pervasively distinguish that when the power has a kind of ability to make recipients do what the personage wants them to do, different things, because that personage, like Mother Teresa, or Mahatma Gandhi, or Martin Luther King, or Dalai Lama, has the gift of the gab, moral thought, and a special charisma; or because, like Ruhollah Khomeini, or John Fitzgerald Kennedy, or Nelson Mandela, whose citizens or followers trust him for his integrity or wisdom; or because the personage has the strength, like Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, or Adolf Hitler, or Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill, to make consequences unpleasant for those whose actions unmeet or unwilling to do what the personage's wants, under the title of coercive power, which is so prominent in political contexts.

Exhilaratingly, Raphael (ibid.) distinguishes two kinds of right, a non-material thing, on the one hand, to which the other has an obligation to stipulate what the right-holder is designated to receive is the performative action's right. So, this right gives the personage an entitlement to receive obedience to her/his orders (or regulations which represent that the personage is being authorized), not just to issue them. On the other hand, a right to be undisturbed also represented a non-material thing, or interference, by others in performing what we (viz., a right of the personage to freedom from restraint like Gandhi, for example) are morally legalistic to do, viz., the right of felicitous recipience. When status, meanwhile, represents the position, a personage holds in the social (viz., moral or political) structure of a community or a pragmatic domain like a priest, a politician, an official, a president, a wife, or a husband, the roles, as Crystal (2006) logically mentions, are reflected the conventional modes of behaviour that environmental context expects a personage to adopt when holding a specific status. In a particular manner, actions of a particular class ought or ought not to be achieved. Moore's (2005) diagnosis is often entitled (amoral) law. So, in institutional settings, any given thing is regarded as part of the law if it has been willed by some personage or personages with influential authority over that context. Even though those personages could impact the change in the case of some (political or moral) laws, sometimes they could not influence it in the case of others. Therefore, moral rules, in the legal sense, are fundamentally dependent on the human will, and they are naturally also dependent on the will of some being.

To highlight some of the conspicuous aspects of the (conceptualistic) core pragmatics, we must decode some referential barriers to see what is meant. Throughout the following tips, some of the core heritage, as well as forthcoming issues:

- i- Back to exegetical philosophy that illustrates the core of beings as the complex illocution enunciates the theme of being conscious of our meaning or of our existence, to know that we are, or to ask meaningful questions about, beings, and illumines the cause which makes this pragmatic knowledge possible.
- ii- Throughout sharing the presuppositional idea, the preterite of the political illocution de-emphasizes precisely when the event took place and adverbialises the pragmatic time of thought via the moral or political action.
- iii- The obligatory center of the state of affairs, which displays which event happens, is a result of this context to explain the forthcoming deixes and essential aspects of force or perlocution (and for more tackle, we recommend about, with more focus, for the future studies).
- iv- Contrary to the abstracted conditions, the personage represents the proper agent of the action and evokes his/her philosophy, thoughts, and feelings, whether this personage is the addressor or the addressee who gives (or pronounces) the illocutionary order.
- v- Unlike Chen's (2024) view that each personage's social (moral or political) status is determined by his/her nature, the personage who adopts moral thoughts or philosophy can perform moral illocutions and delegatory politics.
- vi- For philosophers of pragmatics, interactional language (viz., discursal or spoken) is intentionally subordinated to ideational language. It is processed via the transference of grammatical and ideological characteristics to the mental.

Thought is hereby articulated internally in coded illocutions.

Despite all the periods and effort attempts that have been consecrated to the study of this paper's topics (viz., the themes of personages and phenomena in accordance with such conceptualistic notions as philosophy and thought), the core action (or illocutionary) hesitates to which parameters, either political or moral, under certain circumstances, better to justify in particular ways rather than in others felicitously. As illustrated by the abovementioned discussions, we have regarded a great diversity of justifications, which happen in the thought-word-thought occurrences at the doctrine of intentionality. The pivotal points in this study are the (conscious humane) personage (who is the agent of the action, either s/he is the sender or the receiver (or the utterer or the interpreter, according to Verschueren (1999))) and how to functionalise pragmatic entities or phenomena via their mental and linguistic behaviour, to trace, as a guided map, how those agents behave. Verschueren (1999) elaborates on the agents' illocution by their social roles; firstly, for them, he has conditioned, in most forms of face-to-face speech, their pragmatic roles (viz., personages) to switch repetitively between different real-world peoples; secondly, the agents' action may be at the role of his/her addressees, but vice-versa cannot, take on the role for his or her utterance, or interaction, at any stage after the moment of uttering while observing his or her (addressees) own linguistic conduct. Thirdly, the thoughts (or worlds) of the addressor and the addressee are not strictly separate; the addressee can be telescoped into the addressor, but not the other way around, since there constantly is or has been an addressor; therefore, the contextual aspects of the mental, social or moral, and physical worlds do not usually play a role in language until the language users' cognitive processes have somehow activated them.

Since moral standards principally arise from internalised contextual aspects, Tangney et al. (2007) show that Moral emotions, Culpeper (2011) cites, are important in understanding personages' behavioral adherence (or lack of adherence as well) to their moral standards. Following Pearce and Littlejohn (1997) and Culpeper (2011), we get that the understanding of morality refers to moral order. This moral parameter is pragmatically justified by a set of understandings, which can be carried from situation to situation, and this order, in its pragmatic function, reflects in a set of felicitous patterns to measure personal actions. It is powerful

in driving humane actions since; firstly, it is customarily implicit; secondly, by its guidance, it divides the world up into categories and establishes its scheme; thirdly, it delineates individual rights, roles, and responsibilities via a set of values which characterize the thoughts of people and the world of things. Throughout its logic of relations, it creates a sense of how the state of affairs works together and provides, as well, notions of how personages, as groups or as individuals, should act or re-act to the felicitous conditions of standards. This is true in every field, including politics, morals, pragmatics, science, and art. Ortega y Gasset (1960) has assured that:

Every idea is thought, every picture painted, out of certain assumptions or conventions which are so basic, so firmly fixed for the one who thought the idea or who painted the picture that he neither pays heed to them, nor introduces them into his picture or his idea; nor do we find them there in any guise except as pre-supposed and left at one side. This is why we sometimes fail to understand an idea or a picture; we lack the clue to the enigma, the key to the secret convention. (p.49)

Considering these nexuses, it is essential to remember that pragmatic phenomena are satisfied whenever they understand the nature of those illocutionary acts. Since the personage's perspective can be justified morally, mentally as well as verbally, the validity of the illustration, between the satisfaction values of the connotative meaning of illocutionary acts expressed, is due to a logical nexus of necessity, by their valid inferences, their premises, and by truth-conditional of their conclusions, as foreseeable de-coded intentions.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Publisher's Note: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers.

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