
| RESEARCH ARTICLE

Broker's Position in Patronage Bonds as a Form of the Middle Class in Farming Communities in Rural South Sulawesi

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| ABSTRACT

As an important element driving the creation of a shift in the pattern of patronage bonding relationships in the current era, the broker's contribution to this shift lies in its dual role, namely as an intermediary between patrons and clients in patronage ties. This role has become increasingly visible since rural areas have been opened up by various interests and activities of farmers in accommodating social change in rural areas. This study aims to analyze the existence of brokers in patron-client ties in rural South Sulawesi, as well as the existence of the middle class behind the existence of a broker in this bond. This study uses a case study approach. The data were obtained through elaboration of in-depth interviews, participant observation and documentation. The results of the study show that the intensity of brokerage activities in vertical and horizontal positions is a form of the middle class in rural areas. In a vertical position, the role is as a comprador or intermediary for the interests of patrons and clients in business activities and political activities, while in horizontal ties, it is present in the activities of personal alliances and reversible relationships that mediate the interests of patrons and clients. In its position as an intermediary on both sides, it seems that the role of the broker is no longer considered as an unofficial or pseudo group but has become a demand for the needs of the community because its presence is a real manifestation of the existence of differentiation and social mobility in the countryside.

| KEYWORDS

Brokerage position, patronage ties, middle class, farming community, rural South Sulawesi.

| ARTICLE INFORMATION

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1. Introduction

According to Powell (1970), the role of a broker in a patron-client relationship is to bridge the gap between patrons at the top level and clients at the bottom level. Therefore, according to Powell (1970), his position sometimes changes following the socio-economic development of society. Meanwhile, according to Scott (1972), the role of an intermediary cannot be separated from the purpose of the patron-client bond itself because of its presence as an "anchor" of the interests of the patron and client in the patronage bond. Therefore, Scott places one of the *elements of exchange* in vertical solidarity as a special role; namely, a patron must be able to become a *brokerage* and influence clients and their families as well as rural communities. According to Boissevain (1969), the role of a broker is not much different from the role of patron and client in a patronage bond; sometimes, these two parties even play the role of the broker, and according to Paine (1971), that, sometimes these three parties are difficult to distinguish their roles.

As for distinguishing the roles of patron, broker, and client in the patron-client bond, according to Paine (1971), the formula is the position of the patron, and the position of the client is differentiated by the inequality of their respective resources, the position of the patron and the position of the broker is distinguished by the distribution of resources (the patron of the resource provider

and the broker as the distributor), while the broker's position with the client is differentiated by the consumption value of the resource (the broker distributes resources that are not his and the client receives these resources). Meanwhile, according to Legg (1983), the different roles of these three parties in the patron-client bond are that the position of the broker is determined by the role and not the person, while the position of the patron is determined by the high status, and the position of the client is determined by the lower status.

In the theory of dependency, the description of the broker above is identical to the view of Paul Baran (1970), namely on the position of the *comprador* people or nations who become trade intermediaries between capitalists and underdeveloped countries. According to Baran (1970), compradors also consist of two types, namely *compradors* at the elite level and lower-class compradors. *Compradors* at the elite level are people who are excluded from the upper structure of their society but have equal resources with the elitists (especially the economy) and are intense in social mobility with the elitists to achieve another level of equality. Meanwhile, the lower class *compradors* are people who are excluded from the lower class of their society and who are trying to rise to the middle class through the mobility of jobs that are different from their society (such as brokers, loan sharks, traders, and other service workers). In this study, the *comprador* concept will be compared with other broker concepts.

In studies of rural communities in Indonesia, the role of brokers tends to be sidelined as one of the elements in the process of social stratification, and their role sometimes becomes *stereotyped* in the reality of farmer life (such as being moneylenders, credit workers, loan sharks, and opportunist brokers). Whereas according to Boissevain (1969), Paine (1971), and Legg (1983), their jobs are challenging and require separate knowledge to carry them out; on the other hand, their existence not only exists in rural communities but most rural communities.

This phenomenon is consistent with the findings of Asraf (1989), Haerani (1996), and Parakkasi (1992) in explaining the position of patron-client ties and agricultural modernization in three regions. According to the findings of Asraf (1989) and Haerani (1996), the existence of a broker in his research area is described as a party related to this *stereotype*. While the findings of Parakkasi (1992) describe it as a party that contributes to the success of agribusiness in Sidrap, where a patron sometimes becomes a broker for other patrons and their clients in dealings with outsiders (institutions or officials) or becomes a broker by outsiders who wants to expand its business in this region. Parakkasi's description is in line with the theory of Boissevain (1969) and Paine (1971) that what is typical of the role of this broker is that it plays a dual role in the patron-client bond; besides being a middleman they also sometimes play three different roles in patronage (*as patrons, clients, and go-betweens*), even under certain conditions he can play a role in three positions at once in the patronage bond. In other studies, its position is also considered a trigger for social mobility in various communities. Salman's findings (2002) stated that the presence of brokers (played by Chinese businessmen) was able to dynamize the industrialization of services in Bulukumba. Another finding by Sunyoto (2004) stated that patrons in Situbondo, on the one hand, became brokers of wealthy Chinese citizens for bureaucratic affairs and social matters and from this relationship, patrons and their clients were involved in various businesses of these Chinese citizens.

As for the role of the broker in vertical bonding and horizontal bonding, according to Boissevain (1969) and Paine (1971), the two things have different orientations. According to Boissevain (1969) and Scott (1972), the role of a broker in a vertical bond tends to be played by patrons in the process of reversible relationships or, according to Scott, as a manifestation of the role of a patron, which is brokerage and influence in nature. In a reversible relationship orientation, the broker's role is to become a connection between the interests of fellow patrons and clients with outsiders, as well as being a facilitator for the interests of outsiders in their area. Even so, the brokerage position he plays is for the sake of the perpetuation of his patron position in the vertical ties. The findings of Hendrikson (1971) in North America stated that patrons in the area would survive in their positions if they were able to become brokers of their clients for bureaucratic and trade matters; on the other hand, they became clients for these parties (bureaucrats and businessmen) who have business in their territory.

Meanwhile, in horizontal bonding, according to Paine (1971) and Legg (1983), the brokerage position tends to be played by clients who carry out social mobility in the process of personal alliances. The role played in this process is generally as an entrepreneur both in trading activities and in other service business activities. Syamsuddin's findings (1990) state that client farmers in Maros have a double profession in their daily lives, namely being land brokers, credit brokers, and distributors of farm laborers; from this double job, they generally switch status to become patrons in small groups. From various descriptions, it is concluded that the role of a broker in a patron-client bond has two different characters in the two ties. In vertical ties, he is played by patrons for the sake of *reversible relationships* or *comprador elites* to strengthen his position. Whereas in a horizontal bond, he is played by the client, where the position of the broker he plays represents the socio-economic conditions of the community or the lower class comparator, whose presence aims to create a process of social mobility or to create a shift in position in the patron-client bond.

2. Research Method

This study used qualitative methods and a case study approach to uncover the presence of brokers in patronage ties in rural South Sulawesi. The reason for using this approach is that the researcher describes more deeply and concretely the process of formation and intensity of brokers in patronage ties in the modernization era in rural South Sulawesi. This type of phenomenological research is used to reveal sociocultural meanings by studying lifestyles and interactions between certain socio-cultural groups (*culture-sharing groups*) in a specific space or context (Spradley 1980; Sugiyono 2010). The data collection technique used is in the form of in-depth interviews, observation, and documentation. Furthermore, this analysis activity is carried out using the method of data categorization and data interpretation. The research was carried out for 6 months (from January to July 2019), and the research sample used was a purposive sampling model with the research objects being in Sidrap Regency and Jeneponto Regency, which represent the Bugis and Makassar tribes in South Sulawesi Province.

3. Conceptual Framework

The role of the broker in the patron-client relationship, according to Powell (1970:) is to bridge the gap between the patrons at the top level and the clients at the bottom level. Therefore, according to Powell (1970), his position sometimes changes following the socio-economic development of society. Meanwhile, according to Scott (1972), the role of an intermediary cannot be separated from the purpose of the patron-client bond itself because of its presence as an "*anchor*" of the interests of the patron and client in the patronage bond. Therefore, Scott places one of the elements of exchange in vertical solidarity as a special role; namely, a patron must be able to become a *brokerage* and influence clients and their families as well as rural communities.

Boissevain (1969) and Paine (1971) were the first anthropologists to study the role of brokers in patron-client bonds. According to Boissevain (1969), the role of a broker is not much different from the role of patron and client in a patronage bond; sometimes, these two parties even play the role of the broker. According to Paine (1971), sometimes, these three parties find it difficult to distinguish their roles. As for distinguishing the roles of patron, broker, and client in the patron-client bond, according to Paine (1971, the formula is patron positions and client positions are differentiated by the inequality of their respective resources, patron positions and broker positions are differentiated by the distribution of resources (patron of the resource provider and the broker as the distributor), while the broker's position with the client is differentiated by the value of resource consumption (the broker distributes resources that are not his and the client receives these resources). Meanwhile, according to Legg (1983) that, the differences in the roles of these three parties in a patron-client bond are the position of the broker is determined by the role and not by the person, while the position of the patron is determined by the high status, and the position of the client is determined by the lower status.

In the theory of dependency, the description of the broker above is identical to the view of Paul Baran (1970), namely about the position of the comprador people or nations who become trade intermediaries between capitalists and underdeveloped countries. According to Baran (1970), compradors also consist of two types, namely *compradors* at the elite level and lower-class *compradors*. Compradors at the elite level are people who are excluded from the upper structure of their society but have equal resources with the elitists (especially the economy) and are intense in social mobility with the elitists to achieve another level of equality. Meanwhile, the lower class *compradors* are people who are excluded from the lower class of their society and who are trying to rise to the middle class through the mobility of jobs that are different from their society (such as brokers, moneylenders, traders, and other service workers). In this study, the comprador concept will be compared with other broker concepts.

In studies of rural communities in Indonesia, the role of brokers tends to be sidelined as one of the elements in the process of social stratification. In fact, their role sometimes becomes *stereotyped* in the reality of farmer life (such as being moneylenders, credit workers, loan sharks, and opportunist brokers). Whereas according to Boissevain (1969), Paine (1971:2-5), and Legg (1983:35), their jobs are challenging and require separate knowledge in carrying them out, on the other hand, their existence does not only exist in rural communities but even in the most modern society.

This phenomenon is consistent with the findings of Asraf (1989), Haerani (1996), and Parakkasi (1992) in explaining the position of patron-client ties and agricultural modernization in three regions. According to the findings of Asraf (1989) and Haerani (1996), the existence of a broker in his research area is described as a party related to this *stereotype*. While the findings of Parakkasi (1992) describe it as a party that contributes to the success of agribusiness in Wonomulyo, where a patron sometimes becomes a broker for other patrons and their clients in dealings with outsiders (institutions or officials) or becomes a broker by outsiders who wants to expand its business in this region. Parakkasi's description is in line with the theory of Boissevain (1969) and Paine (1971) that what is typical of the role of this broker is that it plays a dual role in the patron-client bond; besides being a middleman they also sometimes play three different roles in patronage (*as patrons, clients, and go-betweens*), even under certain conditions he can play a role in three positions at once in the patronage bond.

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Another finding by Sunyoto (2004) stated that patrons in Situbondo, on the one hand, became brokers of wealthy Chinese citizens for bureaucratic matters and social matters and from this relationship, patrons and their clients were involved in various businesses of these Chinese citizens.

As for the role of the broker in vertical bonding and horizontal bonding, according to Boissevain (1969) and Paine (1971), the two things have different orientations. According to Boissevain (1969) and Scott (1972), the role of a broker in a vertical bond tends to be played by patrons in the process of reversible relationships or, according to Scott, as a manifestation of the role of a patron, which is brokerage and influence. In a reversible relationship orientation, the roles of a broker are to become a connection between the interests of fellow patrons and clients with outsiders, as well as being a facilitator for the interests of outsiders in their area. Even so, the brokerage position he plays is for the sake of the perpetuation of his patron position in the vertical ties. Hendrikson's findings (1971:22-33) in North America stated that patrons in the area would survive in their position if he was able to become a broker for his clients for bureaucratic and trade matters; on the other hand, he became a client for these parties. (bureaucrats and entrepreneurs) who have affairs in their territory.

Meanwhile, in horizontal bonding, according to Paine (1971) and Legg (1983), the brokerage position tends to be played by clients who carry out social mobility in the process of personal alliances. The role played in this process is generally as *an entrepreneur* both in trading activities and in other service business activities. Syamsuddin's findings (1990: 102) state that client farmers in Maros have a double profession in their daily lives, namely being land brokers, credit unions, and distributors of farm laborers; from this double job, they generally switch status to become patrons in small groups.

4. Result

For the people of Amparita, Latang is a broker who intermediaries important people in Amparita for various matters in government and banking institutions. As a broker who is becoming widely known among people in his community (Tolotang people), he is relatively new to the intermediary business. This is because, in the past, it was played by immigrant Bugis people who became brokers for local people to get involved in various green revolution projects. However, after the agricultural project stalled, its position was taken over by local native people (who came from the Tolotang ethnicity) with a different version. The emergence of Latang, who differentiated his role from patron to broker, was motivated by a shift in their attitude towards the importance of formal education and employment as modern status symbols. This shift affected the mobility of formal jobs in Amparita, which began to appear to be filled by local people. This shift correlates with the expansion of the roles of brokers who come from "insiders" plus the various ins and outs of the public interest that he controls, to be exchanged for other patrons who are not proficient in this field.

For the people of Amparita, Pak Latang is an example of a broker they know as a Tolotang native who exists as an intermediary and a government employee as well as a patron with several pajjama people in agricultural and non-agricultural businesses. The direction of differentiation of Latang's role revolves around dealings with bureaucrats and banking circles. Becoming a broker for bureaucratic matters, generally dealing with land certificate matters, tax matters, matters of completing credit at banks, and matters of establishing business entities. Meanwhile, being a broker with bankers is generally about taking credit, extending credit, and dealing with credit arrears. The extent of Latang's working area made him well-known to the regency and province so that sometimes he became a broker of reversible relationships for back-and-forth affairs, that is, sometimes a broker for Amparita people and sometimes also for outsiders with an interest in Amparita. As a broker as well as a patron, Latang's residence is also sometimes a place to stay for guests from outside Amparita because they have work interests in this area for a few days.

In the theory of patron-client ties, the differentiation of Latang's brokerage role is synonymous with Boissevain's (1969) outline of reversible relationships or broker-like connections in various public affairs and Scott's (1972) outline of brokerage and influence or dual roles of brokers. However, this does not include brokers such as Baran's (1970) outline of compradors at the elite level because, in this type, a broker must have caliber capabilities that directly play with the big elite and control all resource flows. Thus, Latang may be included in the small-scale comprador if it must be related to this Baran theory.

The intensity of the broker as comprador is found in Ridwan, as a broker who is now an intermediary for other patrons or elitists for matters of political interest. Like Latang, Ridwan is also a patron (having dozens of clients in aquaculture) and also a middle-class government employee at the local government. Before becoming a political broker in the last election, residents knew Ridwan as an intermediary for recruitment matters in government offices (both in his area and other regions), an intermediary for promotions and echelon matters for civil servants, and in official education. For political brokers in the recent elections, Ridwan's way of working was to claim certain areas as areas where he could control the votes of his voters through a family approach and personal capabilities, then offered them to candidates and political parties to barter with money or other valuables. Thus, the differentiation of its brokerage role is currently in the political sector.

As a political broker, Ridwan's extended family background supports his new career. Although he is not from the local community

(claiming to be from Bantaeng Regency), his father-in-law is a community figure and comes from the respected Karaengs, and he is a former youth leader in this area who interacted a lot with organizations and political parties in the New Order era. Against this background, several areas in Bontorannu and areas outside Bontorannu were claimed as the political territory of the extended family or under his personal control, even though he and his extended family did not become party administrators or stand as candidates for the legislature (because they were civil servants) in the election. To carry out his political brokerage activities, he also cooperates with local elitists or Karaengs (claimed territories) to collect the votes of voters (which also consist of vertical clients) to choose the party and candidate appointed by Ridwan. As for the results of political brokerage in the last election, according to him, only 2 people (out of 4 people) passed to become members of the district legislature, and the material rewards were good enough to increase family finances for the future.

In the theory of the patron-client bond, the differentiation of Ridwan's brokerage role as a political intermediary is identical to Legg's (1983) and Hendrikson's (1971) outline of the existence of a broker's position as an intermediary for voters' voices in the world of politics. According to Legg (1983), in a more modern country, the position of a broker for political interests is clearer in existence than in socio-cultural life because his role is equal to party officials in placing someone as a member of parliament, even though the barter system uses money and materials. other. Meanwhile, according to Hendrikson (1971), the role of brokers as intermediaries in the world of politics also prioritizes the exchange of a wider network of work, where the network that has been achieved becomes a new opportunity to widen the world of further brokerage. Referring to this theory, it can be predicted that the opportunity for political brokers to be present to color the dynamics of the development of patron-client ties in the political field in the future tends to increase in existence.

The extent to which the existence of a broker as a patron in this vertical bond can be linked to the phenomenon of the ups and downs of three problems of social inequality in three areas (poverty, unemployment and conflict) behind the three cases. For Latang's brokers in Amparita, being an intermediary for bureaucratic affairs and banking services for patrons and elitists, of course, only widens the internal problems experienced by the Amparita community. In another section, it states that the widening inequality of resource ownership between the "Uwe" (patron) and "Paruwe" (client) groups is due to the widening gap in obtaining employment and education in Amparita. This indicates that the direction of Latang's brokerage in the two institutions only serves the upper class of society who are in the minority and are well-off in life; on the other hand, the brokerage does not touch the lower class whose numbers dominate the population and are in dire need of handling in the employment and education sectors. This indicates that Brokerage Latang is correlated with the widening of 3 conditions of social inequality in Amparita.

In the theory of patron-client ties, the presence of brokers as intermediaries in the world of bureaucracy, according to Legg (1983), should help all groups of people (especially their clients) to facilitate their affairs in the government and private bureaucracy because the world of bureaucracy itself (especially in the regions) is brokers from larger brokers in terms of public service, but different from brokers in patron-client ties, because they work with a clear system and for the wider community. This view suggests that the spread of three problems of social inequality in this region behind the Latang brokerage is because the brokerage takes the form of a broker within a broker; this form is oriented only for the sake of self-enrichment and legalizes all means (mainly corruption, collusion and nepotism) by utilizing state facilities and one's position.

Meanwhile, Ridwan's brokerage, which mediates election wins for patrons and the political elite, is not much different from the Latang brokerage pattern, which correlates with the widening of 3 conditions of social inequality in Bontorannu. In sub-chapter 4.2.1, it also appears that the imbalance in resource ownership (especially power) between the "Karaeng" (patron) and "To Samara" (client) groups are due to the widening gap in obtaining jobs and education in Bontorannu. For most of the people who live in poverty and underdevelopment, Ridwan's brokerage is heavily colored by practices of deceiving or exploiting this group for his gain. In addition, citizens who do not understand the specific advantages behind the ins and outs of the world of politics become an easy commodity of interest for political brokers to enrich themselves and add to illegal practices in the world of politics.

Because of the theory of the patron-client bond, the presence of a broker as an intermediary in the world of politics, according to Legg (1983), the presence of a broker in countries where the political rules are very strict, a broker is only an intermediary in terms of party political interests and the political will of the electorate, without involving individuals (candidates). The bargaining offered by brokers to political parties is the political concept of the electorate, while the bargaining desired by parties is the votes of voters. These two forms of bargaining position are regulated transparently and legally, along with the consequences for benefits for both parties (where the broker gets the material and the party gets the power). Referring to this view, it can be concluded that Ridwan's brokerage is not following the proper pattern, and this discrepancy is an illustration of the weakness of the political system itself in accommodating various ongoing social changes.

From the various descriptions above, it can be stated that, as one of the factors that place the role of the broker as an intermediary related to the shift in the pattern of patronage ties, the existence of a dual role of patron (as a patron as well as a broker) in vertical ties, takes place in 3 aspects of activity, namely as intermediaries for patrons and elitists for bureaucratic and banking affairs, as intermediaries for patrons and elitists for matters of winning elections (politics), and as intermediaries for large patrons for business matters. These three intermediary roles appear to be correlated with the ebb and flow of the three conditions of social inequality

in rural areas, where in two areas, it appears that these three conditions are increasing behind one's brokerage, while in Amparita, it appears that these three conditions can be suppressed by one's brokerage role.

5. Conclusion

So far, the presence of the middle class in agricultural communities has been neglected, even though its role is so large in the dynamics of socio-economic change in rural areas. Based on this understanding, researchers have revealed that the role of brokers as intermediaries is related to shifting patterns of patronage ties, clarifying their presence as a middle class in the social structure of agricultural communities in rural South Sulawesi. As a middle class, researchers found that the role of brokers in vertical ties is as a reversible relationship or as an intermediary for patrons in business interests and bureaucratic matters. Meanwhile, in horizontal ties, they become intermediaries for patrons for political interests and trade expansion or the role of brokerage and influence in rural areas. From these findings, the research contribution is to clarify the findings of Scott (1972) and Boissevain (1969) that the intensity of modernization in rural areas will encourage the formation of new strata in agricultural society, in this case, the formation of broker communities. It was also stated that the findings regarding the existence of brokers as a new middle class in the agricultural community were still macro because they were only studied from the perspective of social change, so details regarding their existence were needed. Thus, the study requires further, more specific and in-depth study of its existence in the economic, political and cultural sectors in rural South Sulawesi.

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